Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 31
Number 3 Summer

Article 11

January 2003

Vol. 31, no. 3: Full Issue
Denver Journal International Law & Policy

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
31 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y (2003).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLICY

VOLUME 31
2002-2003

Denver Journal
of International Law and Policy

~

VOLUME 31

NUMBER 3

Summer-2003

ARTICLES
RESOLVING SOVEREIGNTY-BASED CONFLICTS:
THE EMERGING APPROACH OF EARNED

Paul R. Williams 349
Michael P. Scharf

SOVEREIGNTY .........................

James R. Hooper
EARNED SOVEREIGNTY: THE POLITICAL
DIMENSION .............................

James R. Hooper 355
Paul R. Williams

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY:

JURIDICAL

Michael P. Scharf 373

UNDERPINNINGS .......................

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY:

THE ROAD TO

RESOLVING THE CONFLICT OVER

Kosovo's

Paul R. Williams 387

FINAL STATUS ...............

MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND TERRORISM ......

David Stoelting 427

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKING ......

Daniel H. Joyner 437

DEVELOPMENTS AND LIMITS IN

Peter Kovacs

461

Matthew D. Moneyhon

491

Don C. Smith

521

INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE .............

CHINA'S GREAT WESTERN DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT IN XINJIANG:

ECONOMIC

PALLIATIVE, OR POLITICAL
TROJAN HORSE? . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

BOOK REVIEW
WTO

AND THE ENVIRONMENT ..................

RESOLVING SOVEREIGNTY-BASED CONFLICTS:
THE EMERGING APPROACH OF EARNED
SOVEREIGNTY
PAUL R. WILLIAMS
MICHAEL P. SCHARF
JAMES R. HOOPER
Today there are nearly fifty sovereignty-based conflicts throughout the world.
Nearly all of these conflicts entail a high degree of violence with state security
forces engaged in active combat or aggressive policing operations against armed
rebel forces.' In many instances the rebel forces have resorted to terrorism. In
fact, at least a third of the Specially Designated Global Terrorists listed by the
United States Treasury Department are associated with sovereignty-based
conflicts. 2 In addition, a number of non-violent sovereignty-based conflicts
undermine regional stability and prospects for political and economic
development.
Until recently, most efforts to resolve sovereignty-based conflicts have
faltered due to the limited legal and political tools available to policy makers. The
two most applicable principles, sovereignty and self-determination have been
reduced to little more than legal and political shields behind which states and substate entities justify their actions.
While these two basic principles of international law may sometimes be
reconciled to create a lasting settlement of a sovereignty-based conflict, more
frequently they are a recipe for political gridlock and violence.
Given that the international community of nations is structured around the
principle of sovereignty, any effort to dilute the principle or to expand the notion
of self-determination to more readily facilitate the secessionist ambitions of
numerous minority or ethnic groups will have serious consequences. The fear that
too loose a re-definition of sovereignty might lead to a spiraling of selfdetermination claims and calls for independence is genuine. So to is the fear that
the global community will become populated with unstable mini-states which
1. Countries involved in violent sovereignty-based conflicts include for example India, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Russia, Spain, Macedonia, Sudan, the United Kingdom, Israel, Indonesia, Papua New
Guinea, France, Turkey, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, and China.
2. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Cumulative List ofRecent OFAC Actions 2002, availableat
http ://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/2002cum. html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
3. Countries involved in non-violent, but nevertheless destabilizing sovereignty-based conflicts
include Montenegro, Canada, Bosnia, and Cameroon.
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breed yet more conflict ridden mini-states.
Different, yet equally destabilizing consequences arise from the hierarchical
relationship between sovereignty and self-determination. Given that under the
prevailing conceptualization of sovereignty a state is generally entitled to near
absolute discretion to deal with self-determination movements, many states freely
opt for the aggressive use of force. The over-reliance on the use of force is
inherently destabilizing and tends to radicalize self-determination movements,
which then often turn to terrorism. Even in instances where states embark upon
campaigns of attempted genocide, as in the case of the Serbian campaign against
Kosovo Albanians, the principle of sovereignty prohibits international intervention,
leading to surreal situations such as where the NATO humanitarian intervention
designed to stop the atrocities was dubbed "illegal" but "legitimate."
All too frequently the mantra of sovereignty is used by states to shield
themselves from international action to prevent them from violating human rights
and committing atrocities in their attempts to stifle self-determination movements,
as in the case of the Iraqi Anfal campaigns against the Kurds, the Turkish
suppression of Kurdish human rights, the Russian campaign in Chechnya, the
targeting of Christians in Southern Sudan, and Indonesia's brutal occupation of
East Timor and its recent campaign in Aceh.
Recent state practice, however, has evidenced a growing creativity among
states and policy makers which has led to the emergence of a more elastic
approach to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. The new approach, the seeds of
which can be found in a number of recent peace proposals and peace agreements,
can be termed "earned sovereignty." 4
As developed in recent state practice, the approach of earned sovereignty is
designed to create an opportunity for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts by
providing for the managed devolution of sovereign authority and functions from a
state to a sub-state entity. The authority and functions may include the power to
collect taxes, control the development of natural resources, conduct local policing
operations, maintain a local army or defense force, enter into international treaties
on certain matters, maintain representative offices abroad, and participate in some
form in international bodies. In some instances the sub-state entity may acquire
sufficient sovereign authority and functions which will then' enable it to seek
international recognition, while in others the sub-state entity may only acquire
sufficient authority and functions to enable it to operate within a stable system of
internal autonomy.
The instances of recent state practice evidencing the development of this new
approach include the following:
The Israeli/Palestinian conflict: where the Road Map for Peace provides for
the continued devolution of specific sovereign authorities and functions to the

4. As an emerging concept, the approach of earned sovereignty has been referred to by many
names, including intermediate sovereignty, provisional statehood, conditional recognition, and earned
recognition.
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Palestinian Authority, such as the right to maintain independent security forces and
to operate an international airport so long as it meets certain conditions, such as
preventing terrorist attacks against Israel, removing Chairman Arafat from
effective control over the Palestinian Authority, and implementing the rule of law.
The Road Map then envisions eventual statehood for Palestine if it fulfills the
conditions and if it demonstrates itself capable of effectively exercising its
acquired sovereign authority and functions.
The Northern Ireland conflict: where the Good Friday Accord provides for the
creation of Northern Ireland institutions, and the devolution of substantial power to
those institutions so long as the IRA fulfills its obligation to decommission
weapons. The Accords also provide that the people of Northern Ireland are
entitled to a referendum on unification with Ireland within seven years.
The Sudan conflict: where the Machakos Protocol provides for the substantial
devolution of central government authorities, and the opportunity for Southern
Sudan to hold a referendum within six years on the question of secession from
Sudan.
The Western Sahara conflict: where the UN sponsored Baker Peace Plan
provides for the UN assisted creation of a Western Sahara government and the
devolution of numerous sovereign authorities and functions to that government.
The Plan then provides for a referendum on self-determination to determine the
final status of Western Sahara within five years.
The Kosovo conflict: where UN Security Council Resolution 1244 provides
for the near total displacement of Yugoslav sovereignty from Kosovo and its
replacement with interim UN and NATO sovereign responsibilities, the creation of
local institutions of self-government, the creation of a process for determining
Kosovo's final status, and the eventual transfer of authority from the UN
administering institutions to the institutions to be established under a political
settlement.
The Bosnia conflict: where the Dayton Accords provided that many of the
sovereign authorities and functions of the independent state of Bosnia would be
managed by an internationally appointed High Representative for an indeterminate
period. The Accords also provided for the deployment of international military
forces to maintain internal security. While conditionality is not explicit, the pattern
of practice in Bosnia indicates that the international civilian authority will be
discontinued only upon such a time as Bosnia can adequately function as an
independent state.
The East Timor conflict: where after a referendum rejecting continued
association with Indonesia, the United Nations managed a two and a half year
transition process during which time East Timor was able to construct the
institutions necessary for independent self-government.
The Serbia/Montenegro dispute: where the new constitution transforming the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the Union of Serbia and Montenegro provides
for the devolution of nearly all the sovereign authority and functions to the two
member states. The remaining authority and functions are jointly managed by
representatives of the member states. At the end of a three year period, the
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member states are entitled to hold a referendum on independence.
The growing willingness of states and sub-state entities to consider a process
of earned sovereignty for resolving self-determination disputes is matched by the
increasing ability of the international community to aid states in institution
building and to help manage the transfer of sovereign powers and authority. The
OSCE for instance now possesses significant experience in monitoring and
conducting elections, while the European Union is experienced with the creation of
new state institutions, and the United Nations with the creation of mechanisms to
ensure the protection of human and minority rights, and implementation of the rule
of law.
In light of recent state practice, the emerging conflict resolution approach of
earned sovereignty may be characterized as encompassing six elements - three
core elements and three optional elements.
The first core element is shared sovereignty. In each case of earned
sovereignty the state and sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign authority
and functions over a defined territory. In some instances, international institutions
may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in addition to or in lieu of the
parent state. In rare cases, the international community may exercise shared
sovereignty with an internationally recognized state. In almost all instances an
international institution is responsible for monitoring the parties exercise of their
authority and functions.
The second core element is institution building. This element is utilized
during the period of shared sovereignty prior to the determination of final status.
Here the sub-state entity, frequently with the assistance of the international
community, undertakes to construct institutions for self-government and to build
institutions capable of exercising increasing sovereign authority and functions.
The third core element is the eventual determination of the final status of the
sub-state entity and its relationship to the state. In many instances the status will
be determined by a referendum, while in others it may involve a negotiated
settlement between the state and sub-state entity, often with international
mediation. Invariably the determination of final status for the sub-state entity
involves the consent of the international community in the form of international
recognition.
The first optional element is phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty entails
the accumulation by the sub-state entity of increasing sovereign authority and
functions over a specified period of time prior to the determination of final status.
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty. Conditionality may
be applied to the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and functions by
the sub-state entity, or it may be applied to the determination of the sub-state
entity's final status. In either case the sub-state entity is required to meet certain
benchmarks before it may acquire increased. These benchmarks may include
conditions such as protecting human and minority rights, developing democratic
institutions, instituting the rule of law, and promoting regional stability. While the
relationship between the attainment of certain benchmarks and the devolution of
authority, or recognition as an independent state may be formally expressed, there
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may often be an informal relationship.
The third optional element, constrained sovereignty, involves continued
limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, such as
continued international administrative and/or military presence, and limits on the
right of the state to undertake territorial association with other states.
In almost all instances the state and sub-state entities adopt the elements of
earned sovereignty by mutual agreement, but in some instances the international
community may support or initiate one or more of the elements of earned
sovereignty against the interests of the state or sub-state entity.
To better understand the potential utility of the emerging conflict resolution
approach of earned sovereignty, the Public International Law & Policy Group has
undertaken a Carnegie Corporation of New York supported project to map the
development of the approach and to identify ways in which the approach may be
better used to promote the resolution of sovereignty-based conflicts. The three
articles which follow this introductory note are part of the initial phase of the
project and are produced in cooperation with the Denver University Law School.
The ideas expressed in the articles were refined during a day long roundtable held
at the University.
The purpose of the first article is to provide a detailed definition of earned
sovereignty, and its sub-components, as well as to track the development of the
doctrine through recent state practice. The second article sets forth the legal basis
for the doctrine, and the third article tracks international efforts to employ the
doctrine as a basis for structuring a long term resolution of the Kosovo conflict.
In addition to initiating a scholarly debate as to the development and utility of
the approach of earned sovereignty, the Public International Law & Policy Group
is also sponsoring a series of roundtable discussions with former peace negotiators
in order to better understand the political bargaining process which results in the
use of an earned sovereignty approach, and will be running a series of diplomacy
gaming scenarios to test the applicability of the concept to as yet unresolved
sovereignty-based conflicts.
It is important to conclude with a reminder the purpose of the project is not to
argue that the approach of earned sovereignty has evolved into a customary
international legal principle, or that it is a one-size fits all solution to sovereigntybased conflicts. The focus of the following articles, and the project as a whole is to
help state and sub-state entities involved in sovereignty-based conflicts, as well as
future peace negotiators to identify an emerging approach which may be well
suited to assist them in the resolution of their particular conflict.

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY:
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
JAMES R. HOOPER*
PAUL R. WILLIAMS*
The contemporaryworld is beset by conflicts and issues that seem to challenge the
utility ofsovereignty as conventionally understood.'

Stephen D. Krasner
INTRODUCTION

There are currently over fifty sovereignty-based conflicts throughout the
world, and nearly a third of the Specially Designated Global Terrorists listed by the
United States Treasury Department are associated with sovereignty-based conflicts
and self-determination movements.2 To date, the "sovereignty first" international
response to these conflicts has been unable to stem the tide of violence, and in
many instances may have contributed to further outbreaks of violence. This article
will argue that the "sovereignty first" doctrine is slowly being supplemented by a
new conflict resolution approach which we dub "earned sovereignty."
This article is the first in a series of three articles prepared under the auspices
Managing Director, Public International Law and Policy Group, former Foreign Service Officer with
wide experience in the Middle East and Balkans, former Washington Director, International Crisis
Group, and former Executive Director, The Balkan Action Council. M.A. Columbia University, B.A.
American University School of International Service. This article was prepared with the assistance of
Nina Bang-Jenson, Stephanie Frease, Cassandra Cappobianca, Megan Akers, Karen Heymann, and
Marc Vogtman.
. Holds the Rebecca Grazier Professorship of Law and International Relations, American University.
Ph.D., Cambridge 1998; J.D., Stanford Law School 1990; B.A., UC Davis 1987. From 1991-1993
Professor Williams served as an Attorney-Advisor in the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Legal
Advisor for European Affairs. During the course of his legal practice, Professor Williams has assisted
nearly a dozen states and sub-state entities in international peace negotiations, and has served as a
delegation member in the Dayton, Rambouillet/Paris, Key West, Lake Ohrid/Skopje, and
Belgrade/Podgorica negotiations. He has also advised fifteen governments across Europe, Africa and
Asia on matters of public international law.
1. Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm, 30
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 651(1999).

2. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Cumulative List of Recent OFACActions 2002,
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/2002cum.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2002).
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of the Public International Law & Policy Group that discuss the emerging
approach of earned sovereignty, and is the product of the melding of two
presentations delivered at the University of Denver by the co-authors. The purpose
of this article is to provide a detailed definition of earned sovereignty, and its subcomponents, as well as to track the development of the approach through recent
state practice. The second article sets forth the legal basis for the approach, and
the third article tracks international efforts to employ the approach as a basis for
structuring a long term resolution of the Kosovo conflict.
As noted in the introductory note to this series of articles, In light of recent
state practice, the emerging conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty may
be characterized as encompassing six elements - three core elements and three
optional elements.
The first core element is shared sovereignty. In each case of earned
sovereignty the state and sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign authority
and functions over a defined territory. In some instances, international institutions
may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in addition to or in lieu of the
parent state. In rare cases, the international community may exercise shared
sovereignty with an internationally recognized state.
The second core element is institution building. This element is utilized
during the period of shared sovereignty prior to the determination of final status.
Here the sub-state entity, frequently with the assistance of the international
community, undertakes to construct institutions for self-government and to build
institutions capable of exercising increasing sovereign authority and functions.
The third core element is the eventual determination of the final status of the
sub-state entity and its relationship to the state. In many instances the status will
be determined by a referendum, while in others it may involve a negotiated
settlement between the state and sub-state entity, often with international
mediation. Invariably the determination of final status for the sub-state entity
involves the consent of the international community in the form of international
recognition.
The first optional element is phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty entails
the accumulation by the sub-state entity of increasing sovereign authority and
functions over a specified period of time prior to the determination of final status.
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty. Conditionality may
be applied to the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and functions by
the sub-state entity, or it may be applied to the determination of the sub-state
entity's final status. In either case the sub-state entity is required to meet certain
benchmarks before it may acquire increased sovereignty. These benchmarks may
include conditions such as protecting human and minority rights, developing
democratic institutions, instituting the rule of law, and promoting regional stability.
The third optional element, constrained sovereignty, involves continued
limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, such as
continued international administrative and/or military presence, and limits on the
right of the state to undertake territorial association with other states.
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It is important to note that the approach of earned sovereignty does not
perceive "sovereignty" to be a unitary right, but rather a bundle of authority and
functions which may at times be shared by the state and sub-state entities as well
as international institutions. 3 Sovereign functions may include control over foreign
relations, defense, policing, immigration, banking, currency, trade, development of
natural resources, taxation, transportation, education, social welfare and judicial
matters.
To further develop an understanding of the emerging approach of earned
sovereignty this article will review recent state practice in which the approach has
been employed to bring about or attempt to bring about a resolution of a
sovereignty-based conflict. The focus of the review will be on deducing common
themes and distilling key conditions for the utilization of the emerging approach.
Case studies include the Road Map for Peace for the Israeli/Palestinian conflict;
the Good Friday Accord for Northern Ireland; the Machakos Protocol for Sudan,
the Baker Peace Plan for the Western Sahara; UN Security Council Resolution
1244 for Kosovo; the Dayton Accords for Bosnia; UN Resolution 1272 for East
Timor; the Comprehensive Agreement for Bougainville; and the new constitution
for the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. These examples include proposed peace
agreements, successful peace agreements and unsuccessful peace agreements. As
the success of an agreement is based on both its substantive provisions as well as
numerous external factors, such as the political will of the parties, we have sought
to reference a wide variety of agreements, and not just those deemed to be
unqualified successes.
It is important to recall that the aim of this article is not to argue for the
creation of a new conflict resolution approach, but rather to explore some of the
ways in which earned sovereignty is already being practiced around the world.
This exploration is intended to provide greater clarity regarding the most useful
instruments and tools that practitioners have at their disposal to make constructive
use of earned sovereignty.
As such, this article seeks to contribute to a more informed debate about the
circumstances in which earned sovereignty may be applied constructively. To note
that earned sovereignty can be utilized in the context of particular international
disputes is not to assert that it is a panacea that can be applied to resolve all
international problems involving disputes over rival territorial claims, internal
rebellions or self-determination movements. Many conflict resolution practitioners
that have the responsibility to utilize conceptual tools in real-world situations
where lives are at stake and misjudgments can have severe consequences welcome
such a debate. Diplomats have recognized the need to provide a solution where the
involved parties will only stop the violence upon guarantees of independence. For
some time negotiators have employed the tools of earned sovereignty selectively in
crisis prevention and conflict resolution situations. Their attempts to use such
techniques, however, have been hindered to some extent by the unwillingness of

3. See Karen D. Heymann, EarnedSovereigntyfor Kashmir: The Legal Methodology to Avoiding
a NuclearHolocaust, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming Fall 2003).
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state actors in the international system to acknowledge the utility of the concept
even as it was increasingly being applied.
While the origins of the approach of earned sovereignty are uncertain, it is
apparent that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia highlighted the need to develop a
new conflict resolution approach to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. In 1991
in the former Yugoslavia the international community was faced with the choice of
recognizing the Yugoslav sub-state entities of Croatia and Bosnia as independent
states, which was sure to lead to ethnic violence by the Serb-minority, or to
continue to affirm the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, which was sure to
encourage President Milosevic's efforts to ethnically cleanse large areas of those
two entities. In the end, the European Union and United States delayed for too
long the recognition of the successor states, and when they did eventual recognize
Croatia and Bosnia they did so without any capable preparation for the foreseeable
consequences. In hindsight, had the European Union and the United States
undertaken a process of earned sovereignty for Croatia and Bosnia whereby they
were slowly extricated from Yugoslavia in a manner which protected the
legitimate interests of the Serbian minority and created democratic institutions, the
ethnic conflicts might have been avoided.
Learning from these mistakes the European Union, United States and the
United Nations have increasingly sought to rely upon the approach of earned
sovereignty as it provides increased flexibility for determining the timing of
eventual independence and an opportunity to build functioning institutions and a
track record of protecting minority and human rights prior to international
recognition.
RECENT PRECEDENT FOR THE EMERGING APPROACH OF EARNED SOVEREIGNTY
While numerous peace agreements include the elements of earned
sovereignty, this article will focus on the recent surge in agreements which
embrace all three of the core elements and many of the optional elements. This
section provides a brief description of the agreements which will be relied upon in
the remainder of the article to illustrate the various elements of the approach of
earned sovereignty.
The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap was developed by the Quartet of the United
States, EU, UN and Russia and involves a three-phased plan for resolving the
middle east conflict through the achievement of a secure Israel, and an independent
and democratic Palestine.4 To accomplish this objective the Roadmap provides for
the creation of Palestinian institutions of self-government followed by the
international recognition of an independent Palestine with provisional borders,
with subsequent agreement upon final borders and issues such as refugees and the
status of Jerusalem. Progression through these phases is contingent on the
4. U.S. and PartnersPresent Proposalfor Mideast Peace, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2003, available
at www.nytimes.com (last visited May 1, 2003). Proposalfor 'Finaland Comprehensive Settlement' to
Middle East Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2003, available at www.nytimes.com (last visited May 1,
2003).
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Palestinian authority meeting a number of conditions relating to democratization
and the end to violence and terrorism. As a result of recent violence the
implementation of the Roadmap has been suspended.
The Machakos Protocol seeks to initiate a resolution of the Sudanese conflict
by providing for the cessation of hostilities between the Northern and Southern
forces and for the opportunity of the South to determine via referendum after six
years whether it wishes to remain part of Sudan. The Protocol also provides for
Veto power by the South over certain legislative and executive actions. The
Protocol is a precursor to a full agreement.
The UN sponsored Baker Peace Plan for the resolution of the Western Sahara
conflict provides for the UN assisted creation of a institutions of self-government
for the Western Sahara Authority and the devolution of numerous sovereign
authorities and functions to that government. The Plan also provides for a
referendum to determine the final status of Western Sahara within five years.
The Union Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro, mediated by the EU,
provides for the sharing and/or devolution of all sovereign authority and functions
between the two member states and for a referendum on dissolution of the Union
and secession after three years. The purpose of the three year period of shared
sovereignty is to permit the member states time to transform their economic and
democratic systems into viable individual entities and to harmonize their economic
and political systems with European standards.
UN Security Council Resolution 1244, with reference to the Rambouillet
Agreement, provides for the interim UN administration of Kosovo with security
provided by a NATO-led force.5 During this interim period the UN exercises near
absolute executive and legislative authority within Kosovo, as it seeks to build
institutions of self-government. As these institutions become functional the UN
devolves certain sovereign authorities and functions to the Kosovo government.
The full devolution of authority and the determination of final status will be based
on Kosovo's compliance with democratic and other standards, and subject to
internationally mediated negotiations with the republic of Serbia.
The Good Friday Accords, designed to bring about an end to the Northern
Ireland conflict provide for the creation of Northern Ireland institutions, and the
interim devolution of substantial power to those institutions so long as certain
conditions are fulfilled, including the decommissioning of weapons. The Accords
also provide that the people of Northern Ireland are entitled to a referendum on
unification with Ireland after seven years.
UN Security Council Resolution 1272 provided for the creation of the UN
Administration of East Timor after the conflict arising from East Timor's rejection
by referendum of Indonesia's proposal for autonomy within Indonesia.6 The
5. See Rambouillet Agreement: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,
ch. 2, art I, 2, available at www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvorarnbouillet-text.html (last visited
Oct. 8, 2002).
6. See UN Security Council Resolution 1272, and Agreement Between Indonesia and Portugal,
1999, available at
supra note 137; East Timor Popular Consultation ,May 5,
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Resolution provided authority for a two and a half year period of shared
sovereignty between the UN and East Timor during which time East Timor was
able to construct the institutions necessary for independent self-government. After
successfully meeting certain benchmarks East Timor was recognized as
independent and admitted to the United Nations.
The Comprehensive Agreement for Bougainville signed at Arawa in August
2001 provides that within a period of ten to fifteen years Bougainville may via
referendum undertake to secede from Papua New Guinea. During the interim
period Papua New Guinea and Bougainville will share certain sovereign authority
and functions, with Bougainville assuming increasing control over a wide range of
powers, functions, personnel and resources on the basis of guarantees contained in
the National Constitution and reflected in a new Bougainville constitution.
The Dayton Accords which brought an end to the Bosnian conflict provided
that many of the sovereign authorities and functions of the independent state of
Bosnia would be managed by an internationally appointed High Representative for
an indeterminate period. 7 The Accords also provided for the deployment of
international military forces to maintain internal security. While conditionality is
not explicit, the pattern of practice in Bosnia indicates that the international
civilian authority will be discontinued only upon such a time as Bosnia can
adequately function as an independent state.
THE FIRST CORE ELEMENT: SHARED SOVEREIGNTY

During an initial period of shared sovereignty, the state and sub-state entity
may both exercise sovereign authority and functions over a defined territory. In
some instances, international institutions may also exercise sovereign authority and
functions in addition to or in lieu of the parent state. In rare instances, the
international community may exercise shared sovereignty with an internationally
recognized state. In many instances some form of regional or international
institution is responsible for monitoring the parties exercise of their authority and
functions.
The ability to share sovereign authority and functions between states, substate entities and international organizations creates an opportunity to disperse the
often violent tension associated with sovereignty-based conflicts and to ease the
parties onto a path for the long-term resolution of the conflict. If handled
constructively, shared sovereignty affords a cooling off period during which
central authorities and aggrieved peoples can each continue to pledge fidelity to
their own mutually incompatible final aims while initially suspending violence.
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrameEng04.html (last visited
Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of East Timor
Ballot, May 5, 1999,
available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrameEng03.html
17th, 2002)
7. See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995,35 I.L.M. 75 (1996)

Oct. 17th, 2002);
Through A Direct
(last visited Oct.
Herzegovina with
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Frequently shared sovereignty may provide the sub-state entity with sufficient
elements of self-government so that the interest in outright independence is
substantially lessened bringing about an end of the conflict through some perpetual
autonomy. It is reasonable to assume in the Bougainville case this is the hope of
the mediators and Papua New Guinea. In other cases, such as Montenegro and
Northern Ireland, the period of shared sovereignty is necessary for the state and
sub-state entity to establish a viable relationship that will survive the eventual
independence or territorial re-association of the sub-state entity. In still others,
such as Kosovo and East Timor, the period of shared sovereignty is used to
establish order from the chaos of an armed conflict and to create time while the
international community works to help the new entity to create operational
institutions of self-government.
In most instances shared sovereignty occurs between states and sub-state
entities seeking autonomy or independence. The two most comprehensive cases of
such shared sovereignty are the new constitution for the Union of Serbia and
Montenegro, and the Northern Ireland Good Friday Accords.
The Serbia and Montenegro Agreement creates an elaborate structure of
shared sovereignty between the two member states. Under the agreement the
member states may maintain international relations, conclude international
agreements and establish branch offices in other states, if it is not contrary to the
competencies of the Union. The Member states may also assume membership in
international and regional organizations that do not require international
subjectivity as the condition for their membership. The president of each member
state also sits on the Supreme Defense Council, which must act by consensus, thus
providing each member state with shared authority for the defense policy of the
Union.
The Supreme Court which is comprised of an equal number of judges from
each of the member states must include judges from the Constitutional Courts of
the member states whenever it is hearing a case relating to the conformity of the
legislation or competencies of the member states with the legislation or
competencies of the Union, or a case between the member states themselves.
While the Union government does exercise some exclusive authority and
functions, they are limited to matters such as immigration, selection of flag and
anthem, and working with the EU on economic harmonization. All diplomatic
representatives must be appointed with the consent of the member states. To
ensure the representation of the interests of the member states in the exercise of
even these limited functions, the constitution creates a complicated arrangement
whereby of the five cabinet positions two ministers shall be from the same member
state as the President, and three shall be from the other member state. Moreover,
the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defense may not be from the same
member state, and upon the completion of a two-year period (half their term),
certain Ministers must exchange their functions with their Deputies, who are from
different member states.
In practice the Union exercises almost no original authority and merely serves
as a conduit between the member states and the international community, in
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particular the EU and the International Financial Institutions. Almost all sovereign
authority and functions are exercised by the member states and nearly all financial
resources are controlled by the member states.
In Northern Ireland, after more than a century of tension and violence, on
April 8, 1998, the Irish and British governments and eight participating parties
reached a political settlement regarding the status of Northern Ireland. The
Agreement provides that upon a referendum of the people of Northern Ireland the
province may secede from the United Kingdom and join with Ireland. In the
interim the agreement provides for the devolution of certain sovereign authorities
and functions to Northern Ireland while retrenching some of the jurisdictional
power of the United Kingdom, and the claimed jurisdiction of Ireland.
Specifically, it calls for the British government to repeal the 1920 Government of
Ireland Act which reasserted British jurisdiction over all of Ireland and requires the
Irish government relinquish its constitutional claim to the Northern province.
As a result, the citizens of Northern Ireland are enjoying unprecedented levels
of self-governance and democratic control. The Northern Ireland Assembly, which
is the first local legislative body in the territory's history to have substantial,
elected, cross-community representation, exercises significant legislative and
executive authority. The Assembly is entrusted with the responsibility of electing
Ministers with department responsibilities (e.g., education and health) to carry out
executive functions, except as to those such as security, justice, prisons and
policing that remain with the central government in the interim.
Similarly, the Bougainville Agreement provides that during the interim period
Papua New Guinea and Bougainville will share certain sovereign authority and
functions, with Bougainville assuming increasing control over a wide range of
powers, functions, personnel and resources on the basis of guarantees contained in
the National Constitution and reflected in a new Bougainville constitution. Also,
in the case of the UN sponsored Baker Peace Plan for the Western Sahara,
numerous powers are to be devolved to the Western Sahara Authority relating to
taxation, economic development, internal security, law enforcement commerce,
resource development, and social welfare. While Morocco retains the authority for
the foreign relations of Western Sahara, such power is to be exercised in
consultations with the Western Sahara Authority and representatives of the
Authority may be included on Moroccan delegations.
While Serbia/Montenegro, Northern Ireland, Bougainville and the Western
Sahara share sovereignty with a central authority, in a number of instances states
and sub-state entities share sovereign authority and functions with international
organizations during an interim period prior to a determination of final status.
Frequently the international community exercises certain sovereign authority and
functions because the state has been precluded from exercising those functions and
the sub-state entity is not yet capable of doing so. As will be discussed in the next
section, the international community frequently uses this period of shared
sovereignty to assist the sub-state entity in establishing the necessary institutions
for self-government.
The East Timorese came under UN supervision after they rejected via
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referendum a proposal which would have provided for autonomy within Indonesia.
In light of the violent response by Indonesian military forces and paramilitary
groups in East Timor Indonesia was forces to recognize the right of East Timor to
independence, and the UN replaced Indonesia as the authority responsible for the
management of sovereignty during the transition to full independence for East
Timor. During the period of shared sovereignty, UN officials headed the
ministries of Internal Security, Justice, Political Affairs, Constitutional and
Electoral Affairs, and Finance, while East Timorese headed the ministries of
Internal Administration, Infrastructure, Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and
Social Affairs. The National Consultative Council was chaired by the UN
Transitional Administrator and comprised of three UN officials and over a dozen
East Timorese appointed by the UN Administrator officials.
In the case of Kosovo, UN Resolution 1244 provided for the creation of the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which initially assumed
responsibility for nearly all Kosovo's sovereign authority and functions, leaving
only a few to be exercised by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Over time the
UNMIK representative worked to create a Kosovo Constitutional Framework
providing for a parliament and presidency. The UN representative then embarked
on a process of devolving specified powers to the Kosovo institutions and
excluding the exercise of any authority by FRY institutions. Moreover, internal
and external security for Kosovo is provided by a NATO-led force, and elections
are conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE).
The element of shared sovereignty is quite flexible with the number and
nature of devolved functions varying greatly, as well as the time frame of shared
sovereignty, which may range from three years as in Montenegro up to fifteen as in
Bougainville. In some instances, it may be indefinite and subject to the fulfillment
of certain conditions as opposed to specified timelines. Shared sovereignty also
lends itself to the establishment of markers and milestones which the emerging
entity must meet in order to move beyond the transition phase to final status - an
optional element called conditional sovereignty, which will be discussed below.
THE SECOND CORE ELEMENT: INSTITUTION BUILDING

To create the capacity for the assumption of sovereign authority and functions
necessary for the establishment of an autonomous entity, or a future independent
state, it is essential during the period of shared sovereignty to construct institutions
for self-government. In most instances these institutions are constructed with the
assistance of the international community.
In the case of East Timor the United Nations was authorized by the Security
Council to construct all the necessary institutions to transition East Timor from a
period of shared sovereignty with the UN to one of independence. East Timor was
in need of substantial assistance as in response to the referendum rejecting
continued association with Indonesia, its military forces in cooperation with militia
groups invaded with incredible brutality, killing hundreds, deporting hundreds of
thousands to West Timor, and decimating 80 percent of East Timor's
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infrastructure.
To implement the transition to self-governance, the Secretary General
appointed a Transitional Administrator for East Timor who also served as the
Special Representative to the Secretary General for East Timor. Although the
Transitional Administrator retained ultimate authority over the territory, he quickly
moved to establish the National Consultative Council (NCC) comprised of 15
individuals as a way to bring the East Timorese into the decision-making process
early on. The same regulation that created the NCC, also created Joint Sectoral
Committees to be composed of East Timorese and international experts to provide
advice in the areas of agriculture, education, environment, health, human rights,
infrastructure, local administration, natural resources, finance and macroeconomics.
Then, in July 2000, the Administrator created eight cabinet-level positions
comprised of four internationals and four East Timorese. Also in July, at the
urging of East Timorese members of the NCC, the Administrator transformed that
body into a larger, all-Timorese National Council composed of 33 members to
serve as the nucleus of a future assembly. These two bodies provided the skeletal
framework for East Timor's first nascent government, the East Timor Transitional
Administration.
The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap provides that the Quarter will assist the
Palestinians in constructing a number of institutions necessary for assuming greater
attributes of sovereignty. In particular the Roadmap provides for the restructuring
of security services, the establishment of an Interior Ministry, the appointment of
an interim prime minister or cabinet with executive decision-making capacity, the
adoption of a Palestinian constitution, and the creation of an election commission.
In the case of the UN sponsored Baker Peace Plan for the Western Sahara, the
UN is to assist with the creation of a Western Sahara government, including a
Chief Executive, Legislative Assembly and a Supreme Court. Elections for the
Assembly and the Chief Executive are to be held by the UN within one year of the
adoption of the Baker plan.
In the case of Northern Ireland, while there was no need to provide for the
creation of administrative institutions, there was a need to create political
institutions and to reform many of the key administrative institutions. The
agreement thus provided for the creation of a Northern Ireland Assembly which
would be able to absorb the sovereign functions and authority to be devolved from
the United Kingdom. The agreement also provided for the creation of two
consultative mechanisms to facilitate political stability during the period of shared
sovereignty and the transfer of sovereign functions and authority to Northern
Ireland-a North/South Ministerial Council and a British-Irish Council.
The Northern Ireland Assembly is a 108-member Assembly with executive
and legislative powers. In order to prevent gridlock or dominance by the two
major voting blocs (those favoring union with England and those favoring union
with Ireland), the accord requires that "key decisions" taken by the Assembly
receive cross-community support by a "weighted majority" or "parallel consent."
The North/South Ministerial Council is made up of those with executive
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authority in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The Council was required by
the agreement to identify at least twelve areas for future cooperation throughout
the island, including six areas where new implementation bodies will carry out
joint responsibilities immediately. (In late 1998, the Council identified the latter as
inland waterways, food safety, trade and business development, certain EU
programs, language, and aquaculture and marine matters. The six other areas of
cooperation will include transport, agriculture, education, health, environment, and
tourism).
The British-Irish Council was created to deal with bilateral issues of mutual
interest, with a particular focus on sensitive matters of policing, security, justice
and prisons. The Accord provides that those issues remain with the Secretary of
State, but indicates they could one day be transferred to the Northern Ireland
Assembly. The Council includes representatives from the British government, the
Irish government, the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and
Wales, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
In some instances the sub-state entity may begin to create institutions of selfgovernment prior to the period of agreed shared sovereignty. For instance, in the
case of Montenegro the Montenegrin government with support of the United States
and European Union both prior to and after the signing of the Union Treaty
established a Foreign Ministry with unofficial diplomatic offices abroad, a
Ministry of Finance, and a Central Bank. The Montenegrin government also
adopted the Deutsch Mark, and subsequently the Euro in an effort to promote
integration with European monetary institutions. Throughout this time Serbia
continued to use the Yugoslav dinar.
THE THIRD CORE ELEMENT: DETERMINING FINAL STATUS

At some point during the process of earned recognition it will be necessary to
determine the final status of the sub-state entity. The options for final status range
from substantial autonomy to full independence. In some instances, such as East
Timor the final status is determined during the initial stages of the process,
whereas in others it occurs after a period of shared sovereignty and institution
building. While the nature of final status is frequently determined by a
referendum, it may also be determined through a negotiated settlement between the
state and sub-state entity, often with international mediation. Invariably the
determination of final status for the sub-state entity involves the consent of the
international community in the form of international recognition.
In the case of East Timor the rejection by referendum of the proposal for
autonomy within Indonesia began the process of earned sovereignty. In most
instances, however, the date for a referendum is set to occur after a period of
shared sovereignty and institution building. For instance, the agreement between
Montenegro and Serbia for the creation of a Union of Serbia and Montenegro
provides that after three years either republic may separate from the Union and
become independent via a referendum. The UN's Baker Peace Plan for resolution
of the Western Sahara conflict provides that the final status of Western Sahara
shall be determined by referendum no earlier than four and no later than five years

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31:3

after the adoption of the peace plan. The Machakos protocol between Sudan and
Southern Sudan provides for an internationally monitored referendum after six
years by which the people of South Sudan may either confirm the unity of the
Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace
Agreement or vote for secession. The Bougainville Agreement provides for a
referendum on the separation of Bougainville from Papua New Guinea after ten
and before ten to fifteen years from the adoption of the agreement. In the case of
the Bougainville agreement the results of the referendum must, however, be
ratified by the parliament.
The Northern Ireland Agreement takes a more flexible approach. The
agreement explicitly acknowledges that a majority of the population in Northern
Ireland currently wish to remain part of the United Kingdom and that any change
in that status can only come about by majority vote. The agreement requires the
British Secretary of State to call for a referendum on independence every seven
years if it is "likely" that the majority of those voting would express a wish that
Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a
united Ireland. If the resulting vote favors uniting with Ireland, the Secretary of
State is obligated to take such proposals as are necessary to the British Parliament
to give effect to the referendum's result.
In some instances the final status is to be determined by a negotiated
settlement, which may or may not involve a non-binding referendum. In the
Rambouillet Accords the final status of Kosovo was to be determined by an
international conference which would take into consideration the will of the people
for independence. The current efforts to determine the final status of Kosovo focus
on a negotiated settlement between Kosovo and Serbia with substantial
international mediation.
The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap provides that the final status of Palestine will
be determined in a two stages. The first stage will follow successful institution
building and will involve an international conference convened by the Quartet at
which the parties will negotiate the establishment of an independent Palestinian
state with provisional borders. The second stage will involve a second conference
at which the parties will conclude a permanent status agreement encompassing
agreement on permanent borders, refugees, settlements and the status of Jerusalem.
THE FIRST OPTIONAL ELEMENT: PHASED SOVEREIGNTY
In order to enhance the relationship between shared sovereignty and institution
building some earned sovereignty agreements have incorporated the element of
phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty involves the measured devolution of
sovereign functions and authority from the parent state or international community
to the sub-state entity during the period of shared sovereignty. The timing and
extent of the devolution of authority and functions may be correlated with the
development of institutional capacity and/or conditioned on the fulfillment of
certain conditions such as democratic reform and the protection of human rights.
Kosovo presents the most comprehensive example of the use of phased
sovereignty to manage the devolution of sovereign authority and functions.
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Subsequent to resolution 1244, the UN endorsed a Provisional Constitutional
Framework for Kosovo which provided that UNMIK and Kosovo entities would
exercise most of the functions typically associated with an independent state,
including foreign relations. Initially nearly all the authority and functions were
designated "reserved competencies" which remained with UNMIK. Since the
adoption of the Provisional Constitution UNMIK has gradually transferred nearly
all the local powers to Kosovo municipal authorities, and has begun a slow but
stead process of transferring powers to Kosovo's central government institutions.
While the power to regulate transportation has been completely transferred, only
minimal powers relating to the conduct of foreign affairs have been transferred.
The degree of transfer is determined by an informal mix of institutional
capacity on the part of Kosovo, the degree to which Kosovo is perceived by
UNMIK to reasonably exercise the powers which it currently possesses, and the
coordination of the timing of devolution with progress being made towards
resolving the final status of Kosovo. With respect to the latter factor, UNMIK is
concerned that it not transfer all powers to Kosovo too soon as it might prejudice
the outcome of the final status talks as a complete assumption of these powers
would render Kosovo a de facto independent entity.
Other agreements which include an element of phased sovereignty are the
Northern Ireland Accords, the Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap, and the Bougainville
Agreement. In the Northern Ireland Agreement the United Kingdom is able to
manage the rate of devolution, and even to reverse the devolution by suspending
parliament if the IRA fails to comply with its obligations to demobilize and
decommission its weapons. The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap provides for the
phased accumulation of sovereign attributes beginning with the adoption of a new
constitution and elections for a prime minister and cabinet and ending with the
possible creation of an independent Palestinian state. The Bougainville Agreement
also provides for the Bougainville Government to assume increasing control over a
wide range of powers, functions, personnel and resources during the interim period
prior to the determination of final status.
Importantly not all instances of earned sovereignty require the element of
phased sovereignty. For instance, upon ratification of the agreement for the
creation of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro both member states immediately
assumed the sovereign authority and functions allocated to them under the
agreement. In fact, Montenegro had exercised many of those functions prior to the
adoption of the agreement.
THE SECOND OPTIONAL ELEMENT: CONDITIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

The approach of earned sovereignty may provide the option of conditioning
the transfer of sovereign authority and functions to the sub-state entity, or the
determination of final status, on its fulfillment of certain benchmarks. These
benchmarks may include conditions such as protecting human and minority rights,
developing democratic institutions, instituting the rule of law, and promoting
regional stability.
The element of conditional sovereignty has its origins in the European
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approach of earned recognition of the successor states of the former Soviet Union
and former Yugoslavia. In response to calls for international recognition by the
republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, on December 16, 1991, the
European Community Council of Foreign Ministers developed a policy of earned
recognition. 8 Under this approach, states seeking recognition by the European
Community were required to meet a set of detailed criteria. The European
Community then adopted additional criteria to be applied specifically to the
republics of Yugoslavia, and required that the republics seeking recognition must
submit an application to the Yugoslav Peace Conference at that time being
conducted by the UN and EU. The co-chairs of the Peace Conference would then
seek a determination from the Arbitration Commission as to whether the applicant
states fulfilled the criteria for recognition.
According to the Declarationon Guidelines on the Recognition of New States
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the specific criteria which each applicant
state was required to meet included:
1) Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the
commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris,
especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;
2) Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in
accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;
3) Respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by
peaceful means and by common agreement;
4) Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; and
5) Commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by
recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and regional
disputes.
The European Community further proclaimed that it would not recognize
entities which were the result of aggression, and they would take account of the
effects of recognition on neighboring states.
The European Community then issued a second, more specific, Declaration
on Yugoslavia,9 which added the conditions that the applicant republic 1) accept
the provisions laid down in the European Community Draft Convention on Human
Rights, especially those in Chapter 11 on the rights of national or ethnic groups,
and 2) that the republics continued to support the efforts of the U.N. and the
continuation of the Peace Conference.' 0 While the European Community generally
8. Council of Ministers of the European Community, Declaration on Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, (December 16, 1991).
9. European Community Declaration on Yugoslavia (December 16, 1991).
10. The Declarationon Yugoslavia provided that republics seeking recognition must apply to the
Chairmen of the Peace Conference by December 23, 1991, and the Chairmen, would pass the
applications to the Arbitration Commission for a ruling as to whether the applicants met the criteria set
forth in the Guidelinesand Declaration. The Arbitration Commission would make its recommendation
to the European Community's Council of Foreign Ministers, who would then announce its decisions on
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recognized the determinations of the Arbitration Commission, it did not
exclusively follow those recommendations. Thus, upon the recommendation of the"
Arbitration Panel it recognized Slovenia and Croatia, but did not recognize
Macedonia despite the Commission's determination that it fully met the
conditions. Similarly, upon the recommendation of the Commission it required
Bosnia to hold a referendum to determine the will of the people for independence,
and rejected the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's claim to continue the
international legal personality of the former Yugoslavia.
The case of Kosovo provides the most detailed example of conditional
sovereignty. In 2002 the UN Security Council adopted a proposal by UNMIK
identified as"standards before status." In brief, the UN had determined that before
Kosovo could undertake final status negotiations to secure independence it must
meet a number of standards or benchmarks. According to UNMIK, the general
prerequisites of the standards before status approach were, "full compliance with
and implementation of Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework. Multiethnicity, tolerance, security, and fairness under normal conditions, without special
measures."" In particular, UNMIK placed significant emphasis on the creation of
a multi-ethnic society.
Specifically, the benchmarks covered the areas of
functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee
returns and reintegration, economic reform and development, property rights,
dialogue with Belgrade, and the responsible operation of the Kosovo Protection
Corps.
For each of these categories, UNMIK set forth goals, benchmarks, and
specific actions to be taken by the local community. For instance, with respect to
freedom of movement, JNMIK set the goal that all communities can circulate
freely throughout Kosovo, including city centers, and use their language. The
benchmark for measuring the attainment of this goal was the unrestricted
movement by minorities without reliance on military or police. The required local
action included policy and sustained action by local institutions to promote
freedom of movement publicly and unprompted condemnation by holders of public
office of obstruction and violence.
Other agreements contain similar conditionality.
For instance the
Bougainville agreement provides that the referendum on final status will only be
recognition by January 15, 1992. In order to carry out its task of rendering determinations on the
independence of the republics of Yugoslavia, the Commission created a questionnaire which was sent
on December 24, 1991, to those republics invited to apply for recognition. Conference on Yugoslavia
Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M.
1488 (1992). (Introductory Note by Maurizio Ragazzi). This questionnaire was only sent to the
republics of Yugoslavia, as the republics of Soviet Union were not required to formally apply to the
European Community for recognition, and thus were not required to subject their requests to the review
of the Arbitration Commission.
11. UN Mission in Kosovo, Standards Before Status, May 2002 available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/apr02/benchmarkseng.pdf. Press Release, United Nations,
Highlights Of The Introductory Remarks At A Press Conference By Michael Steiner, Special
Representative Of The Secretary-General In Kosovo, June 27, 2002 available at
http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/pc020627.htm [hereinafter Highlights].
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held if the Bougainville government ensures the decommissioning and disposal of
weapons and undertakes good governance, including the development of
democracy, transparency, and accountability, as well as respect for human rights
and the rule of law, including the Constitution of Papua New Guinea. The IsraeliPalestine Roadmap conditions the movement from phase two (the transition phase)
to phase three (the final status phase) on the completion of free and open elections
in Palestine, the appointment of new cabinet officials, the creation of a new
constitution, reform of the Palestinian security forces, and the designation of
provisional borders. Recently, President Bush has also emphasized that progress
in rooting out corruption would be explicitly linked to progress toward the
establishment of a provisional Palestinian state. In the case of Northern Ireland,
the continued devolution of authority was conditioned on the decommissioning of
paramilitary forces and the surrender of weapons.
With East Timor, the conditions were less substantive and more related to the
creation of institutions. For instance, in order for East Timor to be entitled to
formally declare independence it was first required by the UN Security Council to
1) undertake a nation-wide consultation process and make decisions regarding
electoral procedures and composition of the future Constituent Assembly; 2) elect
members of the Constituent Assembly and draft the constitution; and 3) establish
the government and hold Presidential elections if required by the Constitution.
Importantly, not all agreements contain the element of conditionality. For
instance the Baker plan for Western Sahara and the Machakos Protocol for Sudan
set a specific date for the devolution of sovereign authority and functions as well as
the determination of final status without conditions.
THE THIRD OPTIONAL ELEMENT: CONSTRAINED SOVEREIGNTY

Constrained sovereignty involves continued limitations on the sovereign
authority and functions of the new state, such as continued international
administrative and/or military presence, and limits on the right of the state to
undertake territorial association with other states.
In certain cases, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina a fully independent state may be
forced to share sovereign authority and functions with an international
organization. The 1995 Dayton Peace agreement, which ended the Bosnian
conflict with Serbia, in effect established a regime whereby the independent state
of Bosnia was put within a de facto trustee relationship with its sovereign authority
and functions shared with an international High Representative from a west
European country. Security is provided by a NATO-led Force. The international
civilian presence now numbers close to eight thousand. In fact, the Office of the
High Representative has served as a defacto central governing authority in Bosnia
since late 1995, with the power to veto and promulgate legislation and remove
officials at any level of government from municipal to provincial to state. A
United Nations office oversees police and refugee matters, and for the first several
years after the agreement was signed, elections were handled by the OSCE.
East Timor also is under a soft form of constrained sovereignty as the
international community, in the form of a UN follow-up mission UNMISET
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(United Nations Mission of Support for East Timor), which provides continued
assistance in the areas of: 1) civilian administration; 2) law and order (police and
development of a law enforcement agency); and 3) military security (maintaining
internal and external security).' 2 The administrative elements were scheduled to
continue through the beginning of 2004, while continued military assistance and
training would continue until the second battalion of the new East Timor Defense
Force became operational (at least through 2003). Although independent, East
Timor will continue to rely heavily on the UN and donor countries as it continues
to progress toward ever-increasing levels of sovereignty.
NOTE ON MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EARNED SOVEREIGNTY

Frequently during the process of earned sovereignty a monitoring mechanism
is established to build confidence among the parties, to ensure coordinated
implementation of the Agreement, to monitor compliance, and to assist in the
resolution of any disputes. In the case of Bougainville the parties created an intergovernmental supervisory body charged with overseeing the implementation of the
agreement and establishing the new Autonomous Bougainville Government. The
same body was also granted competency to resolve disputes between the new
Bougainville government and Papua New Guinea. The Machakos Protocol for
Sudan provides for the creation of an Assessment and Evaluation Commission to
monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and conduct a mid-term
evaluation of the unity arrangements established under the Peace Agreement. The
Commission is to be comprised of representatives of the parties as well as
representatives from neighboring states and from the observer states of Italy,
Norway, the UK and US. The Baker plan for Western Sahara provides for UN
monitoring and for the right of the Secretary-General to issue binding
interpretations regarding any disputes which arise with respect to the
implementation of the plan.
In the case of Northern Ireland, the parties have created a series of trilateral
mechanisms involving the new Northern Ireland government, the Irish government
and the British government which include the North/South Ministerial Council and
the British-Irish Intergovernmental Council. The Agreement also provides for the
creation of a specialized Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, the
membership of which must reflect community balance. The Commission is
designed to advise as to the adequacy and enforcement of human rights
protections, to propose recommendations, to consider draft legislation, to bring
court proceedings and otherwise to ensure that the human rights commitments
under the Agreement are met.
In many instances the parties decide that objectives of a monitoring
mechanism are best met when the monitors are international. In these instances,
the monitoring mechanism might be the United Nations, a regional body such as
12. See Press Release: Security Council Establishes Support Mission in East Timor Unanimously
Adopting Resolution 1410, U.N. SCOR, 4534th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/7400 (2002), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7400.doc.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
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the Organization of American States or the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, an ad hoc group of nations, or combinations of the above.
In some instances, such as Papua New Guinea domestic monitoring mechanisms
may be combined with international mechanisms. In that instance, the domestic
mechanisms are augmented by an international Truce Monitoring Group and the
presence of a UN Political Office for Bougainville.
The Dayton Accords provided for extensive participation of international
organizations in the implementation of the Bosnia peace settlement. In the military
arena, the NATO-led security forces assisted in implementing the terms of the
agreements regarding territory, size and disposition of forces, and in the
establishment of a durable peace. The agreement tasked the OSCE with carrying
out an election program for Bosnia. The Dayton Accords also required the parties
to grant access to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Development
Program, all of which thereby have acknowledged roles in the implementation of
the settlement. Finally, an International Police Task Force, under the auspices of
the United Nations, was established to train and monitor law enforcement
personnel and their activities. Similarly, in Kosovo and East Timor substantial
numbers of international civilian administrators were deployed to manage the
sharing of sovereign authority and functions, and the Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap
provided for extensive monitoring operations by members of the Quartet.
CONCLUSION

Political leaders, diplomats and representatives of states and sub-state entities
must deal with the tensions and confusions created by the friction between
traditional notions of sovereignty and the increasing reliance on earned
sovereignty. The latter has attained vitality and momentum as a result of its
practical utility to those involved in peacemaking and conflict resolution. At
times, however, diplomats and leaders find it difficult to combat the notion that
earned sovereignty will undermine the world order by creating new levels of
statehood. While this may to some extent be inevitable during periods of
transition-such as the sovereignty transition existing in today's global
community-much greater emphasis must be accorded to practical and theoretical
efforts to identify additional circumstances where earned sovereignty can be
applied constructively. Similarly, efforts should be made to draw attention to
situations where it is unlikely to be of benefit. The variety of examples furnished
in this presentation should contribute to that aim.

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY:
JURIDICAL UNDERPINNINGS
MICHAEL P. SCHARF*
Sovereignty either is or is not.
-

Stephen Leacock 1

It is undeniable that the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive
sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so absolute as it was
conceived to be in theory.
-

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

2

I. INTRODUCTION

It has often been said that "the defining issue in international law for the 21t
century is finding compromises between the principles of self-determination and
the sanctity of borders."3
Today, there are some 140 self-determination
movements world-wide. 4 Those aspiring to obtain self-determination often resort
to terrorism or armed conflict. Most of the groups on the United States (U.S.)
Department of State's list of terrorist organizations are self-determination
movements. 5 Meanwhile, there are currently secessionist conflicts under way in
numerous countries including Anjouan, Azerbaijan, Bougainville, Chechnya,
Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Kashmir, Moldova, Northern Ireland, Somaliland, Southern
Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tibet, the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, and
West Irian in Indonesia.

* Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law; formerly Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs, U.S.
Department of State.
1. G. C. FIELD, POLITICAL THEORY 60 (1956).

2. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1993).
3. Lorie M. Graham, Self-Determinationfor Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: TranslatingSelfDetermination "Into Practice" and "Into Peace," 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 455,465 (2000).
4. Halim Moris, Self-Determination:An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?, 4 ILSA J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 201, 201 (1997).
5. U.S. Department of State, Office of Counterterrorism Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (Aug. 9, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2OO2/12389.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2002).
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This piece is the second in a trilogy of three simultaneously published articles
in the Denver Journal of InternationalLaw that examine the emerging doctrine of
"earned sovereignty," a concept that seeks to reconcile the principles of selfdetermination and humanitarian intervention with the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity. This article sets forth the legal underpinnings for the doctrine,
while the other two articles in the trilogy provide its policy foundations, and apply
the doctrine to several modem case studies. Together, the three articles are the
product of the Public International Law and Policy Group's "Intermediate
Sovereignty Project," sponsored by a grant of the Carnegie Corporation.6
Traditionally, international lawyers have adhered to a rigid notion of
sovereignty. Under this view, sovereignty is "monolithic" and "possessed in full
or not at all:" 7 As one author has stated, "'sovereign,' like 'unique,' cannot take
certain qualifying adverbs.' 8 An entity either was or was not sovereign.
This unyielding conception has hindered diplomats in their effort to craft
creative means for resolving conflicts involving attempts at self-determination or
secession. For example, "[tihere is little doubt that the collective inability of the
Western powers to see beyond the statist/secessionist models was partly
responsible for the collapse of Bosnia and the war in Krajina." 9 The adoption of
extreme positions, dictated by the conventional view of sovereignty, from support
for the sanctity of Yugoslavia to the recognition of the secession of its federal
republics, was a recipe for disaster. 0 Conversely, where diplomats experimented
with new conceptions of sovereignty without legal sanctification, the rule of law
and role of international lawyers in the policy making process suffered."
To remedy this, it is necessary for international lawyers to adopt a new view
of sovereignty existing as a spectrum, and recognize a range of intermediate
sovereign statuses as part of that spectrum. Intermediate sovereignty and the
associated concepts of deferred sovereignty, conditional independence, and
provisional statehood may take the form of heightened autonomy for a group,
earned recognition, or phased recognition. The term is meant to describe an entity
that is something less than a fully sovereign state, but more than a sub-state entity.
This article begins with an examination of the history of the concept of
sovereignty, revealing that numerous states are in fact less than fully sovereign.
Next, it analyzes the evolving principle of self-determination, focusing in
6. Bridging Self-Determination and Sovereignty: The Intermediate Sovereignty
available at www.intermediatesovereignty.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).

Project,

7. INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 32 (The Pa. State

Univ. Press 1995).
8. Steven Lee, A Puzzle of Sovereignty: Sovereignty Either is or is Not, 27 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
241, 241 (1997).
9. Gerry J.Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the PostcolonialAge,
32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 282 (1996).
10. Id.
11. At a workshop on "Failed States and the Collapse of Sovereign Authority" sponsored by the
U.S. Department of State on May 17, 2002, one State Department official suggested that as a result of
perceived narrow thinking on the part of Department's Office of the Legal Adviser, the members of the
Office have been excluded from meetings in which they traditionally had participated.
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particular on the emerging notion of a remedial right to secession. The concluding
section explains how recognition of a more flexible and pragmatic conception of
sovereignty and a remedial right to secession lays the legal foundation for
application of the earned sovereignty concept.
II. THE MEANING OF SOVEREIGNTY

There are several different meanings of the term sovereignty.' 2 In the context
of this article, sovereignty is concerned with establishing the status of a political
entity in the international system. Under the conventional view, an entity qualified
as a sovereign state if it had a territory, a population, a government and formal
juridical autonomy. 13 If an entity did not qualify as a sovereign state, it was
deemed a dependent or subordinate territory of a sovereign state. Thus, an entity
was either sovereign or it was not. There was no such thing as an in between status
such as "earned sovereignty."
Sovereignty is perceived as a "ticket of general admission to the international
arena." 14 A sovereign state is accepted as a juridical equal of other States. It is
entitled to political independence, territorial integrity, and virtually exclusive
control and jurisdiction within that territory. 15 Its sovereign acts are generally
immune from civil suit in other states, its representatives are entitled to diplomatic
immunity from both civil and criminal actions, and its ruler is entitled to absolute
head of state immunity. 16 It can enter into agreements with other States.' 7 It can
be a member of international organizations. Dependent or subordinate territories,
in contrast, do not customarily possess any of these rights in the international
system. 19
Contrary to the conventional view, since the dawn of the state system 355
years ago with the Peace of Westphalia, very few states have actually possessed
full juridical autonomy.2 ° Rather, most states in the world might more accurately
12. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9-25 (1999) (of the four

meanings of sovereignty that Krasner describes, we are concerned here with what Krasner labels
"International Legal Sovereignty").
13. Id. at 14-15.
14. MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE:
THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 12 (1995).

15. KRASNER, supra note 12, at 20-21.
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id. at 16.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm, 30
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 651, 652 (1997). The state system, characterized as an association of sovereign
states, is widely believed to have originated with the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the thirty years
war in 1648. The Peace of Westphalia was composed of two separate agreements: (1)the Treaty of
Osnabruck concluded between the Protestant Queen of Sweden and her allies on the one side, and the
Holy Roman Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on the other; and (2) the Treaty of Munster
concluded between the Catholic King of France and his allies on the one side, and the Holy Roman
Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on the other. The Conventional view of the Peace of
Westphalia is that by recognizing the German Princes as sovereign, these treaties signaled the beginning
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be characterized as quasi-sovereigns.
History is replete with examples of quasi-sovereign states, including the
member states of the Federal State of Germany before the First World War, each
of which retained the right to send and receive diplomats. 21 The reigning
monarchs of these several component states of Germany were 22treated by foreign
states as if they were the monarchs of fully independent entities.
Several quasi-sovereign states were permitted to ratify treaties and participate
alongside sovereign states as full members of international organizations. India,
for example, was a member of the League of Nations and a signatory of the
Versailles Treaty even though it was still a colony of Britain.23 Later, both India
and the Philippines were permitted to serve as founding members of the United
Nations (U.N.) even though they did not become formally independent from
Britain and the United States until 1946 and 1947 respectively. 24 Andorra, which
is a tiny territory nestled in the Pyrenees between France and Spain, became a
member of the United Nations in 1993 and the Council of Europe in 1994 even
though France and Spain have control over its security affairs and retain the right
to appoint two of the four members of its Constitutional Tribunal.25 The "freely
associated states" of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau have each
attained U.N. membership although the United States continues to maintain control
of their national security policy. 26 And Hong Kong, at the time a British Colony
and currently part of China, became a founding member of the World Trade
Organization.27
On the other side of the spectrum are states that have ceded away portions of
their juridical autonomy through treaties. Thus, the member states of the European
Union can be deemed quasi-sovereign, in that the decisions of the European Court
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have supremacy and direct
effect within their territory. Similarly, any state that borrows money from an
international financial institution such as the International Monetary Fund or the

of a new era. But in fact, the power to conclude alliances formally recognized at Westphalia was not
unqualified, and was in fact a power that the German Princes had already possessed for almost half a
century. Furthermore, although the treaties eroded some of the authority of the Habsburg Emperor, the
Empire remained a key actor according to the terms of the treaties. For example, the Imperial Diet
retained the powers of legislation, warfare, and taxation, and it was through Imperial bodies, such as the
Diet and the Courts, that religious safeguards mandated by the Treaty were imposed on the German
Princes. See Stephane Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy - Myth orReality? 2 JOURNAL OF
THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (2000). For the full text of the Osnabruck and Munster
Treaties, in both their Latin and English versions, see C. Parry (ed.), Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 1
(Dobbs Ferry, U.S.: Oceana Publications, 1969), at 119 and 270.
21. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 n.9 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992).
22. OPPENHEIM, supra note 21, at 250 n. 9.
23. KRASNER, supra note 13, at 15.
24. Id. at 15.
25. Id. at 229-30.
26. See United Nations Web Site, List of Member States at http://www.un.org/overview/
unmember.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
27. KRASNER, supra note 13, at 16.
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World Bank is subject to conditionality requirements that involve issues of what
Although these international
the World Bank terms "good governance., 28
commitments may be viewed as a manifestation of the exercise of sovereignty, the
ultimate effect is in fact a diminution of the traditional attributes of sovereignty.
Also relevant are states that have been stripped of their autonomy at the
conclusion of international armed conflict. For instance, under the terms of the
occupation statute that created the West German state in 1949, the allied powers
retained authority over foreign trade and exchange, demilitarization, and foreign
affairs including international agreements made on behalf of Germany. 29 The
German state established in 1949 did not attain independent status until 1955, and
even then it did not exercise full autonomy. 30 Similarly, after the Second World
War, the basic constitutional structures and policies of the eastern European states,
with the exception of Yugoslavia and Albania, were determined by the Soviet
Union. 31 Through force or threat of force, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin imposed
dependent communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe, transforming a dozen
states in the region into Soviet controlled satellites, which were nonetheless
32
Most recently, in 2003 the United
granted membership in the United Nations.
States and United Kingdom invaded Iraq, overthrew the regime of Saddam
Hussein, and established an occupation government to administer the country
during a phased transition to sovereignty.
While the proposed recognition of the status of intermediate sovereignty has
not yet been extensively accepted in international law, the quasi-sovereign
character of many of the states in the contemporary international system and many
states in the past, suggests that solutions to issues of self-determination should not
require rigid conformity with the principles that are conventionally and
misleadingly associated with sovereignty.

III. EVOLVING NOTIONS OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A.

InternationalRecognition of the Principleof Self-Determination

Traditionally, international law viewed the formation of new sovereign
entities as purely a political matter. International law came into play only after the
de facto existence of the new state.33 During the period of decolonization (in
which more than 100 new sovereign countries were recognized), however, the
creation of states was for the first time subject to international law in the form of
the principle of self-determination.

28. Id. at 225-26.
29. Id. at 210.
30. Id. at 210 (of the four meanings of sovereignty that Krasner analyzes, we are concerned here
with what Krasner labels "International Legal Sovereignty.").
31. KRASNER, supra note 21, at212.
32. Id.
33. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES ININTERNATIONAL LAW 47-48 (1979).
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President Woodrow Wilson was responsible for elevating the principle of
self-determination to the international level when, in 1916, he included it in his
Fourteen Points. 34 But President Wilson's call for self-determination was not so
much intended to apply to the global empires of the victorious European powers as
it was an effort to ensure that the vanquished empires of Europe did not rise again
and to extend American commercial interests to new parts of the world.35
The principle of self-determination is included in Articles 1, 55, and 73 of the
United Nations Charter.36 The right to self-determination has also been repeatedly
recognized in a series of resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, the
most important of which is Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970.37 While these
resolutions are not in themselves binding, they do constitute an authoritative
interpretation of the U.N. Charter and may represent opinio juris respecting
o cases,
a
including the Namibia Case in
customary international law. 38 In a series of
39

1970,

the Western Sahara case in 1975,40 the FrontierDispute case in 1986,41

and the Case Concerning East Timor in 1995,42 the International Court of Justice
held that the principle of self-determination crystallized into a rule of customary
international law, applicable to and binding on all states.
The principle of self-determination was further codified in the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights,43 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, which together are considered to constitute the international "Bill of
Rights." 4 The vast majority of countries of the world are party to the two
34. President Woodrow Wilson, Address before the League of Nations to Enforce Peace (May 27,
1916), in 53 CONG. REC. 8854 (May 29, 1916) ("We believe these fundamental things: First that every
people have a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live...").
35. C. Lloyd Brown-John, Self-Determination, Autonomy and State Secession in Federal
Constitutionaland InternationalLaw, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 567, 572 (1999).
36. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; See also U.N. Charter arts. 55, 73 (while the term "selfdetermination" does not occur within Article 73 of the U.N. Charter, the terms "self-government" and
self-government... political aspirations... and progressive development of.. .free political institutions"
do occur).
37. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 2625].
AUTONOMY,
SOVEREIGNTY,
38. HURST HANNUM,
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 45 (1990).
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THE

39. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31-32 (June 21).
40. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33 (Oct. 16).
41. Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Rep. of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 566-567 (Dec.
22) [hereinafter Frontier Dispute Case].
42. Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 265-68 (June 30).
43. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 22.
44. Article 1, common to both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development;
The States Parties to the present Covenant ...shall promote the realization of
2.
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with
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Covenants, which constitute binding treaty law.
Under the principle of self-determination, all self-identified groups with a
coherent identity and connection to a defied territory are entitled to collectively

determine their political destiny in a democratic fashion and to be free from
systematic persecution.4 5 For such groups, the principle of self-determination may
be effectuated by a variety of means, including self-government, substantial

autonomy, free association, or arguably, in certain circumstances, outright
independence/full sovereignty.46
B.

Who is Entitled to Self-Determination?

For a group to be entitled to a right to collectively determine its political
destiny, it must possess a focus of identity sufficient for it to attain distinctiveness
as a people.47
The traditional two-part test examines first "objective" elements of the group
to ascertain the extent to which its members share a common racial background,
ethnicity, language, religion, history and cultural heritage.4 s Another important
objective factor is the territorial integrity of the area the group is claiming.49
The second "subjective prong" of the test requires an examination of the
extent to which individuals within the group self-consciously perceive themselves
collectively as a distinct "people."'50 It necessitates that a community needs to
explicitly express a shared sense of values and a common goal for its future.
Another subjective factor is the degree to which the group can form a viable
political entity. 5'

the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1,993
U.N.T.S. 3, 5.
45. G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 37, at 123-124.
46. Id.

47. The United Nations Economic and Social Cooperation Organization (UNESCO) defines
"people" as individuals who relate to one another not just on the level of individual association, but also
based upon a shared consciousness, and possibly with institutions that express their identity. UNESCO
considers the following indicative characteristics in defining people: (a) a common historical tradition;
(b) religious or ethnic identity; (c) cultural homogeneity; (d) linguistic unity; (e) religious or ideological
affinity; (f) territorial connection; and (g) common economic life. See Patrick Thornberry, The
Democraticor Internal Aspect of Self-Determination With Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN
LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 10 1-104 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
48. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under InternationalLaw: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 276 (1981).
49. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A TerritorialInterpretation, 16 YALE J.
INT'L L. 177, 178-79 (1991).
50. See Nanda, supra note 48, at 276.
51. Id.
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Does Self-Determination Create a Right to Secession and Independence?

All nations carry within their territories other nations, and since secession is
synonymous with the dismemberment of states, the international community
understandably views it with suspicion. "If each group within a state can claim the
right to self-determination and succeed, self-destruction of virtually every state
could result., 52 Thus, at the time the U.N. Charter was formed, the drafters made it
clear that the right to self-determination did not give rise to a right to secession
under any circumstances." In this regard, one may note the 1970 statement of
U.N. Secretary-General U. Thant to justify the inactivity of the U.N. during the
secessionist conflict in Biafra:
As far as the question of secession of a particular section of a State is concerned,
the United Nations attitude is unequivocable. As an international organization,
the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not 54believe it
will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member States.
Traditionally, the right to pursue independence as an exercise of the principle
of self-determination was applied only to people under "colonial domination,"
"alien domination," or "racist oppression," and under the principle known as uti
possidetis states were permitted to become independent only within their former
colonial boundaries. 55 This was not characterized as an exception to the general
rule rejecting the right of secession because the independence of a colony was not
considered "a secession," as that term was reserved for situations involving the
separation from a State of a portion of its domestic territory.56
Until recently, the international community subscribed to a theory of "saltwater colonialism," under which self-determination could only apply to territories
which were separated from their metropolitan parent by oceans or high seas. In
this way, overland acquisitions such as those made by China and the Soviet Union
were excluded from consideration. Also excluded were the ethnic groups within a
colonial territory who regarded the majority rule as alien or oppressive. Thus, it is
said that in the post-colonial world, "the right to57self-determination is rarely
recognized until it is won through a bloody conflict.

52. Ediberto Roman, Reconstructing Self-Determination: The Role of Critical Theory in the
Positivist InternationalLaw Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 943, 95 8-959 (1999).
53. The United Nations Conference on International Organization, UNCIO Doc. 343, Vol. VI, at
296 (1945) (during the works of the Committee I/1 at the Conference of San Francisco, it was agreed
that "the principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of selfgovernment of peoples and not the right to secession.").
54. Secretary-General's Press Conferences, in 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 36 (Feb. 1970).
55. See Frontier Dispute Case, supra note 41, at 565. In the Frontier Dispute Case, the
International Court of Justice acknowledged an "apparent contradiction" between the principles of uti
possidetis and self-determination. Id. at 567. But the Court did not elaborate on this statement because
it was limited by an agreement of the parties to resolve their dispute on the basis of the "principle of
intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization." Id. at 565.
56. Id. at 565.
57. See Simpson, supra note 9, at 263.
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58
However, the modem trend, evidenced by the writing of numerous scholars, 6
59
0
conferences,
U.N. General Assembly resolutions, declarations of international
62
61
judicial pronouncements, decisions of international arbitral tribunals, and some
state practice supports the right of non-colonial "people" to secede from an
existing state when the group is collectively denied civil and political rights and
subject to egregious abuses. This has become known as the "remedial" right to
secession.

The remedial right to secession has its origin in the advisory opinion given by
the second Commission of Rapporteurs in the 1920 Aaland Islands Case.63 After
excluding the existence of a general right to secede, the Commission observed that
"[t]he separation of a minority from the State of which it forns part and its
incorporation into another State may only be considered as an altogether
exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power
to enact and apply just and effective guarantees [for the protection of
minorities] .64
The denial of the exercise of the right of democratic self-government as a
precondition to the right of a non-colonial people to dissociate from an existing
state is supported most strongly by the United Nations' 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, which frames the

58. See Curtis G. Berkey, InternationalLaw and Domestic Courts: EnhancingSelf-Determination
for IndigenousPeoples, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 79 n.88 (1992); Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking SelfDetermination:A CriticalAnalysis of CurrentInternationalLaw Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 21 (1992); Antonio Cassese, The Self-Determination of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 92, 101 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Thomas
M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2, 13-14 (Catherine Brolmann et al., eds., 1993); Otto Kimminich, A "Federal"
Right of Self-Determination?, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 83 (Christian Tomuschat,
ed., 1993); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 304 (1994); W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 181-190 (1977); Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: SelfDeterminationat the InternationalCourt of Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT'L L. & COMP. L. REV. 323, 340
(1994); Christian Tomuschat, Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World, in MODERN LAW OF SELFDETERMINATION 1, 2-8 (Christian Tomuschat, ed., 1993).
59. See G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 37, at 121-124.
60. Vienna Declarationand Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1661 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action].
61. See, e.g., Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Matter of Section 53 of the Supreme
Court Act, and in the matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council Concerning Certain Questions
Relating to the Secession of Quebec from Canada, as set out in Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497, dated
September 30, 1996, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 154 [hereinafter Decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada].
62. See, e.g., Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 1, Opinions on the
Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Nov. 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1494-1497
[hereinafter Conference on Yugoslavia].
63. Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands
Question, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 3 (1920).
64. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31:3

proper balance between self-determination and territorial integrity as follows:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity of political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to
representing the whole
65
race, creed or color.
By this declaration, the General Assembly indicated that the right of territorial
integrity takes precedence over the right to self-determination only so long as the
state possesses "a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or color. 66 Reasoning a contrario,
where such representative government is not present, "peoples" within existing
states are entitled to exercise their right to self-determination through secession.
A similar clause was included in the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the World
Conference on Human Rights, which was accepted by all United Nations member
states.67 However, unlike the 1970 Declaration on Friendly relations, the Vienna
Declaration did not confine the list of impermissible distinctions to those based on
"race, creed, or color," indicating that distinctions based on religion, ethnicity,
language or other factors would also trigger the right to secede.68
Further references by U.N. bodies to the right to "remedial secession" can be
found in the 1993 Report of the Rapporteur to the U.N. Sub-Commission Against
the Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities on Possible Ways and Means
of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving
Minorities,6 9 and in General Recommendation XXI adopted in 1996 by the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.70
Most recently, in considering whether Quebec could properly secede from
Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court found that:
A right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of
peoples at international law where "a people" is governed as part of a colonial
empire; where "a people" is subject to alien subjugation, domination or
exploitation; and possibly where "a people" is denied any meaningful71exercise of
its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part.

65. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 37, at 124.
66. Id.
67. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 61, at para. 2.

68. See Id
69. Protection of Minorities: Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and
Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, Commission on Human Rights: Subh
commission on Prevention and Protection of Minorities, 45" Sess., Agenda Item 17, at para. 84, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (1993).
70. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 18 at 125-26, para. 11,U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (1996).
71. See Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, supra note 62, at para. 154.
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The Court then went on to declare:
A state, whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples resident
within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects
the principles of self-determination in its internal arrangements, is entitled to
maintain its territorial integrity under
72 international law and to have the territorial
integrity recognized by other states.
The Court found that because the people of Quebec were not "denied
meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and
social development, they were not entitled to secede from Canada" without the
agreement of the Canadian government.73 Implicit in this decision, however, is the
proposition that had the Court found that the people of Quebec were denied any
such right of democratic self-government and respect for human rights, unilateral
secession from Canada would have been permissible under international law.
As for actual State practice, the existence of a right to remedial secession is
supported by the 1971 secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan (with the aid of
India), which was justified on the ground that the Bengali population was victim of
massive economic and political discrimination as well as violence and repression.
Another development that lends credence to the idea that a new post-colonial
right to remedial secession may be on the point of crystallizing is the U.N.sanctioned intervention on behalf of the Kurds in May 1991. 74 The rationale for
this intervention was that the Kurds in northern Iraq were suffering massive human
rights deprivations inflicted by the Iraqi government.75 Subsequent to the
intervention, the Kurds enjoyed the benefits of de facto intermediate sovereignty
from Baghdad's harsh rule as a consequence of the U.S.- and British-enforced nofly zone over northern Iraq.
More recently, in the case of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the
republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia were deemed
entitled to secede on the basis that they were denied the proper exercise of their
right of democratic self-government, they possessed clearly defined borders within
the umbrella state, and, in some cases, they were subject to ethnic aggression and
crimes against humanity committed by the forces of the central government of
Belgrade.76 Notably, the international community did not consider that the
Bosnian Serb entity known as Republika Srpska was entitled to disassociate from
Bosnia-Herzegovina because, although it possessed a right of political autonomy, it
was not denied the proper exercise of its political rights, and it did not possess
historically defined borders.77 On the contrary, in the case of the Serb autonomous
region of Kosovo, the international community (through North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (N.A.T.O) action) supported the effort of the Albanian Kosovars to
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 222.
See Simpson, supra note 9, at 284.
Id.
See Conference on Yugoslavia, supra note 62, at 1494-1497.
Id. at 1498.
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attain a status that was characterized as "intermediate sovereignty" within
Kosovo's regional borders in the face of ethnic cleansing and repression by the
central government of Serbia.78
These authorities suggest that if a government is at the high end of the scale
of representative government, the only modes of self-determination that will be
given international backing are those with minimal destabilizing effect and
achieved by consent of all parties. If a government is extremely unrepresentative
and abusive, then much more potentially destabilizing modes of selfdetermination, including independence, may be recognized as legitimate.79 In the
latter case, the secessionist group would be fully entitled to seek and receive
external aid, and third-party states and organizations would have no duty to refrain
from providing support.80
D. Rulesfor Achieving Independence
Where a people are entitled to resort to remedial secession, international law
may provide guidance on how independence may be achieved. As Professor
Franck, one of the "five experts" consulted in the 1992 Opinion on the
consequences of a secession of Quebec from Canada, recalls, "so we were able to
say to the Quebec government, international law does not tell you whether you
have a right to secede or not, but it does tell you that unless you do it according to
[certain] rules you are likely to run into a lot of flak from the international
community.'
Recent state practice indicates that as a precondition to the legitimate
attainment of international status, a self-identified group seeking to disassociate
itself from the parent state must first affirmatively demonstrate that it was denied
the ability to exercise its right of democratic self-government and that its people
were denied basic human rights.82 Second, it must respect the principle of uti
possidetis, whereby states become independent within their colonial or
administrative boundaries and may not seek to obtain territory held by third
states. 83 Third, the new state must commit itself to the respect for the rule of law,
78. Paul R. Williams, EarnedSovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Kosovo Conflict over Final
Status, 31 DENVER J. INT'L L. 387 (2004).
79. See Kirgis, supra note 58, at 304. Some commentators have taken the position that the right of
a people to secede must further be based on a "balancing of conflicting principles," considering such
factors as "the nature of the group, its situation within its governing state, its prospects for an
independent existence, and the effect of its separation on the remaining population and the world
community in general. LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 217
(1978); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 73-74 (1982).
80. Cf. G.A. Res. 6(t), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 10, 15, U.N. Doc. A/31/39
(1976) (appealing to member states "to provide all assistance required by the oppressed people of South
Africa and their national liberation movements during their legitimate struggle").
81. Thomas M. Franck, Remarks at the Proceedings of the 8 7 h Annual Meeting, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 26 1.
82. European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition
of the New States, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1486-1487 (1992).
83. Id.
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democracy and human rights, including the need for guarantees for the rights of
minorities, the inviolability of all frontiers,84 and all commitments with regard to
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
As described in more detail in the other two articles in this series,
intermediate sovereignty and phased/earned recognition can be a particularly
useful mechanism for the international community to employ to facilitate the
responsible exercise of the right of remedial secession consistent with the
preconditions set forth above. It would involve an initial period of heightened
autonomy and self-government, the interim maintenance of territorial association
with the parent state, international monitoring, and the possibility of attaining full
sovereignty after meeting a series of benchmarks over time. The intermediate
sovereignty approach can be employed with the parent state's consent (albeit
obtained under threat of sanction or force) or in the absence of its consent (e.g., as
a result of humanitarian intervention).
IV. CONCLUSION

The maintenance of territorial integrity is vital in light of the disruptive
consequences of breaches of that integrity. But since its ultimate purpose is to
safeguard the interests of the peoples of a territory, it follows that "[t]he concept of
territorial integrity is meaningful only so long as it continues to fulfill that purpose
to all the sections of the people." 85
The modem trend is to treat territorial integrity as a rebuttable presumption,
which can be invoked only by states that act in accordance with the principle of
self-determination. International support for transitional independence in the form
of phased sovereignty must be recognized as a valid remedy when the state's
actions extinguish that presumption, thus resolving the tension between territorial
integrity and self-determination.
This article has illustrated that sovereignty was never as absolute in practice
as in theory. Consequently, earned sovereignty may be no more than an old wine
in a new bottle. But its value to diplomats is that this new bottle may be attractive
enough to sell to those seeking to exercise the newly recognized right of remedial
secession, who have grown unsatisfied with the prospect of simple autonomy. At
the same time this less potent vintage (which carries with it the possibility of
permanent intermediate sovereign status) may, with a little coaxing, prove
palatable to parent states, which oppose complete secession.
As described in the other two articles in this trilogy, developments in Bosnia,
Kosovo, Montenegro, East Timor and Iraq suggest that the time has come to
embrace de jure the new reality of earned sovereignty that is emerging from
diplomatic practice.

84. Id.
85. See Simpson, supra note 10, at 283, quoting Umozurike Oji Umozurike, in SELFDETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1972).
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INDEPENDENCE? 3 (2001), available at http://www.kosovocomission.org/reports/followup.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2003) [hereinafter THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE KOSOvO REPORT].

2. For the first and second articles in this series as well as an introduction to earned sovereignty
see Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
373 (2004) and James R. Hooper & Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The PoliticalDimension,
31 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'v 355 (2004).
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The purpose of this article is to promote a more complete understanding of
the approach of earned sovereignty by examining in detail its role in efforts to
resolve the Kosovo conflict. To accomplish this purpose, the article explains how
the approach of earned sovereignty shaped the international community's response
to the conflict in Kosovo, and how, if properly applied, it may help to bring about a
resolution of this particularly vexing sovereignty-based conflict; and thereby
enhance prospects for a long term peace in the region. The article also tracks the
substantive evolution of the approach from 1998 to the present, and explores the
extent to which policy makers and others adapted the approach in response to the
changing factual situation of the conflict, and the perceived viability of the
approach as a means for resolving the conflict. Finally, the article highlights the
highly fluid nature of "sovereignty" in the context of the Kosovo conflict.
As noted in the introductory note3, the conflict-resolution approach of earned
sovereignty essentially seeks to resolve the centuries-old tension between selfdetermination and sovereignty by managing the devolution of sovereign authority
and functions from a state to a sub-state entity. In some instances the sub-state
entity may acquire sufficient sovereign authority and functions which will then
enable it to seek international recognition, while in others the sub-state entity may
only acquire sufficient authority and functions to enable it to operate within a
stable system of internal autonomy.4
The conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty may be characterized
as encompassing six elements - three core elements and three optional elements.
The first core element is shared sovereignty. In each case of earned
sovereignty the state and sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign authority
and functions over a defined territory. In some instances, international institutions
may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in addition to or in lieu of the
parent state. In rare cases, the international community may exercise shared
sovereignty with an internationally recognized state. In almost all instances an
international institution is responsible for monitoring the parties exercise of their
authority and functions.
The second core element is institution building. This element is utilized
during the period of shared sovereignty prior to the determination of final status.
Here the sub-state entity, frequently with the assistance of the international
community, undertakes to construct institutions for self-government and to build
institutions capable of exercising increasing sovereign authority and functions.
The third core element is the eventual determination of the final status of the
sub-state entity and its relationship to the state. In many instances the status will

3. See Paul R. Williams, Michael P. Scharf & James R. Hooper, Resolving Sovereignty-Based
Conflicts: The EmergingApproach of EarnedSovereignty, 31 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 349 (2004)
4. While at its essence earned sovereignty is a political approach that grew from the need to
structure creative and workable solutions to conflicts arising from the tension between selfdetermination and sovereignty, it is well-founded in the most basic principles of international law. See
Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: JuridicalUnderpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 373
(2004)
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be determined by a referendum, while in others it may involve a negotiated
settlement between the state and sub-state entity, often with international
mediation. Invariably the determination of final status for the sub-state entity
involves the consent of the international community in the form of international
recognition.
The first optional element is phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty entails
the accumulation by the sub-state entity of increasing sovereign authority and
functions over a specified period of time prior to the determination of final status.
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty. Conditionality may
be applied to the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and functions by
the sub-state entity, or it may be applied to the determination of the sub-state
entity's final status. In either case the sub-state entity is required to meet certain
benchmarks before it may acquire increased. These benchmarks may include
conditions such as protecting human and minority rights, developing democratic
institutions, instituting the rule of law, and promoting regional stability. While the
relationship between the attainment of certain benchmarks and the devolution of
authority, or recognition as an independent state may be formally expressed, there
may often be an informal relationship.
The third optional element, constrained sovereignty, involves continued
limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, such as
continued international administrative and/or military presence, and limits on the
right of the state to undertake territorial association with other states.
In almost all instances the state and sub-state entity progress through the
phases of earned sovereignty by mutual agreement, but in some instances, such as
Kosovo, the international community may support or initiate one or more of the
phases of earned sovereignty against the wishes of the state or sub-state entity.
As a relatively new approach to conflict resolution, earned sovereignty, has
been referred to by many names, including intermediate sovereignty, phased
recognition, provisional statehood, and conditional independence. Conflicts in
which variations on the approach of earned sovereignty have been proposed or
applied include the Palestinian Road Map for Peace (with provisional statehood);
the Northern Ireland Accords (with a referendum for independence and unification
with Ireland after seven years); East Timor (with phased sovereignty leading to full
independence); the Sudan Machakos Protocol (with an independence referendum
by Southern Sudan after six years); the UN proposal for Western Sahara (with
shared sovereignty for four years and then an independence referendum by the fifth
year); the transformation of the FRY into the Union of Serbia and Montenegro
(with provision for a referendum on Montenegrin independence within three
years); the recent proposal by President Musharef of Pakistan for a Roadmap for
Peace for Kashmir, and most recently the initiation of the Philippine/Moro Islamic
Liberation Front negotiations (with the express conditioning of US financial
assistance on progress in a number of areas).
As will be discussed below, in the case of Kosovo the approach of earned
sovereignty was developed in an ad hoc and halting manner beginning as a
proposed initiative by the Public International Law & Policy Group working with
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the International Crisis Group, and then becoming a core element of the
Rambouillet Peace Accords and UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The
approach was then further refined and developed by a number of expert
commissions and think tanks, including the Goldstone Commission, the
International Crisis Group, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
and came to form the basis of the current United Nations doctrine of Standards
before Status. Throughout its development and application, the earned sovereignty
approach competed for influence with the alternative approach of stability through
accommodation and was shaped by the compromises inherent in the foreign policy
decision making process. In the end, the debate yielded a more refined approach
which appears to present the greatest opportunity for facilitating a viable and
lasting settlement of the centuries old dispute over the sovereignty of Kosovo.
OVERVIEW

The history of the territory of Kosovo is marked by near perpetual
competition for sovereign control between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs.5 Great
powers, such as Germany and Italy, and now the United Nations, have also played
important roles in the allocation of sovereignty over Kosovo. Throughout the
history of competition, sovereignty has ebbed and flowed from the Kosovar
Albanians to the Serbs and back again. Frequently, the competition for sovereign
control is accompanied by mass atrocities and human rights violations.
Throughout the 1990s, the competition for sovereign control led to increasingly
intolerable human rights abuses by the government of Serbia against the people of
Kosovo.
In an effort to break the cycle of retribution, to highlight the need for a
comprehensive approach to resolving the conflict, and to fill the diplomatic deficit
created by the lack of a coherent response by the European Union, in November
1998 the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) defined and proposed
the adoption of the approach of intermediate sovereignty.6 This approach sought to
serve as a basis for structuring the phased reduction of Serbian sovereign control
over Kosovo, and for allowing the people of Kosovo to accumulate sovereign
authority and functions in a manner protecting the legitimate interests of the
Serbian minority in Kosovo and of the international community. 7
The key elements of the 1998 PILPG approach involved the creation of a
system whereby the people of Kosovo, through legitimate political bodies, would
be entitled to exercise certain sovereign rights, while simultaneously retaining
specified links to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 8 (FRY). 9 As a condition for
5. See generally JULIE A. MERTUS, Kosovo: How MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR (1999)
and TIM JUDAH, Kosovo: WAR AND REVENGE (2000).
6. See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP,
INTERMEDIATE SOVEREIGNTY AS A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE Kosovo CRISIS (1998) available at

htp://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=l 71 (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
7. Id.
8. On February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia officially changed its name to Serbia
and Montenegro. See Vesna Peric Zimonjic, Politics - Yugoslavia: A Country Disappears,INTER

2003

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY: CONFLICT OVER KOSOVO'S FINAL STATUS

391

attaining greater sovereign authority and functions, the people of Kosovo and their
political institutions would have to: guarantee the protection of the rights of all
minority populations within Kosovo; respect the territorial integrity of neighboring
states such as Macedonia and Albania; renounce any intention of political or
territorial association with Albania; and accept Kosovo's borders as confirmed by
the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. After the three-to-five-year period, Kosovo
would be entitled, subject to an internationally conducted referendum within
Kosovo, to pursue recognition from the international community.' ° Once Kosovo
earned international recognition it would continue to be bound by its obligations to
protect minority rights, maintain its current borders, and reject any political or
territorial association with Albania."
Within two months of the release of the report, the failure of the then-current
approach of stability through accommodation, 12 and the necessity of a new
approach, became apparent when Ambassador William Walker proclaimed the
massacre of over forty civilians by Serbian security forces at Racak to be a crime
against humanity. 13 Public reaction in the United States and Europe to the
massacre allowed key American foreign policymakers to push for the convening of
peace negotiations backed by the threat of the use of force.14
At the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations, the American and European
negotiators reached agreement on a proposal for an Interim Agreement for Peace
and Self-Government in Kosovo, which embodied many of the core elements of
earned sovereignty. 15 Most importantly, the Accords provide that three years after
the entry into force of the Agreement an international meeting would be convened
to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo. The meeting would
take into consideration, among other criteria, whether the Kosovar Albanians had
fulfilled obligations to establish democratic institutions and to protect human and
minority rights. 16 An assessment of the will of the people would also guide the

PRESS SERVICE,

Feb. 4, 2003. For purposes of clarity, however, the former name will be used in this

article.
9. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP, supra note 5, at i.
10. Id. at 38.
11. Id.
12. This approach entailed supporting Serbian sovereign control over Kosovo while attempting to
persuade the Serbian regime to halt its atrocities against the people of Kosovo.
13. See BBC News Online, "Racak Killings 'Crime Against Humanity,"' (Mar. 17, 1999) at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/298131.stm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
YUGOSLAv

GOVERNMENT

WAR

CRIMES

IN

RACAK,

(1999

World

Report)

available

at

http://www.hrw.org/press/ 1999/jan/yugo0129.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
14. See Radio Netherlands, "Walker: 'Racak Massacre Was Not Faked,"' (June 14, 2002) at
http://www.mw.nl/hotspots/html/ictyO2O6l3.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).

15. Rambouillet Accords, Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Govemment in Kosovo, Feb. 23,
1999, U.N. Doe. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999) available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/99648_ I.pdf
(last visited Jan. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Rambouillet Accords]. It is useful to note that while the concept
of earned sovereignty was originally articulated as "intermediate sovereignty," and subsequently
referred to as "conditional independence," the most descriptive reference to the concept is "earned
sovereignty".
16. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP, supra note 5,38.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31:3

final decision.17
The draft Accords were agreed to by the Kosovar Albanians, but rejected by
Mr. Milosevic, who sought to resolve the competition over sovereignty by
ethnically cleansing Kosovo of its Albanian population.' 8 To prevent this, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched an air campaign.' 9 NATO
halted the air campaign when Milosevic agreed to transfer de facto sovereign
control over Kosovo to the United Nations and NATO.
The U.N. Security Council then adopted Resolution 1244 to provide a
framework for the interim administration of Kosovo by the United Nations. 0
While retaining the core elements of the Rambouillet Accords, Resolution 1244
gave a primary role to the U.N. mission in overseeing the development of
democratic institutions (an added and now necessary element to the approach of
earned sovereignty). 21 The United Nations was then to devolve sovereign
authority and functions to these new institutions and to facilitate a political process
designed to determine Kosovo's future status based on the process described in the
Rambouillet Accords.
Acting under the authority of Resolution 1244, the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General (SRSG) displaced the FRY's ability to exercise sovereign
authority and functions in Kosovo and began the process of building Kosovar
institutions, but hesitated in transferring substantial sovereign responsibility to the
people of Kosovo.
In response to the perceived failure of the United Nations to articulate a clear
plan for transferring sovereign authority and functions to Kosovo as required under
Resolution 1244, the Goldstone Commission renewed the call for earned
sovereignty for the people of Kosovo.22 The key elements of the Goldstone
proposal, termed conditional independence, included the prompt holding of a
referendum to ascertain the will of the people, the initiation of U.N.-sponsored
talks between the Kosovar Albanians and the Kosovar Serbs, the development of
mechanisms to protect minority and human rights, arrangements for the continued
presence of international security forces, and the phased transfer of effective
administration from the United Nations to the legitimate national and municipal
authorities.23

17. Id.
18. For the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's indictment detailing
Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign see ICTY Prosecutor, IT-99-37, Indictment against Milosevic et
al. (May 22, 1999).
19. See Radio Netherlands, supra note 12.
20. See SC Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 lth mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999)
availableat http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/ 1999/sc99.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003)..
21. Id. at para. 10.
22. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT,
at
284
(2000)
available
LESSONS
LEARNED,
RESPONSE,
INTERNATIONAL
http://www.kosovocommission.org/reports (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) [hereinafter THE KOsOvO
REPORT].
23. Id.
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Subsequent to the release of the Goldstone proposal, the United Nations
began a process of building up Kosovar institutions and devolving power to those
institutions. During this time, and with little input from the Kosovar political
leadership, the Americans and the Europeans negotiated a Constitutional
Framework for Provisional Self-Government, which was promulgated by the
24
United Nations and laid the foundation for an approach of phased sovereignty.
The Constitutional Framework provided for the development of a unique dual key
system of initial and primary responsibility for the SRSG and Kosovar institutions.
The dual key approach of shared sovereign functions was coupled with a mandate
for the provisional institutions of self-government to conduct their work with a
view to facilitating the determination of Kosovo's future status through a process,
which would take full account of all relevant factors including the will of the
people.
Despite significant progress toward earned sovereignty, with the fall of
Milosevic and other important political changes, there was increasing pressure by
the European Union to reign in the devolution of sovereign authority and functions
to Kosovo in an effort to promote perceived democratic reform in Serbia proper.
In light of the dangers posed by a halt to the process of earned sovereignty for
Kosovo, the Goldstone Commission issued a second, more detailed, proposal for
conditional independence.25 The basic elements of the proposal included the rapid
devolution of authority to Kosovar institutions, and substantial limiting of SRSG
authority to include only protection of minorities, guarantee of human rights and
the guarantee of border integrity. The SRSG powers were to be exercised only
when the locally elected officials fail to meet their obligations. According to the
Commission, the presence of the international community should be diminished
and the sovereign authority of Kosovo should continue to grow as the government
and people of Kosovo proved themselves capable of meeting the above
commitments. As Kosovo fully met these commitments, the member states of the
international community would grant it international recognition.
In partial response to the efforts of the Goldstone Commission and others, the
new SRSG for Kosovo, Michael Steiner, embarked on a process of indicating that
Kosovo would not likely return to Serbian sovereign control, and of devolving
greater power to the Kosovar authorities.
Seeking to support this renewed initiative for earned sovereignty, while
recognizing the slow nature of political institution building in Kosovo, the
International Crisis Group (ICG) put forth a detailed proposal for a mixing of
international trusteeship and earned sovereignty for Kosovo. 26 The cornerstone of
the proposal was a call for immediate negotiations on final status, with the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to then transfer increasing sovereign
22. See generally Regulation No. 2001/9 On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional SelfGovernment, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.
UNMIKJREG/2001/9 (2001) available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-OI.htm
(last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
25. See generally THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 1.
26. See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY GROUP, supra note 5.
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authority and functions to Kosovar institutions, retaining only limited veto power
in certain areas.27
Under increasing international pressure to adopt a clear approach for
resolving the crisis over Kosovo's final status, the SRSG adopted a strategy
referred to as "standards before status."2 8 While ostensibly rejecting conditional
independence, this approach contains most of the basic elements of earned
sovereignty. It calls for the measured devolution of sovereign authority and
functions to Kosovar institutions as they demonstrate capacity to operate
effectively and meet select criteria. However, the approach also suspends any
discussion of final status until after certain standards are met. At its essence, the
standards before status approach simply suspends the political discussion over final
status and sets in motion the construction of Kosovar institutions which will likely
ensure an independent Kosovo.
THE COMPETITION FOR SOVEREIGNTY OVER Kosovo

On December 1, 1918, following the end of World War I, Kosovo became a
part of The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which subsequently became
Yugoslavia, though never legally part of Serbia.29 In 1919, in response to a denial
of their basic human rights, including the right to education in the Albanian
language, an estimated 10,000 rebels took up arms against the central government
of the Kingdom. The suppression of this revolt involved the commission of
widespread atrocities against Kosovar Albanians, the arming of Serbian civilians,
and the relocation of Kosovar Albanian women and children to internment camps
in central Serbia. 30 In an attempt to change the ethnic make-up of Kosovo, the
central government accelerated a colonization program, promising sizable tracts of
land and exemption from taxes for ethnic Serbs willing to relocate to Kosovo. 3 '
In 1929, Yugoslavia was divided into nine governorships, with the territory of
Kosovo being dispersed amongst three governorships.32 From that time until
World War II, much of the land held by Kosovar Albanians was confiscated and
transferred to the state. In 1933, the government of Yugoslavia sought to resolve
the claim to sovereignty by relocating much of the Albanian population to Turkey,
and began negotiations with the government of Turkey to accomplish this
objective. In 1938, an agreement was reached with Turkey to forcibly relocate as
many as 400,000 Kosovar Albanians, but the outbreak of World War II prevented
the parties from carrying out the agreement.33
27. Id. at i.
28. Press Release, United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Address to Security Council by Michael
Steiner, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (July 30, 2002), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr792.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
29. See generallyNOEL MALCOLM, Kosovo: A SHORT HISTORY (1998).
30. See id.
at 273-76.
31. See MALCOLM supra note 27 at 280-81. It is estimated that approximately 14,000 families
settled in Kosovo because of the colonization program. Id.
32. See id.
at 283.
33. See id.
at 285-86.
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During World War II, when Axis forces occupied Yugoslavia, Kosovo was
partitioned between Bulgaria, Albania (governed by Italy), and Germany.
Following the end of the war, when the state of Yugoslavia was reconstituted, the
1946 Yugoslav constitution provided that Kosovo would be an Autonomous
Region within the Republic of Serbia. Although the 1946 Yugoslav constitution
did not address in detail the rights and obligations of the Autonomous Region of
Kosovo, the separate Serb Republic constitution provided that Kosovo would
direct its own economic and cultural development and that it would be responsible
for protecting the rights of its citizens.34 At this time, the Yugoslav government
relaxed the restrictions on the use of the Albanian language and reduced the
intensity of the colonization program, which had been halted during the war during which many of the Serbian colonists had been forced to return to Serbian
territory.
In 1963, Yugoslavia adopted a new constitution, which promoted Kosovo to
an Autonomous Province, but effectively decreased some of its federal rights. In
1968, the constitution was amended to provide Autonomous Provinces the status of
"socio-political communities" which was the same term used to describe the other
republics making up Yugoslavia.3 5 In early 1969, the Kosovar Albanians were
permitted to fly the Albanian flag as their "national emblem," and later that year
the University of Prishtina was established. Throughout the 1970s the Kosovar
Albanians increased their participation in the economic sector, political
bureaucracy and local police forces, with Kosovar Albanians holding two-thirds of
the membership in the local League of Communists, and three-fourths of the
membership in the local police and security forces.36
In 1974, Yugoslavia adopted yet another constitution, which provided that the
Autonomous Province of Kosovo, as well as the Autonomous Province of
Vojvodina, would be entitled to a sovereign status nearly equivalent to that of the
other six republics of Yugoslavia. As a result, Kosovo adopted its own
constitution, appointed its own representative on the rotating federal Presidency
and elected Parliamentarians to the federal Parliament.
In the early 1980s, after Tito's death, and in response to perceived and real
discrimination by the Kosovar Albanians, the Kosovar Serbs began to agitate for a
return to the earlier political system, in which the Kosovar Serbs held greater
privilege and power. In 1985, the Serbian Academy of Sciences drafted a
"Memorandum," which essentially called for a revocation of the sovereign
authority and functions accorded Kosovo under the 1974 constitution, and the
creation of a greater Serbia.37 In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, then a deputy to the
President of the Serbian Party, traveled to Kosovo to hear demands by Kosovar
Serbs. In response to an orchestrated riot by Serbian nationalists, Milosevic
delivered an extemporaneous speech calling for the "defence of the sacred rights of
34.
35.
36.
37.

Seeid at 289-93,315-17.
See id. at 324-25.
See id. at 326.
For a comprehensive collection of the texts central to the operation of Serb nationalism, see LE
NET7OYAGE ETHNIQUE (Mirko Grmek et al. eds., 1993)
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the Serbs. 38 In late 1987, Milosevic used the growing political unrest in Kosovo
as a platform for assuming the presidency of the Serbian League of Communists.
In early 1988, the Serbian Assembly adopted amendments to the Serbian
constitution which removed Kosovo's control over the Kosovar police force,
criminal and civil courts, civil defense, and economic, social and education policy.
The amendments also effectively prohibited the use of Albanian as an official
language in Kosovo. To force these amendments through the Kosovar Parliament
as required by the Federal constitution, members of the Serbian security forces
surrounded the Kosovar Parliament building with tanks and armored personnel
carriers, and inserted special police and communist party functionaries amongst the
Kosovar delegates. 39 These actions were met by mass demonstrations of the
Kosovar Albanian population and resulted in the declaration of a state of
emergency in Kosovo by the Serbian regime.
In March and June of 1990, the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia issued a
series of decrees meant to entice Serbs to return to Kosovo, while suppressing the
rights of the Kosovar Albanians. The decrees for instance created new "Serb only"
municipalities, forbade the sale of property to Albanians by departing Serbs, closed
the Albanian language newspaper, closed the Kosovo Academy of Sciences, and
dismissed several thousand Kosovar Albanian state employees. 40 In response, on
July 2, 1990, the Albanian members of the Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo "an
equal and independent entity within the framework of the Yugoslav federation. 41
The Serbian regime reacted by dissolving the Kosovo Assembly and the
government. Finally, in late 1990 the Serbian regime expelled 80,000 Kosovar
Albanians from state employment.
The members of the dissolved Albanian assembly responded by holding a
secret meeting and creating a constitutional law for the Republic of Kosovo, and
then holding a referendum on the question of whether Kosovo should be declared a
sovereign and independent republic. According to Kosovar Albanian sources,
eighty-seven percent of eligible voters participated in the vote, with ninety-nine
percent voting in favor of independence. Subsequently, using the same procedure
of underground voting, the Kosovar Albanians held an election on May 24, 1992,
whereby they elected a new assembly and government.4 2 In the spring of 1998, the
Kosovar Albanians held a second round of parliamentary elections as required by
their constitutional law.
From 1989, the Kosovar Albanians were denied the ability to exercise any
sovereign authority or functions or even to participate in the federal government.
They were also denied the ability to participate in the local formal political
structures responsible for determining the political fate of Kosovo. In addition, the
Kosovar Albanians were subjected to a systematic denial of their basic human

38. MALCOLM, supra note 27, at 341-42.

39. See id.
at 343-45.
40. MALCOLM, supra note 27, at 345-46.

41. See id.at 346.
42. Id. at 347.
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rights, which included a policy of arbitrary arrests, police violence, detention
incommunicado, torture, summary imprisonment and economic marginalization.
As a result, in the mid 1990s some elements of the Kosovar Albanian population
formed the Kosovo Liberation Army, which murdered members of the Serbian
police and military forces and perceived Kosovar Albanian collaborators.
Commencing in the winter of 1998, Serbian forces engaged in a brutal
crackdown in Kosovo ostensibly aimed at extinguishing the KLA and its popular
support, but in reality aimed at ethnically cleansing large swaths of Kosovo. As
part of their campaign, the Serbian forces terrorized local civilian populations,
murdered vast numbers of noncombatants, and laid siege to numerous villages.43
The results of the new campaign of Serbian ethnic aggression were that over
350,000 civilians were displaced and over 18,000 homes were deliberately
destroyed, and almost half of the population centers were subject to siege. The
intensity of the campaign of terror, ostensibly to drive the KLA from Kosovo,
rapidly increased in the autumn of 1998.
In the face of such atrocities, the United States and Europe responded with
humanitarian assistance, mild economic sanctions," and public declarations of the
need to stop the atrocities. Although the United States and Europe had eventually
been compelled to use force in Bosnia and had stationed over 30,000 troops to
prevent renewed hostilities there, they initially eschewed even the threat of force in
45
Kosovo.

At this point, the task of the international community evolved into an effort to
halt Serbian atrocities in Kosovo and devise a means to peacefully resolve the
dispute over the sovereignty of Kosovo.
EARNED SOVEREIGNTY AS AN APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

Throughout the summer of 1998 the United States and its European allies
sought a negotiated settlement of the crisis in Kosovo." Despite the history of
Serbian atrocities and aggression in Croatia and Bosnia, America and its allies
43. For a review of the atrocities committed, see Human Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org
(last visited Jan. 2, 2003); the reports of the Kosovo Verification Mission, at
http://www.osce.org/Kosovo (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
44. CNN.com, Calm Returns to Montenegro on Inauguration Day Jan. 15, 1998 at
htp://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/15/montenegro (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) (statement of U.S. envoy

to the Balkans Robert Gelbard).
45. See Press Conference of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Special Envoy, and Ambassador
William Walker, Director of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, On-the-recordBriefing, released
by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep.'t of State (Oct. 28,
1998), available at
http://www.mthoyoke.edu/acad/intrel/holb.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
46. The draft agreements prepared by the United States generally sought to accommodate the
Serbian interests in the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY, while providing certain human
rights protections for the people of Kosovo. Like the Dayton Accords, the draft agreements proposed a
complicated system of government which was likely to lead to political gridlock. On the whole the
draft agreements minimized the emphasis on self-determination and rather placed the emphasis on
sovereignty. While there was some hint of earned sovereignty in the draft text it represented the more
traditional approach to resolving such conflicts - and was as a result unsuccessful.
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were highly reluctant to use, or threaten the use of, force. As a result of the
perceived weakness of the international community, the Serbian interlocutors
bogged the talks down in technical negotiations over arcane power sharing
arrangements, and Mr. Milosevic's forces increasingly relied upon violence against
the civilian population to secure Serbia's hold over Kosovo.
Recognizing the necessity of a shift in approach, the Public International Law
& Policy Group published a monograph through the International Crisis Group in
the fall of 1998. This monograph argued that the only means for resolving the
crisis in a manner that would protect the lives of the two million Kosovar
Albanians, while not destabilizing the region, would be for the international
community to intervene and oversee a three-to-five-year period of transition.
During this period of transition, Kosovo would assume increasing levels of
sovereign authority and functions from Serbia, so long as it met certain conditions.
The approach was dubbed intermediate sovereignty.
According to the proposal, the people of Kosovo, through legitimate political
bodies, would be entitled to exercise certain sovereign rights, while simultaneously
retaining specified links to the FRY. In exchange for the assumption of these
rights, the people of Kosovo would commit to respect fundamental principles of
international law. This arrangement would exist for a period of three to five years.
After this period, Kosovo would be entitled, subject to an internationally
conducted referendum within Kosovo, to pursue recognition from the international
community. 47 The assessment of the will of the people of Kosovo through a
legitimate referendum served as a cornerstone of the approach of intermediate
sovereignty.
The proposal provided that during the interim period, the people of Kosovo
would exercise complete legislative, executive and judicial control over their
internal affairs relating to the key areas of economic development, internal
security, education, taxation, extraction and processing of natural resources,
transportation, health care, media and news broadcasting, cultural development,
and the protection of minority rights. To a certain degree the institutions of
Kosovo would be permitted 48to conduct their own international affairs and appoint
international representatives.
In exchange for the exercise of these rights, the people and institutions of
Kosovo would be required to guarantee the rights of all minority populations
within Kosovo, respect the territorial integrity of neighboring states such as
Macedonia and Albania, renounce any intention of political or territorial
association with Albania, and accept its borders as confirmed by the 1974
Yugoslav Constitution. The proposal also indicated that Kosovar representatives
would be permitted to participate in the government of the FRY to the degree
necessary to ensure an effective transition to its own international status.49
To ensure the protection of the rights of the Albanian, Serbian and other
47. See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP, supra note 5, at i.
48. Id.
49. See id.
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inhabitants of Kosovo, international monitors from the Organization for Security
and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union, as well as
independent non-governmental organizations, would be authorized to establish
monitoring missions and accorded complete and unrestricted access to Kosovo.
The proposal envisioned these organizations would publicly report their findings.
The key to the success of the proposal rested on the agreement of the Serbian and
Yugoslav police, military and paramilitary forces to withdraw from Kosovo within
six months and to permit international organizations to monitor this withdrawal. °
Upon the expiration of the interim period, the conditions for recognition of
Kosovo would include the traditional legal criteria of territory, population,
government and capacity to conduct international relations. Additionally, they
would include the political criteria of whether Kosovo had fulfilled its commitment
to protect the rights of all minority populations within its territory, respected the
territorial integrity of Macedonia and Albania, rejected any political or territorial
association with Albania, and maintained the status of its borders.
Once
recognized by the international community, Kosovo would remain bound by these
commitments, and would cease its participation in the Yugoslav federal

government. 1
The report sought to base the approach of intermediate sovereignty upon the
basic principles of international law, which provide that all self-identified groups
with a coherent identity and connection to a defined territory are entitled to
collectively determine their political destiny in a democratic fashion, and to be free
from systematic persecution. The report then reasoned that in cases where selfidentified groups are effectively denied their right to democratic self-government
and are consequently subjected to gross violations of their human rights, the most
reasonable course of action is for the international community to support
international status for the sub-state entity in order to ensure the protection of those
rights.52 While this proposition remains the subject of debate among international
lawyers, it is increasingly accepted as a viable means for protecting a population
from further gross violations of human rights in certain circumstances.
The 1998 proposal also drew legal support from the following factors: 1) the
legal and factual similarity between Kosovo and the other republics of the former
Yugoslavia, which were deemed by the international community to be entitled to
international recognition; 53 2) the legal precedent of earned recognition established
by the international community in recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina and Macedonia after they met specific conditions; 54 3) the fact that
Yugoslavia had dissolved, and the international community had rejected
Serbia/Montenegro's claim to continue its international legal personality;55 4) the
historical fact that Kosovo, while legitimately part of Yugoslavia, had never been

50. Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at i.
Id. at ii.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29-32.

55. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP, supra note 5, at 33-35.
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legitimately incorporated into Serbia; 56 5) the fact that the people of Kosovo had
been subjected to ethnic aggression;57 and 6) at the time the recent precedent set by
the Russian/Chechen Accords and the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement. 58
The key themes of the 1998 PILPG proposal were that the people of Kosovo
had to a certain degree earned a right to increased sovereignty because of the long
history of human rights violations perpetrated against them by the Serbian regime.
Given the circumstances of their situation, it appeared that the only means for
adequately protecting those rights would be some form of international status for
Kosovo.
In order to ensure, however, that the attainment of international status for
Kosovo did not have negative consequences in the region, or lead to additional
violations of human rights, it was necessary to establish a process whereby the
international community could manage the development of an independent Kosovo
and ensure the protection of its interests in regional stability. The corollary
element was that the Kosovars, while entitled to heightened sovereignty because of
past abuses by the Serbian regime, would be required to earn full sovereignty at the
end of an interim period by demonstrating their commitment to democratic selfgovernment, the protection of human rights, and promotion of regional security.
While not explicitly stated in the 1998 PILPG Report, the report provided support
for the notion that certain specified limits on sovereignty might continue after
Kosovo had attained international recognition. 59
While the approach of intermediate sovereignty resonated with the policymaking community in the United States and Europe (and would later form the
basis for their proposal at Rambouillet), and was adopted in principle by the
government of Kosovo, 60 it was dismissed by President Milosevic - who was
determined to pursue a program of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.6 1
THE INITIAL INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

To implement ethnic cleansing, the Serbian regime began to round up
Kosovar Albanian men, and place them in camps reminiscent of the Bosnian
concentration camps. 62 In the face of increasing atrocities, the United States and

56. Id. at 33.
57. Id. at 35-36.
58. Id. at 36-38.

59. See generally PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP, supra note 5.
60. In part as a result of the 1998 PILPG Report, two members of Group were invited to serve as
experts on the Kosovo delegation to the Rambouillet talks. While at Rambouillet and Paris they further
developed and advocated for the utilization of the approach of earned sovereignty.
61. For details on Milosevic's plan to resolve the Kosovo crisis through ethnic cleansing, see
Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told, An Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo
Verification Mission, October 1998 to June 1999 (June 9, 1999) available at http://www.osce.org/
kosovo/documents/reports/
hr/partl/index.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) (Chapter 14 recounts the forced expulsion of Kosovo
Albanians from Kosovo).
62. See UN Warns of Bosnia-type Horrorsas 600 Held by Serbs, Irish Times, Sept. 9, 1998, at 10
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Europe marshaled political and public support for the use of air strikes against
Serbian forces,63 and dispatched Ambassador Richard Holbrooke on a mission to
the FRY to negotiate an arrangement for the deployment of international monitors.
The resulting Holbrooke/Milosevic deal provided for the stationing of unarmed
monitors" and the provision for unarmed NATO over flight. 65 The weakness of
the deal aside, the primary effect was to temporarily diffuse international support
for the use of force to protect Kosovar Albanians by prying sovereign control over
Kosovo from Yugoslavia.
In light of the unarmed nature of the monitors and the perceived retrenchment
from the threat to use force, the Serbian regime continued its attacks on the civilian
population. Public criticism and demand for action reached a peak shortly after

January 15, 1999, when Serbian military and paramilitary forces massacred over
40 civilians in the Kosovar town of Racak. The massacre was met by a series of
public denunciations by President Clinton, 66 Secretary of State Albright,67 the
Chairman
of the OSCE, 68 the European Union, and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
69
Annan.

As a result of the Racak massacre, the collapse of the Holbrooke/Milosevic
deal, the apparent failure of earlier mediation efforts, and political pressure
(especially from the U.S. Congress), the United States led its allies from the
approach of accommodation and sovereignty first to one of "diplomacy backed by
force.

7°

(comments of Kris Janowski, UNHCR Spokesman, on Serbia's arrest of some 600 Kosovar Albanian
men).
63. See Statement to the Press Following Decision on the ACTORD by Dr. Javier Solana,
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty (Oct. 13, 1998) available at http://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/1998/s981013a.
htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
64. See Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, Oct. 16, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 24
(1999).
65. See Operation Eagle Eye - The NATO Kosovo Verification Mission, available at
http://www.afsouth.
nato.int/operations/deteagle/Eagle.htm#MISSION (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) , (referring to the
Agreement between the Chief of General Staff of the FRY and NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, signed on Oct. 15, 1998, establishing air verification mission over Kosovo)
66. See Statement by President Clinton (Jan. 16, 1999), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/
1999/01 /1999-01-16-statement-by-the-president-on-kosovo.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
67. See Press Statement by Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State of the United States (Jan. 18,
1999), available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/99011912.htm (last visited Jan. 2,
2003).
68. See Statement to the Press by Ambassador Kai Eide, Chairman of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe Permanent Council (Jan. 18, 1999), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/
policyremarks/1999/990118_eide racak.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
69. See Press Release, Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, Secretary General
Shocked by Alleged Massacre in Kosovo (Jan. 19, 1999) (relating the statement issued Jan. 16, 1999, by
the Spokesman for the Secretary-General) U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6864, available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/1999/19990119.sgsm6864.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
70. See Statement to the Press by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of the North Atlantic
Treaty (Jan. 28, 1999) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-01 le.htm (last visited Jan. 2,
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RAMBOUILLET AND THE NEGOTIATION OF EARNED SOVEREIGNTY

Using the now credible threat of force, the United States and its allies
convened the Rambouillet peace talks in early February 1999. 71 The approach
developed by the international community during the talks was based in large part
on the approach of earned sovereignty.
As explained in the U.S. Department of State's Fact Sheet entitled
"Understanding the Rambouillet Accords," the primary elements of the Interim
Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo concerned provisions for the
creation of democratic self-government, the protection of human rights, the
establishment of security, and the convening of an international meeting at the end
of a three year period which would establish a mechanism for final settlement.72
As noted below, the nature of the final settlement would depend in large part on
the will of the people of Kosovo and compliance by the Kosovar government and
other institutions with the relevant provisions of the agreement.
The primary focus of the Rambouillet Accords was to create democratic selfgovernment in Kosovo. The Rambouillet Accords sought to promote democratic
self-government by creating a comprehensive Constitution under the authority of
which there would be the democratic election of a President and an Assembly and
the subsequent appointment of a prime minister and government. Strong local
governments would also be created. The Constitution also provided for a full
range of powers to be exercised by the central government, which included
taxation, economic regulation and development, property rights, social policy,
environmental protection, local self-government, and the power to conduct foreign
relations in specified areas. To ensure the participation of minority representatives
in the government, the Accords established a quota system for such representatives
in the Assembly and for the adequate inclusion of minority representatives in
Government positions.73
The Accords also provided for the interim retention of significant elements of
sovereignty by the FRY, including the rights to ensure the territorial integrity of
establish
the FRY, maintain a common market, operate the customs services,
74
policy.
foreign
conduct
and
defense,
for
provide
policy,
monetary
To prevent future atrocities against the Kosovar Albanians, and to protect the
Serbs from acts of retribution, the Accords included numerous provisions on the
protection of human rights. The cornerstone of the protections for human rights

2003). See also Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo (Jan. 30, 1999), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
71. See Press Release, Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, Albright on NATO Final Warning
on Kosovo (Jan. 30, 1999), available at http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/WF990201/
epfl 15.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
72. See generally Understanding the Rambouillet Accords, U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Eur.
Aff. (Mar. 1, 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html
(last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
73. Rambouillet Accords, supranote 13, at ch. 1, art. 2 & 4.
74. Id. at ch.1, art. 1(3).
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was the incorporation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and its Protocols, directly into Kosovar law."
Additional protections included the creation of an Ombudsman office with
extensive authority to monitor the protection of minority and human rights and
fundamental freedoms throughout Kosovo. 76 The Accords also provided explicit
protection for such rights as the use of national community symbols, language,
cultural and religious association, and the right to be free from discrimination.77
The Accords provided for the complete withdrawal of all Yugoslav Army
forces and the substantial reduction of Serbian police forces in Kosovo, as well as
the transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army into the Kosovo Protection
Corps modeled after the American National Guard. Security was to be provided
by the deployment of an extensive international force. The international force
would be responsible for providing both internal and external security.78
Importantly, the Accords expressly provided there would be no change in the
borders of Kosovo. 79
The Accords embodied the approach of earned sovereignty by providing the
Kosovar Albanians with certain sovereign rights, and excluding the exercise of
certain sovereign rights by Serbia and the FRY. For instance, under the Accords,
Kosovo would be able to exercise partial sovereignty by conducting foreign
relations in specified areas, concluding some international agreements, and
receiving direct international assistance.8 ° Moreover, there was also no bar to
Kosovo appointing international representatives for foreign countries.
In the Rambouillet Accords, the international community set the precedent for
diminishing Yugoslav sovereignty, building up Kosovar sovereignty, and accruing
certain sovereign responsibilities unto itself. The deployment of the international
security force was the most direct example of the erosion of Yugoslav sovereignty,
while the presence of three international judges on the Kosovar Supreme Court
illustrates the limit on Kosovar sovereignty occasioned by the extensive
involvement of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo.
A primary tenet of earned sovereignty, that of an opportunity to earn full
sovereignty, was codified in article one of the final chapter of the Rambouillet
Accords, which provided that:
Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting
shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on
the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's
efforts
regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final
81
Act.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at ch. 1, art. 6.
Id. at ch. 6.
Id. at ch. 1, art. 7.
Rambouillet Accords, supra note 13, at ch. 7.
Id. at ch. 1, art.1(6)(a).
Id. at ch. 1, art. 1(6)(c).
Rambouillet Accords, supra note 13, at ch. 8, art. 3.
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This article served as the core of the earned sovereignty approach detailed in
the Rambouillet Accords. The three key elements were that the arrangement
provided for in the Accords was interim, that at the end of the interim period the
international community would participate in the determination of the final status
of Kosovo, and that this determination would be based in large part on the will of
the people and each party's compliance with the basic elements of the agreement.
The reference to the Helsinki Final Act is also important as it seeks to balance the
right of self-determination with the rights of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
It is useful to note here that the Rambouillet approach to earned sovereignty
did not include provisions for the phased evolution of sovereignty for Kosovo.
Rather, the Accords provided for the allocation of sovereign rights and
responsibilities among the Kosovars, the Serbs and the international community
with a set time for reassessment of that allocation with the possibility of full
sovereignty for Kosovo. This was highly similar to the approach mapped out in
the 1998 PILPG proposal. As noted in the concluding section of this paper, the
inclusion of a process for phased sovereignty, where sovereignty increases in
relation to compliance with specified benchmarks, may, in the case of Kosovo, be
the key to the successful employment of the approach of earned sovereignty.
THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN
In response to the massive ethnic cleansing that followed the collapse of the
Rambouillet/Paris negotiations, NATO launched a strategic air campaign, striking
targets in Kosovo and Serbia proper. During the course of the air campaign, the
Yugoslav Tribunal indicted Mr. Milosevic and a number of other top officials for
orchestrating crimes against humanity in Kosovo. After seventy-eight days of
NATO bombing and an apparently increasing willingness of the NATO member
states to authorize the deployment of ground troops, Mr. Milosevic agreed to
remove Serbian military forces from Kosovo and to allow the deployment of
NATO forces and the creation of an interim administration operated by the United
Nations. The NATO victory came, however, after Serbian forces had expelled 1.5
million Kosovo Albanians, killed tens of thousands more, and destroyed most of
their homes.
To end the conflict, the NATO member states enlisted Finnish President Marti
Ahtisaari, while Russia contributed the former Russian Prime Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin, to negotiate Milosevic's withdrawal from Kosovo.
The
Agreement, accepted by the FRY in June 1999, provided for the withdrawal from
Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces, with a possibility of
negotiated return to perform tasks under the supervision of international personnel
such as de-mining and protecting patrimonial sites.
The agreement also provided for the deployment in Kosovo, under U.N.
auspices, of effective international civil and security presences. The civilian
presence would be charged with creating mechanisms to provide the people of
Kosovo with democratic self-government and substantial autonomy in an interim
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period8 2 The security presence would establish a safe environment for all people
in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons
and refugees.8 3
Although the agreement was primarily designed to codify Milosevic's
agreement to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and permit the deployment of a
NATO-led protection force, it reflected and modified some of the key elements of
earned sovereignty. While the agreement provided for the displacement of
Yugoslav and Serbian sovereignty and the necessity of creating institutions for
democratic self-government in Kosovo, it also provided for the assumption of
sovereign functions by an international civilian administrative force, and by a
NATO-led international security force. 84 In light of the devastation caused by
Serbian forces and the displacement of nearly the entire Kosovar population, the
insertion of civilian and security forces with the responsibility to assume sovereign
functions was in fact more practical than the immediate transfer of those functions
to non-existent Kosovar institutions.
During the transition period between the withdrawal of the Serbian forces and
the full deployment of the NATO-led peacekeeping force, a number of Serbian
residents of Kosovo fled to Serbia. While some fled of their own accord, others
had been targeted for revenge attacks by some elements of the Kosovar Albanian
population. Those that stayed were subject to varying degrees of harassment by
armed Kosovar Albanians until the NATO-led forces were able to provide
adequate protection. While Serbian residents in Kosovo currently live within a
relatively secure environment, very few of the Serbian refugees who left Kosovo
have returned.
Also during the transition period, Serbian paramilitary forces retained control
of the northern section of the town of Mitrovica which straddles the Ibar River.
The town, which is a major access route to Serbia, is now effectively divided into
the northern Serb township and the southern Albanian township. All political
efforts to reintegrate the town have failed, and the French peacekeepers stationed
there have been unwilling to take effective action to provide security for minority
individuals wishing to return to their homes. Those who advocate the partition of
Kosovo talk of the "Mitrovica line," with the northern township and the territory
north of the Ibar River becoming part of Serbia in exchange for the independence
of Kosovo.
UN RESOLUTION 1244: SWAPPING SERBIAN SOVEREIGNTY FOR UN SOVEREIGNTY

To formalize the agreement between Milosevic and the international
community to end the conflict and withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo, the U.N.
Security Council adopted resolution 1244. Resolution 1244 both established the
mandate for the NATO deployment and authorized the United Nations'

82. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at Annex 2, para. 5.
83. Id. at Annex 2, para. 4.
84. Id. at Annex 2, para. 5.
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administration of Kosovo for an interim period. 85 The Agreement further codified
a number of principles which were to guide the allocation of sovereignty among
the FRY, Kosovo and the international community and sanctioned the intent of the
international community to undertake a process for resolving the final status of
Kosovo.
The substance of Resolution 1244 focused on: 1) displacing FRY sovereignty
from Kosovo 86 ; 2) replacing it with interim U.N. and NATO sovereign
responsibilities 87; 3) establishing substantial autonomy and democratic selfgovernance8s; 4) "facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's
future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords," 8 9 and 5) preparing in
the final stage to oversee "the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement." 90
The United Nations substantially limited the sovereign authority of the FRY
and completely excluded the sovereign authority of Serbia over Kosovo by
requiring the FRY to withdraw all military, police and paramilitary personnel from
Kosovo, 9' and by making no reference to any form of Serbian sovereign rights in
Kosovo. In instances where the Security Council referenced the relationship
between the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and Kosovo, it did so
only in the context of the interim period prior to a resolution of the final status of
Kosovo, and never in perpetuity.92
The Security Council then authorized an international security presence, led
by NATO, to replace FRY security forces. The international force was authorized
to prevent the return of FRY forces, establishing conditions for a safe and secure
environment for the people of Kosovo and the institutions operating there, monitor
and secure the Kosovar border, and
ensure public safety in the interim - all crucial
93
elements of a sovereign presence.
The international civil presence in Kosovo, which would take the form of an
SRSG and accompanying staff, was authorized to provide an interim civil
administration for Kosovo. 94 The Security Council then made it clear, however,
85. In early July, NATO deployed its forces and within the next week the U.N. appointed Bernard
Kouchner to head the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Letter from Kofi Annan,
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Security Council (July 6, 1999), U.N. Doe. S/1999/748,
availableat http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/1999/sglet.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
86. S.C. Res. 1244, supranote 18, at paras. 3, 4, 9.
87. Id. at para. 5-11, 17-19.
88. Id. at para. I I(a).
89. Id. at para. I I(e).
90. Id. at, para- 1l(f).
91. Id. at para. 3.
92. Resolution 1244 did provide for the possible return of some sovereign authority by FRY
forces by including the Ahtisaari Agreement in Annex 2, which, as noted above, provided that after a
period of time an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel would be permitted to return and
would operate under the supervision of international forces to mark and clear minefields; maintain a
presence at Serb patrimonial sites; and maintain a presence at key border crossings. Id. at Annex 2,
para 6.
93. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at para. 9.
94. The mandate of the U.N. administration included the authority to perform basic civilian
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that the U.N. administration was only an interim entity and that pending settlement
of the final status of Kosovo, its primary task was to promote the establishment of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, based on the Ahtisaari
Agreement and the Rambouillet Accords. 95 To accomplish this objective the U.N.
civil administration was charged with "organizing and overseeing the development
of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government
pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections. ' 6
As discussed below, a key element in this process was the adoption by the
U.N. administration of a Constitutional Framework for Provisional SelfGovernment. The Security Council also made it clear in its reaffirmation and
restatement of the Ahtisaari Agreement that the "negotiations between the parties
for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic selfgoverning institutions. 97 Once the Kosovar institutions were created, the U.N.
administration was to transfer to these institutions its administrative
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of these
provisional institutions as well as other peace-building activities.98
Most importantly, the Security Council also charged the interim U.N.
administration with the obligation to facilitate "a political process designed to
determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords." 99
The U.N. administration was then to oversee the "transfer of authority from
Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political
settlement."'1° While the Security Council did not provide an express timetable for
resolving the question of the final status of Kosovo, it did indicate this process
should be governed by the Rambouillet accords, which set a three-year time-frame.
Resolution 1244 significantly, and likely irreversibly, altered sovereign
control over Kosovo. By displacing Yugoslav sovereign control and replacing it
with an interim U.N. administration mandated to build Kosovar institutions
capable of providing for democratic self-government, it created a situation where
the chances of Kosovo returning to Yugoslav or Serbian sovereign control are
quite slim.
Resolution 1244 essentially follows the basic themes of earned sovereignty
articulated in the 1998 proposal and the Rambouillet Accords in that it displaces
Yugoslav sovereignty, creates mechanisms for establishing democratic selfgovernment and the protection of minority rights, and mandates the resolution of
administrative functions, support the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic
reconstruction; supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian
and disaster relief aid; maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and
meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; protect and
promote human rights; and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons
to their homes in Kosovo. Id. at para. 11.
95. Id. atpara. 10.
96. Jd. at Annex 1, para. I I(c).
97. Id. at Annex 2, para. 8.
98. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at para. 11 (d).
99. Id. at para. 1 (e).
100. Id. at para. I1(0.
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Kosovo's final status. Resolution 1244, however, creates a substantial addition to
the approach by providing for the exercise of sovereign functions by the United
Nations.101 Whereas the original articulation of the approach and its design in the
Rambouillet Accords provided for a transfer of sovereignty to the people of
Kosovo and then an evaluation of the final status of Kosovo based in part on its
compliance with the specific provisions of the Accords, Resolution 1244 provides
for the United Nations to first assume control of sovereign functions, negotiate a
constitutional framework and then begin the transfer of sovereign functions to
Kosovar institutions. Simultaneously, the
United Nations is mandated to pursue a
10 2
resolution of the final status of Kosovo.
Importantly, Resolution 1244 in no way intends for the deployment of a U.N.
administration to supplant the process for a settlement of Kosovo's final status.
Rather, Resolution 1244 is very clear in its mandate to the U.N. Administration to
facilitate the resolution of Kosovo's final status, to phase in Kosovar control of the
mechanisms for self-government, and then to assist in the transfer
of sovereign
01 3
authorities to the new institutions created in any final settlement.
While Resolution 1244 lacks an express provision for the ability of the people
of Kosovo to earn increasing degrees of sovereignty based on their demonstrated
respect for certain principles, its constant reference to the Rambouillet Accords
provides a strong basis for the inference of such a principle. 1°4 Notably,
Resolution 1244 does not provide for a continued international presence, civilian
or military after the transfer of authority.
Despite the clarity of Resolution 1244 regarding the interim transfer of
sovereignty to the U.N. administration and the legitimacy of a process for
determining the final status, some European states have argued that Resolution
1244, by its preambular reference to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY, precludes an eventual independent final status for Kosovo. This argument,
however, does not possess a sufficient legal foundation.
In the preamble to Resolution 1244 the Security Council cited the ritual
affirmation of the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the FRY and the other States of the region, as set out in the
Helsinki Final Act and Annex 2 of the Resolution. 0 5 Crucially, the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the FRY was conditioned by the Helsinki Final act and
Annex 2 of the Security Council Resolution. The Helsinki Final act provides for
the equal recognition of a state's right to sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
of a minority peoples' right to self-determination. Annex 2 expressly places the
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY within the context of
the "interim political framework agreement providing for substantial selfgovernment for Kosovo,"'' 0 6 and also noted the necessity of taking full account of
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at paras. 5, 6, 9-11.
Id. at para. 11.
Id.
Id. at para. 11, Annex 1, Annex 2, para. 8.
S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at pmbl.
Id. at Annex 2, para. 8 (emphasis added).
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The Rambouillet Accords, also in the preamble, "recalled" the commitment of
the international community to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY. 108 The Accords, as noted above, then went on to provide for the near total
exclusion of FRY sovereignty over Kosovo and for the creation of a mechanism to
determine final status in three years. The preamble of Resolution 1244 therefore
cannot reasonably be perceived to prevent the international community from
moving forward with a process for resolving Kosovo's final status.
THE EROSION OF SERBIAN SOVEREIGNTY

Pursuant to Resolution 1244, the NATO-led security force displaced all of the
Yugoslav and Serbian forces operating in Kosovo, and assumed all sovereign
functions previously performed by those forces. Moreover, the security force has
refused to permit the return of Serbian forces to guard patrimonial
sites and be
09
present on the border as envisioned in the Ahtisaari Agreement. 1
Acting under the authority of Resolution 1244, UNMIK has assumed all of
the sovereign functions in Kosovo. In fact, the first act of UNMIK was to adopt
Regulation One, which provides, "All legislative and executive authority with
respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in
JNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG)." '"0 UNMIK also assumed authority over all financial assets in Kosovo,
by authorizing itself to "administer movable or immovable property, including
monies, bank accounts, and other property of, or registered in the name of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia or any of its organs,
which is in the territory of Kosovo."' n
Acting under this and subsequent regulations, UNMIK levies and collects
taxes; operates its own civil service; issues Kosovo specific stamps through its own
postal system; controls borders; collects customs duties to fund Kosovo's
budget;1 2 enters into agreements with foreign governments; and grants consent for
the establishment of "Liaison offices" representing the governments of foreign
states. 3'
UNMIK has also operated to remove or prohibit any Yugoslav or Serbian
107. Id.
108. Rambouillet Accords, supra note 13, at pmbl.
109. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at Annex 2, para 6.
110. See Regulation No. 1999/1, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, § 1, para. 1, U.N.
Doc. UNMIK/REG/ 1999/1 (1999) available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/
regl.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
111. Id. at§6.
112. See Regulation No. 1999/3, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, § 1, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/1999/3 (1999) available at http://www.un.org/peacelkosovo/pages/regulations/reg3.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
113. See Regulation No. 2000/42, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REGi2000/42 (2000) available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg42-00.htrn
(last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
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sovereign functional control by adopting the Euro to replace the Dinar as the
currency, refusing to sanction or organize participation in Yugoslav presidential
and parliamentary elections, issuing OSCE developed identity cards which can
also be used in lieu of passports, replacing the use of Yugoslav or Republic of
Serbia seals and insignia with U.N. symbols and the word "Kosovo," and
removing Yugoslav and Serbian flags from former state property.
In keeping with its obligation to build institutions for democratic selfgovernment, while also reducing the likelihood of moving too quickly to establish
an independent Kosovo, UNMIK first created government and administrative
institutions at the local level. UNMIK thus initially provided an international
Municipal Administrator for each of Kosovo's thirty municipalities. At the start of
the international mission these local administrators formed consultative municipal
councils staffed by local appointees and administrative boards responsible for
managing local services.
At first, UNMIK exercised exclusive executive authority at the Kosovo-wide
level. After the first six months, however, on January 31, 2000, UNMIK created
the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) which devised three political
structures at the provincial level responsible for incorporating Kosovo's citizens
into the decision-making process. The first of these bodies was an executive board
called the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) which would come to act as the
highest decision making body in Kosovo. The SRSG is the chief executive while
eight members, four local and four UNMIK international officials, make up the
council. 1 4 Second, JIAS also established twenty administrative departments, now
referred to as ministries, ranging from justice to civil security, that were co-run by
UNMIK officials and local representatives. Third, it created a new municipal level
governmental system, with municipal elections in October 28, 2000 that5 offered
for the first time defined powers and responsibilities for elected officials.l"
The municipal elections played a crucial role in transforming the former
paramilitary organizations into legitimate political parties and providing them a
political avenue to express their views, thereby reducing the overall level of
violence in Kosovo. While the local municipal political structures were slow to
implement legislation and were often charged with petty corruption, the overall

114. The four local seats were occupied by Ibrahim Rugova, President of the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK); Hashim Thaii, President of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK); Rexhep Qosja,
President of the United Democratic Movement (LBD); and Bishop Artemije leader of the Serbian
National Council (SNC).
115. These powers include: providing basic local conditions for sustainable economic development;
licensing of building and other development; the implementation of building regulations and building
control standards; public services including fire and emergency services; management of municipal
property; pre-primary, primary and secondary education; social services and housing; licensing of
services and facilities including: entertainment, food, markets, street vendors, local public transport and
taxis, hunting and fishing and restaurants and hotels ; naming and renaming of roads, streets and other
public places; and such other activities as are necessary for the proper administration of the
municipality and which are not assigned elsewhere by law. See Regulation No. 2000/45, U.N. Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/45 (2000), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg45-00.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
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consensus among international observers is the municipal governments are
functioning as basic political entities and are capable of assuming increasing
degrees of authority and are likely to play a constructive role in protecting human
rights and promoting a normalization of life in Kosovo.
FINDING SPACE FOR KOsOVO SOVEREIGNTY: GOLDSTONE PROPOSAL I

In light of the progress made in displacing Yugoslav and Serb sovereignty in
Kosovo and initiating the creation of institutions for democratic self-government,
the Goldstone Commission, formally known as the Independent International
Commission on Kosovo,' 1 6 argued that it would soon be time to resolve the final
status of Kosovo and transfer full authority to Kosovar institutions. The Goldstone
Commission thus crafted and announced a proposal for earned sovereignty which
it termed conditional independence.
The core elements of the proposal reflected the 1998 PILPG proposal with
necessary modification to account for the changed circumstances brought about by
the NATO air campaign, Resolution 1244 and the establishment of UNMIK. The
core elements thus included the prompt holding of a referendum to ascertain the
will of the people,' 17 the subsequent initiation of U.N.-sponsored talks between the
Kosovar Albanians and the Kosovar Serbs, the development of mechanisms to
protect minority and human rights, arrangements for the continued presence of
international security forces, and the phased transfer of effective administration
from the United Nations to the legitimate national and municipal authorities."'
The Goldstone Proposal provided that a supervisory international presence would
continue to operate in Kosovo even after independence was established." 9
The Goldstone Commission was clear that its proposal would "effectively end
FRY sovereignty over Kosovo, [but] it would not immediately confer the full
international legal personality of statehood." 20 Under the proposal, Kosovo would
"gradually acquire the rights of a state as it demonstrates that its people can live in
peace with each other and with the neighboring states in the region."' 12 1 As Kosovo
attained increasing levels of sovereignty in response to its protection of minority
rights and promotion of stability, the international community could reduce its
military presence. At such time as Kosovo "established conditions of internal and
external peace" it would be able to earn recognition of its independence from the

116. The Goldstone Commission, was created at the initiative of the Swedish government and
funded by that government as well as the Government of Canada, and numerous foundations. Members
of the Commission included key foreign policy makers and commentators from Japan, the United
States, Russia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Czech Republic. The
Commission was chaired by Judge Richard Goldstone of the South African Constitutional Court, and
Co-Chaired by Carl Tham of Sweden. The report was presented to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations on October 23, 20000.
117. THE Kosovo REPORT, supranote 20, at 271.
118. Id. at 272-3.
119. THE Kosovo REPORT, supranote 20, at 274.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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The Goldstone Proposal was a crucial development in the evolution of the
approach of earned sovereignty in two important ways. First, it provided a rational
and lucid road map for the international community to establish a secure peace and
consequently reduce its presence in Kosovo, at a time when the United Nations had
effectively displaced FRY sovereignty over Kosovo, but had begun to settle into
the process of establishing a costly and perpetual U.N. protectorate over Kosovo.
Second, the Goldstone Proposal further evolved the notion of earned sovereignty
by proposing the element of phased sovereignty for Kosovo in proportion
23 to the
ability of the Kosovo institutions to provide internal and external security.'
One of the flaws of the Goldstone proposal was that it did not seek the
express renunciation of designs for a Greater Albania or a Greater Kosovo, or any
commitments not to undertake territorial association with neighboring states as
called for in the 1998 PILPG report.
In response to the Goldstone proposal, and efforts by influential former policy
makers, the United States and the United Nations renewed their efforts to craft
province-wide institutions capable of absorbing the transfer of sovereign authority
from the United Nations to the people of Kosovo. These efforts met stiff
resistance by the European Union and some European states who had come to
believe that an independent Kosovo might further destabilize the region and
promote increased separatism in Europe.
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROVISIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

While Resolution 1244 expressly called for the creation of a Constitutional
Framework for the governance of Kosovo, it was not until May 15, 2001 that
UNMIK officially promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional SelfGovernment. Little progress towards a constitution was made during the first two
years of UNMIK's operation, as many European states objected to the devolution
of authority from UNMIK to the Kosovar people that would accompany the
promulgation of a constitution. In large part, key European states returned to the
approach of "the stability through accommodation" and sought to diminish the
elements of earned sovereignty woven into the Rambouillet Accords and UNSC
1244.
The Constitutional Framework was eventually drafted and promulgated as a
result of strong American pressure to fulfill the international obligations set forth
in 1244 and by the commitment of a highly skilled Department of State lawyer
who was able to craft a constitution which provided for the democratic
representation of all legitimate parties in Kosovo, while providing mechanisms for
building up the capacity24 of Kosovar institutions, and thus easing any future
transition to final status.'

122. Id.
123. THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 20, at 274.
124. See generally RegulationNo. 2001/9, supra note 22.
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The Constitutional Framework set forth three sets of guiding principles for the
future governance of Kosovo. First, it required the domestic institutions of Kosovo
to "exercise their authorities consistent with the provisions of JNSCR 1244 (1999)
and the terms set forth in this Constitutional Framework."'125 Second, it required
those institutions to "promote and fully respect the rule of law, human rights and
freedoms, democratic principles and reconciliation."' 126 To ensure the protection of
human rights throughout Kosovo, the Constitutional Framework required that the
provisions on rights and freedoms set forth in a number of international human
rights treaties and instruments would be directly applicable in Kosovo as part of
the Constitutional Framework. 127 Finally, the Constitutional Framework provided
that the Kosovar institutions must "promote and respect the principle of the
division of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.' 28
These principles represent an expansion of the core themes of earned sovereignty
relating to the protection of human rights and the basic principles of democratic
governance.
The Constitutional Framework then enumerated the responsibilities of the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. These include economic policy, trade,
administrative and operational customs, education, health, environmental policy,
infrastructure, agriculture and forestry, tourism, and "good governance, human
rights and equal opportunity." The institutions also possess specific duties in the
fields of local administration, judicial affairs, mass media, and emergency
preparedness. The Constitutional Framework further stipulated that any external
relations conducted by the provisional institutions must be conducted with the
coordination of the SRSG,
and that the powers must be exercised in alignment with
29
international standards. 1
With respect to the allocation of authority, the Constitutional Framework set
the foundation for the implementation of a process of phased sovereignty as
suggested in the Goldstone report by creating democratic institutions for the
governance of Kosovo, while initially retaining most of the authority for decisionmaking within the purview of the SRSG. For instance, while the new Kosovar
Parliament possessed the authority to establish economic and fiscal policy, and to
regulate most areas of state activity, the SRSG retained authorities such as
approval of the budget, operation of the customs service, the setting of monetary
policy, the appointment and dismissal of judges, and conduct of the international

125. Id. at ch. 2, para. a.
126. Id. at ch. 2, para. b.
127. These treaties included the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Protocols thereto; the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages; and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities. Id. at ch. 3, para. 2.
128. Id. at ch. 2, para. c.
129. United Nations: Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, ConstitutionalFrameworkfor
ProvisionalSelf-Government, UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001), Chapter 5.
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affairs of Kosovo.130 The Constitutional Framework was clear that, consistent with
Resolution 1244, the powers retained by the SRSG should be increasingly turned
people of Kosovo as the new institutions mature and become
over to the
3
effective.) 1
The Constitutional Framework also set up a unique dual key system of initial
and primary responsibility that could be used to effectively implement a system of
earned sovereignty. For instance, while the Kosovar institutions possessed the
right to make decisions regarding the appointment of judges and prosecutors, the
SRSG retained the final authority regarding the appointment, removal from office
and disciplining of judges and prosecutors. While the Kosovar institutions could
ensure coordination on matters pertaining to the judicial system and the
correctional service, the SRSG exercised authority over law enforcement
institutions and the correctional service, both of which included and were
supported by local staff.132 Similarly, as noted above, the Kosovar institutions
could engage in international and external cooperation, including the reaching and
finalizing
of agreements so long as they coordinated such activities with the
33
SRSG. 1
With the significant overlap of sovereignty, the system created by the
Constitutional Framework was well designed to transfer increasing amounts of
sovereign authority in an orderly and effective manner to the Kosovar institutions
as they demonstrated their capability to govern successfully and to protect minority
and human rights.
The Constitutional Framework also very clearly carried through the key
element of earned sovereignty as reflected in the Rambouillet Accords, that of a
final status determined along the lines expressed by the will of the people.
Specifically, the Constitutional Framework provided that the provisional
institutions of self-government should conduct their work with "a view to
facilitating the determination of Kosovo's future status through a process at an
take
appropriate future stage which shall, in accordance with UNSCR 1244(1999),
' 34
full account of all relevant factors including the will of the people."'
Initially, the work of the Kosovar Parliament was largely preoccupied with
establishing itself, as opposed to UNMIK, as the responsible body for exercising
Kosovo's sovereignty. One of the first acts of the parliament was to pass a
resolution in the foreign policy and security sphere, a responsibility retained
exclusively for the SRSG under the Constitutional Framework. In May 2002,
Parliament voted to reject the Serbia/Macedonia border demarcation agreement of
February 2001 between Serbia and Macedonia. The agreement was opposed by
Kosovars and was, at first, condemned by UNMIK for failing to consult the
international administration in an agreement that altered Kosovo's boundaries.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Regulation 2001/9, supra note 22, at ch. 8.
Id. at chs. 6, 14.2
See Regulation 2001/9, supra note 22, at ch. 9.4.
Id. at ch. 5.6.
Id. at pmbl.
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However, a year later the United Nations decided to support the agreement over
the objections of Kosovars, who claimed that over 2500 hectares of land were
being turned over by Serbia, which no longer exercised any de facto sovereignty
over Kosovo, to Macedonia.
The Parliament's resolution to preserve and protect Kosovo's territorial
integrity was declared null and void by the SRSG, Michael Steiner, who criticized
the action as a setback that deliberately antagonized the international
community.135 The Parliament's actions and Steiner's response reflected the
growing competition between the United Nations and the new Kosovo political
institutions over control of sovereign functions and authority for Kosovo.
POLITICAL CHANGES IN SERBIA AND LULL IN ACCUMULATION OF Kosovo
SOVEREIGNTY

Political changes in Serbia, such as the removal of President Milosevic and
his transfer to the Yugoslav Tribunal to stand trial for crimes against humanity in
Kosovo and genocide in Bosnia, as well as the continued tension between Kosovar
Albanians and Kosovar Serbs led the SRSG to retain substantial powers and to
significantly slow any further devolution, despite the requirements of the
Constitutional Framework.
With the collapse of Milosevic's authoritarian, nationalist rule and its
replacement by a more Western-focused government, the international community
became increasingly concerned that efforts to increase Kosovar self-governance
could destabilize Serbia. The election of a pro-independence government in
Montenegro also dampened the willingness of the international community to
support further devolution of sovereign authority and functions to Kosovo.
Moreover, although the Serbian public became increasingly aware of the atrocities
committed by Serbian forces against Kosovar civilians, there was no abatement in
the nationalist pull to retain Kosovo within Serbia. Growing political violence in
southern Serbia and Macedonia reinforced the Serbian desire to retain Kosovo and
the fear of the international community that an increasingly sovereign Kosovo
could lead to greater instability in the Balkan region. In particular, the European
Union objected to any efforts that might be deemed as leading toward a resolution
36
of final status for fear of undermining the democratic transformation in Serbia. 1
As a result of these developments there was a lull in the accumulation of Kosovar
sovereignty. The lull became all the more pronounced, as the second Kosovo
135. See Administrator Rules Kosovo Resolution "Null and Void," DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
May 23, 2002.
136. The primary policy objective of the European Union in 2002 has been to maintain the
existence of the Yugoslav federation in the face of Montenegrin desire for independence and growing
indifference on the part of Serbians toward the future of Yugoslavia. Believing that if Montenegro were
to depart Yugoslavia then Kosovo's exit would be guaranteed, the European Union secured an
agreement that preserved Yugoslavia in a very loose confederacy for another three years before
referendums, if so desired, on independence could be launched. Maintaining the stability through
accommodation, in preserving Yugoslavia and in avoiding determination of Kosovo's future political
status is the core of the European Union's Balkan policy.
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Commission reported, explaining that once Kosovo's Parliament and Prime
Minister were chosen, "the stage will be set for a growing conflict over the
SRSG's reserved powers, and more generally between a local political elite,
ratified by their electorate, bent on securing ever greater powers of selfgovernment and an international administration, bent on maintaining its
prerogatives."'' 37 The Goldstone Commission further noted that some international
authorities treated Kosovar capacity for self-rule with "imperial condescension"
capacity of the
and that a "pervasive distrust" of the political and administrative 138
local population "appears to underlie the constitutional provisions."
GOLDSTONE PROPOSAL II

In September 2001, in response to the stalled efforts to devolve sovereignty to
Kosovar institutions, and in light of increasing fears that maintaining the stability
through accommodation would lead to an unnecessarily prolonged commitment of
U.N. resources and NATO troops, and that the stability through accommodation
was creating substantial instability in the region, the Goldstone Commission
released a more detailed proposal for conditional independence.1 39 The second
Goldstone proposal (Goldstone II) maintained the elements of the first proposal,
but provided a more specific road map for the devolution of powers.
In rejecting the stability through accommodation model of an indefinite
protectorate, the Goldstone proposal cited several reasons that this protectorate
was actually increasing and prolonging instability. The Commission argued that
the indefinite protectorate implied by the Constitutional Framework would not, as
some argued, allay tension in the region by ruling out independence. Rather, the
protectorate would increase tension between the people of Kosovo and the
international administration of the SRSG. Moreover, by maintaining the undefined
nature of Kosovo's status, the international protectorate model would encourage
both nationalist hopes for a greater Albania, or for a greater Yugoslavia, and was in
fact already serving as a catalysts for ethnic violence, both within and outside
Kosovo. 140
Goldstone II argued for the rapid devolution of important powers from the
SRSG to the Kosovar government relating to such matters as customs, the
judiciary, the police, public and state owned property, transportation, civil aviation,
housing and property matters, and regulation of municipal boundaries. The
Goldstone commission also argued that the undefined residual powers of Chapter
12 of the Constitutional Framework should also be exercised by the Kosovar
government. 141

137. THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
138. Idat20-21.
139. See generally THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 1.
140. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Follow Up: Why Conditional
Independence? (September 2001), "The Situation in Kosovo and the Illusion of Self-Rule," "Revisiting
Conditional Independence."
141. Id. at25
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Coupled with the devolution of powers, Goldstone II proposed that the
relevant Kosovar institutions be permitted to negotiate with the NATO-led Kosovo
Force (KFOR) international security presence in Kosovo, and that they be
empowered to enter into negotiations with international agencies and foreign
governments, and presumably be entitled to establish some form of foreign
mission. In particular, the Goldstone commission thought it necessary for the
Kosovar government to be able to enter into relations with neighboring states.
Absent such authority, it is feared the Kosovar authorities would have little or no
incentive to behave in a responsible manner toward its neighboring states.142
In arguing for the rapid devolution of authority, the Goldstone Commission
noted that over seventy
percent of revenues used by the Kosovo government were
43
internally generated.
Goldstone II proposed that in exchange for the assumption of these powers,
the Kosovar government would undertake a variety of commitments which were a
mix of general responsibilities of a state under international law, and
responsibilities which would be considered limits on the sovereignty of an
internationally recognized state.' 44
The first commitment reflected a return to the original condition contained in
the 1998 PILPG report and provided that Kosovo must explicitly renounce any
claim to a Greater Albania or a Greater Kosovo. While the Commission was
sympathetic to the legitimate need to support Albanian rights in other states, it
believed it was necessary for the Kosovar government to explicitly declare a
commitment to a policy of non-interference
in neighboring states, and to the
45
respect for their territorial integrity.
The second commitment reflected a return to a key theme of the Rambouillet
Accords, which was the requirement for a constitutional guarantee of human rights
for all the citizens of Kosovo. In the same vein as the Rambouillet Accords,
Goldstone II seemed to call for guaranteed participation in all the institutions of
Kosovo, and in particular the judiciary, police and elected offices. Goldstone II
further suggested that minority populations should be entitled to "internationally
protected rights to government services and education in their own language."
Goldstone II was careful to note that mere constitutional protections and some
form of international involvement in the protection of rights were in and of
themselves insufficient and that in addition the Kosovar institutions would be
expected to make "real efforts" to cooperate with the minority populations in
Kosovo and to foster inter-ethnic dialogue and promote reconciliation. The
measure of success would be the extent to which minorities continued to remain in
Kosovo, and whether conditions1 46were created which prompted Serb refugees to
return to their homes in Kosovo.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
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The third commitment concerned the standard international legal obligation of
states to renounce the use of violence. Here the Goldstone Commission felt it
necessary that the Kosovo political leadership expressly renounce violence to settle
internal and external disputes and that it take active steps to build a culture of nonviolence. Goldstone II also called for the express distancing of the Kosovar
political leadership from liberation groups in neighboring Serbia and
Macedonia. 147
The fourth commitment involved the obligation/right to actively engage in
for regional
efforts at regional cooperation and participate in mechanisms
48
governance and support the work of regional institutions.
To ensure compliance with these commitments, Goldstone II called for
continued international supervision, with the final authority for protecting borders
49
and minorities being placed in the hands of the international presence.'
Goldstone II seemed to argue that the Kosovar government should hold the initial
responsibility to fulfill the commitments, and that in areas such as the protection of
minority rights and the respect for the territorial integrity of neighboring states the
international community would create back-up mechanisms to be employed only
when the Kosovo government is unwilling or unable to meet these commitments.
Goldstone II thus called for the near immediate reduction of the powers of the
international community, in the form of the SRSG or some other appropriate form,
to include only protection of minorities, guarantee of human rights and the
guarantee of the integrity of borders, with these powers exercised only when the
locally elected officials failed to meet their obligations. S5
The presence of the international community would be phased out and the
sovereign authority of Kosovo would continue to grow as the government and
people of Kosovo proved themselves capable of meeting the above commitments.
Over time, as Kosovo fully met these commitments, it would become international
recognized by the member states of the international community.' 5 '
The Goldstone Commission sought to rebut the three main arguments
presented against earned sovereignty. First the Commission addressed the concern
that the nascent democracy in Serbia would be jeopardized by reopened
discussions about Kosovo's future, which could fuel extremist sympathy. Here,
the Commission argued that, in fact, postponing the resolution would actually
in the future, once support for the new
increase the difficulty of resolving the issue
152
democratic administration had subsided.
Next, the Commission reviewed the concern that permitting conditional
independence for Kosovo could set off demands for the same in Montenegro and
other regions. The Commission argued that this concern was overstated as the
147. Id. at 27.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
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specific conditions for Kosovo's earned sovereignty ruled out spillover effects,
conditional independence would eliminate many of the current uncertainties in the
region, none of the other sub-sate entities possessed the same legal argument for
independence, which was a history of systematic human rights abuses, and earned
sovereignty was not any more likely than the other proposed scenarios to generate
domino effects.' 53
Finally, the Commission addressed the concern that the mere discussion of
Kosovo's final status could undermine unanimity within the UN Security Council.
The Goldstone Commission argued that this too was an overstated concern as
Russia was unlikely to154block a resolution if such a resolution had already been
agreed to in the region.
ICG PROPOSAL
Following the initial articulation and subsequent development of the concept
of earned sovereignty by the Public International Law & Policy Group and the
Goldstone Commission, the ICG sought to lend additional support for the concept
and to further refine its application to Kosovo.
The ICG proposal, which was firmly based in the PILPG and Goldstone
precedent, extended the concept and argued for a renewed international trusteeship.
The ICG proposal also separated out the question of compliance with conditions
from that of Kosovo's final status. The ICG argued that Kosovo's final status
should be settled in parallel with the running of the international trusteeship of
Kosovo, and at such point as the international presence was no longer needed
Kosovar institutions would be able to assume
relevant sovereign powers and then
55
step into whatever status Kosovo possessed.
The ICG proposal argued that a resolution of Kosovo's final status was
crucial to stability in the region. ICG believed that the uncertain process for
determining a final status was a significant obstacle to the normalization of
relations between the Albanian and Serb communities, and that it prolonged the
view of each group that the other was a threat. The proposal further argued that
continued uncertainty threatened the political investment of the international
community56 in Kosovo, and caused the unnecessary extension of the peacekeeping
presence.
Like the Goldstone proposal, the ICG proposal then sought to refute the three
main arguments that the international community often made for postponing the
discussion of Kosovo's final status. First, lCG argued that the initiation of final
status talks would not setback Serbia's transition, as it was in fact the lack of
definition of Kosovo's final status which was beginning to undermine Serbian
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See International Crisis Group, A Kosovo Roadmap (I): Addressing FinalStatus,
"ICG Balkans Report N0 124" (2002), pp. ii-iv, available at www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/
kosovo/reports/A400561_01032002.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2002).
156. ICG, supra ii..
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stability and slow the transition to a non-nationalist state. Second, ICG argued that
a determination of Kosovo's final status would not jeopardize regional stability by
encouraging other separatist movements in the region as Kosovo's case was
dissimilar to other regional groups, given its history as a defined state within the
former Yugoslavia and its status as a UN protectorate. Finally, the ICG observed
that while some argued international consensus on Kosovo was not strong enough
to withstand reopening
the issue, in fact, "the international consensus has become a
157
recipe for inertia."'
With respect to the substance of conditional independence, the ICG proposal
built on the earlier earned sovereignty proposals by separating out questions of
internal and external sovereignty. While ICG adopted the notion of earned
sovereignty for the devolution of powers from an international trusteeship to
domestic Kosovar institutions, it argued that the final status of Kosovo, be it
independence or some association with Serbia, should be settled immediately in
political negotiations, and that status should be implemented by an international
trustee until such time as the Kosovar institutions were capable of displacing the
trustee.' 58
This addition was a critical development as it clarified the need to resolve the
fact that there was no possibility for Kosovo to remain part of Serbia and to begin
the process of creating an independent Kosovo, so that when Kosovar institutions
were capable of assuming full sovereign powers, they were not immediately faced
with having to then establish Kosovo as an independent entity.
Recognizing the necessity to respond to the will of the people of Kosovo, the
ICG proposal argued that Kosovo and Serbia should negotiate arrangements for
Kosovo's final status under the auspices of the United Nations and G8, but that if
these negotiations are unsuccessful, the international community "should discharge
the responsibility it assumed in 1999 by imposing a solution based on the
democratic will of the people of Kosovo." 59 The will of the people would be
assessed via a referendum.
The ICG believed that the success of the negotiations would be enhanced if
Kosovar and Serb institutions immediately undertook a dialogue on practical issues
of mutual concern and on confidence building measures.'6
While the PILPG and Goldstone proposals focused substantial attention on
the conditions for earned sovereignty, the ICG proposal was less adamant about
the nature of the conditions, in part because it believed they should be negotiated
by the parties concerned, and rather focused on the process of phasing sovereignty,
while simultaneously resolving the question of final status. Moreover, the focus of
the ICG report was more on the actual ability of Kosovar institutions to effectively
govern in a fair and effective manner, and less on its express commitment to
certain principles.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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As such, the ICG proposal argued that earned sovereignty would likely
include the requirement of the full protection of minority rights, and the
renunciation of intentions for a Greater6 Albania or Greater Kosovo, although the
ICG believed this fear to be overstated.1 1
With respect to the nature of the proposed trusteeship, the ICG argued it
should be less intrusive than the current SRSG arrangement, with the trustee
simply exercising veto powers either at large or in specifically defined areas. Like
the 1998 PILPG and Goldstone II proposals, ICG argued that the Kosovo
responsibility for foreign
government should be permitted to exercise immediate
162
policy, the budget and matters of law and order.
The external security of Kosovo would be provided by an international
military presence, with internal security being increasingly provided by the
internationally trained Kosovo Police Service. Potentially the trustee would be
able to call upon the international military force to ensure the protection of
minority rights, and could rely upon a 63monitoring mission to monitor the
effectiveness of the Kosovo Police Service.1
Finally, the ICG warns that "a viable future for Kosovo has to be based on
close integration with its neighbors," but that one should not "impose models of
integration that do not enjoy the support of the countries and the entities
concerned."164

The ICG argued that conditional independence, or earned recognition, was the
only final status option that satisfied all the key ingredients necessary for a stable
final status. While ICG recognized that Kosovo was not yet prepared to exercise
full sovereignty, it reasoned that through a process of conditional independence it
would be able to earn this right and gradually prove itself capable of full
According to the ICG, conditional independence would also
independence.
solidify Kosovo's status as an entity outside the sovereign control of the FRY.
International aid and investment, currently discouraged by the uncertainty in
Kosovo, would increase with a certain final status, and would remain in Kosovo as
it would be unimpeded by fears that a fledgling nation might prove itself unworthy
of such inflow. The ICG also argued that by "remaining on probation, Kosovo
Albanians would have a strong 5incentive to ensure that Kosovo would cease to be a
factor of regional instability."16
The ICG then addressed a number of arguments that had been presented
against the approach of earned sovereignty. First, the ICG disputed the notion that
maintaining an uncertain prospect for independence preserved stability. Rather, in
the view of the ICG, it was the lack of certainty over Kosovo's future that was a

161. Id. at 12.
162. Id. at 12-13.
163. The ICG makes the argument for fair representation of minorities in the judiciary and for
supervision of the judiciary by an international entity other than the trustee in order to preserve the
principle of separation of powers. International Crisis Group, supranote 149, at 12-13.
164. Id. at iv.
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major contribution factor to regional instability. The ICG also argued that the fear
of retaliation from the Serb community, which was frequently invoked as an
argument against earned sovereignty was unfounded as the democratically elected
Serbian government was unlikely to call for mass emigration in the face of final
status. Another argument often presented regarding Serbia is that final status for
Kosovo would lead to an increase in nationalist sentiment in Serbia, at the expense
of moderates and stability. ICG rebutted this claim by noting that, if the goal was
long-term stability, preservation of an unstable entity and, with it, the possibility of
another change to Serbia's geography and demographics would only prolong the
transition to a stable democracy. Finally, the ICG rebutted the claim that Kosovo
would set a precedent for other separatist movements in the region by presenting
the key difference between Kosovo and other areas, that "Kosovo's interim status
is underpinned by a UN Resolution that leaves the question of final status open.' 66
UNMIK's

STANDARDS BEFORE STATUS APPROACH

Adopting the key elements of earned sovereignty, UNMIK laid out in May
2002 an approach entitled "standards before status." The two cornerstones of the
approach were 1) a public declaration in June 2003, that the United Nations could
not foresee a return to direct Serbian control; and 2) the public release in July 2003
of a detailed set of benchmarks required of the Kosovo institutions. Michael
Steiner also publicly added that he ruled out the possibility "for Kosova's future: a
partition along ethnic lines."' 67 Steiner's development of an earned sovereignty
approach of standards before status came at a time when according to Western
observers in Prishtina, "Kosova is heading for independence sooner or later, and
that even 'almost everyone in Belgrade regards Kosova as lost' to Serbia".168
The standards before status policy sought to ensure that Kosovo possessed
sufficient institutions to govern an independent state, and that it would be a
democratic state which protected human and minority rights, thus diminishing the
need for continued shared international responsibility for Kosovo's sovereign
authority and functions.
According to UNMIK, the general prerequisites of the standards before status
approach were, "full compliance with and implementation of Resolution 1244 and
the Constitutional Framework. Multi-ethnicity, tolerance, security, and fairness
under normal conditions, without special measures."' 69 In particular, Mr. Steiner
70
placed significant emphasis on the creation of a multi-ethnic society.
166. ICG supra, 6-9.
167. RFE/RL Newsline, Southeastern Europe: Steiner Says No Return Of Kosova to Serbian Rule
(June 26, 2002) at http:/lwww.rferl.org/newline/2002/06/4-Seesee-260602.asp (last visited Mar. 1,
2003).
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Status].
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Specifically, the benchmarks covered the areas of functioning democratic
institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee returns and reintegration,
economic reform and development, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and
the responsible operation of the Kosovo Protection Corps. 171
For each of these categories, UNMIK set forth goals, benchmarks, and
specific actions to be taken by the local community. For instance, with respect to
freedom of movement, UNMIK set the goal that "all communities can circulate
freely throughout Kosovo, including city centers, and use their language." 172 The
benchmark for measuring the attainment of this goal was the "unrestricted
movement by minorities without reliance on military or police." 173 The required
local action included "policy and sustained action by [local institutions] to promote
condemnation by
FOM [freedom of movement] publicly" and "[u]nprompted
' 74
holders of public office of obstruction and violence"'
With respect to the process for resolving final status, the United Nations
determined that it was necessary to meet these benchmarks before discussions on
final status could commence. 75 In essence, the UN determined that phase four of
earned sovereignty could not commence in the case of Kosovo until after the
conditions had in fact been met to a substantial degree. As explained by SRSG
Steiner, the rationale behind this approach was that "Kosovo can only advance
176
towards a fair and just society when these minimum pre-conditions are met."'
Moreover, Mr. Steiner argued, these standards also mirrored those that were
required to be considered for integration into Europe: "I offer this to you as an
'exit strategy' which is, in reality, an 'entry strategy' into the European integration
process. The benchmarks complement the preconditions that Kosovo needs to
meet to qualify for the Stabilisation and Association process." 177 According to the
United Nations press office, "the Parliament in Kosovo, the population, the
on the benchmark
political leaders and the government had agreed to concentrate
178
of a respected society before talking about the status issue."'
In deciding to not set a fixed date for final status talks, but to rather condition
the initiation of the process upon the achievement of specified conditions, the
United Nations seems to have determined both that discussions on final status
would generate political instability, which would undermine efforts to build
Kosovar institutions, and that when the Kosovar institutions were in fact able to
[hereinafter
available at http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsenpc020627.htm
2002
Highlights].
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meet the criteria set forth in the standards before status approach, the independence
of Kosovo would be a relatively foregone conclusion. The view that standards
before status attempts to circumvent potentially cumbersome political negotiations
with Serbia and establish an irreversible final status for Kosovo is supported by
Steiner's declarations that Kosovo would not return to direct Serbian control and
by his general unwillingness to consult with FRY or Serbian officials concerning
any matters relating to Kosovo - as evidenced by his statement, "I will
not mix
1 79
into Belgrade affairs, and Belgrade will not mix in Prishtina's affairs."'
Mr. Steiner and the United Nations may also have calculated that in the 3-5
years it will take Kosovo to reach the standards of democratic self-governance, the
political elite in Serbia will have come to accept the inevitable loss of Kosovo and
the fact that it would be impossible for a truly democratic Serbia to retain
possession of a territory where nearly all two million of its inhabitants desire
independence.
The key to a successful implementation of standards before status will be the
continued devolution of authority to Kosovar institutions as required by Resolution
1244. According to Mr. Steiner he has begun, and will continue, to phase
responsibility for the exercise of sovereign authority and functions to Kosovar
institutions in order to prepare Kosovo for a final determination of its international
status. 80
CONCLUSION

The approach of earned sovereignty to the Kosovo conflict, which began in
1998 as a proposal by the Public International Law & Policy Group working with
the International Crisis Group has evolved over the past five years through peace
negotiations and UN Security Council Resolutions and subsequent interpretations
of those resolutions to now to serve as the foundation for the resolution of
Kosovo's final status.
During the course of its evolution, the basic elements of the approach were
further refined. In the wake of the NATO humanitarian intervention the first phase
of shared sovereignty, which initially involved a detailed and complicated
arrangement for dual sovereignty over Kosovo with substantial international
monitoring and some international administration, evolved into a phase of
excluded sovereignty. The first phase thus ended with the United Nations and
NATO excluding Serbia for exercising any sovereignty authority or functions on
the territory of Kosovo, only in the interim retaining Kosovo within the territorial
designation of the FRY. During the second phase, the international community
undertook an aggressive approach of institution building, including the election of
local and regional officials, but suffered from an initial institutional unwillingness
to transfer authority and functions to those institutions once established.
The benchmarks established in the third phase for increased transfer of
179. See Naegele, supra note 133.
180. Id.
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authority and functions, which were guided by the views of the Goldstone
Commission and the International Crisis Group, included traditional concerns such
as the protection of human and minority rights, the transformation to democratic
rule and the rule of law, and respecting the territorial integrity of neighboring
states. The attainment of these conditions soon became the primary, if not sole
focus, of the international presence in Kosovo. Phase four, the determination of
final status, which had been set with a clear date in the Rambouillet Accords, was
transformed into an ongoing process in the United Nations Standards before Status
doctrine whereby the international community required that the conditions in phase
three be substantially met prior to undertaking negotiations to settle Kosovo's final
status. In light of the heavy involvement of the international community in
Kosovo's transition it is predictable that even after independence the international
community will continue to undertake certain monitoring tasks to ensure the
continued compliance with phase three conditions.
Throughout its development and application in Kosovo, the earned
sovereignty approach competed for influence with the alternative approach of
stability through accommodation and was shaped by the compromises inherent in
the foreign policy decision making process. In the end, the debate yielded a more
refined approach which presents the greatest opportunity for facilitating a viable
and lasting settlement of the Kosovo conflict.

MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND TERRORISM
DAVID STOELTING*
President George W. Bush's Military Order of November 13, 2001, issued
just thirty-two days after the terrorist atrocities of September 11, 2001, pointedly
adopted the language of war and, almost by fiat, declared that terrorism was a war
crime. As a result, under the Military Order the fight against terrorism became a
"state of armed conflict"' and terrorist acts became "violations of the laws of
2
war."
These designations abruptly erased long-held distinctions between terrorism
and war crimes and represented a signal departure from pre-9/11 practice. More
specifically, the Military Order has provided the theoretical underpinning for
allowing foreign terrorists to be subject to trial by American military commissions.
The consequence has been the largest expansion of the jurisdiction of military
commissions in American history.
The novelty of using military commissions to try terrorists is apparent in
several respects. First, unlike every other military commission ever created by the
United States government, the Military Order, which is focused almost exclusively
on terrorism, is designed to create tribunals not for war criminals but for terrorists.
Next, terrorism and war crimes had been defined by different legal regimes. The
Order, however, collapses their definitions and blurs longstanding distinctions.
Finally, military commissions have never before been used to try terrorists. As a
long line of U.S. Supreme Court and Attorney General Opinions demonstrate,
military commissions had been restricted to members of an organized military
force acting as an agent of a state or government.
Using military commissions to try terrorists, then, represents a stark departure
previous practice and policy. As a result, because the commissions envisaged by
the Order at last appear to be nearing realization (almost two years after the
Order's issuance), the Supreme Court may have to decide the legality of this
*Ofthe New York Bar; Immediate Past Chair, Committee on International Criminal Law, ABA Section
of International Law and Practice; Chair, Committee on African Affairs, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York. This article arises from a paper delivered on March 23, 2002, as part of the Sutton
Colloquium at the University of Denver College of Law. I am grateful to the organizers of the
Colloquium, including Prof. Ved P. Nanda, Prof. Michael Scharf and Prof. Paul Williams. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author.
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first and foremost to prevent enemy combatants from continuing to fight.") (transcript available at
http://www.osce.org/odihr/hdim/2002/doc/speech_!.pd).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31:3

approach. And while the government will emphasize its duty to protect national
security in a time of "war," it should at least be recognized that permitting military
commissions to try terrorists is a radically different approach. Indeed, supporters
of the Military Order could more credibly argue that the exigencies of September
11 h led to a cataclysmic transformation of international law legitimizing what had
previously been illegitimate. Better to acknowledge an arguably necessary shift in
the legal landscape than to assert a dubious consistency.
I. THE MILITARY ORDER CREATES A FORUM FOR TRYING TERRORISTS

In the immediate aftermath of September 1 th, the rhetorical and symbolic
purposes of the Military Order were paramont. To begin with, the Order departed
starkly from prior orders creating military commissions by focusing
unambiguously on terrorism rather than violations of the laws of war. This is
apparent from the face of the Order, which repeatedly mentions terrorism and
terrorists and clearly is directed at persons accused of terrorist acts rather than war
crimes. In the "Findings" section, for example, the Order states that "international
terrorists" have committed "grave acts of terrorism" and that there is a risk of
"further terrorist attacks." 4 Individuals "involved in international terrorism" may
"undertake further terrorist attacks." 5 Military commissions are needed due to "the
nature of international terrorism" for the "prevention of terrorist attacks."6
The Military Order, therefore, introduced and formalized the militarization of
America's response to terrorism. It repudiated the idea that terrorism is strictly a
criminal justice problem and, more importantly, established the legal basis for a
long-term military approach to the problem of terrorism. By embracing the notion
that terrorist acts are war crimes, the Military Order provided a conceptual context
that sought to legitimate overwhelming force in response. Moreover, the Order
delivered this message of resolve at the outset of the military response to terrorism.
As a result, those suspected of terrorism during the length of this unending war are
subject to what no foreign terrorist has ever faced before: an American military
tribunal staffed by U.S. soldiers as judges, no habeas corpus option and no right of
appeal to civilian courts.
The text of the Military Order demonstrates its single-minded emphasis on
terrorists rather than war criminals. Section 2 of the Order, describing the persons
eligible for trial by military commissions, does not state that war criminals are to
be subject to the commissions. Instead, the persons to be tried pursuant to the
Military Order are any individual who "is or was a member of the organization
known as al Qaida" and any individual who "has engaged in, aided or abetted, or
conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation
therefor" designed to harm "the United States, its citizens, national security,
foreign policy, or economy." 7 The Military Order also permits trial by military
4.
5.
6.
7.
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commission of any individual who has "knowingly harbored" current and former
members of al Qaida or other persons that have engaged in, aided or abetted of
conspired to commit terrorism.8
The Military Order's ideological purposes were further evidenced by the fact
that at the time of its promulgation there was no apparent intent to actually create
commissions. Although various rules and regulations regarding the operation of
the commissions have been released in the twenty months after the issuance of the
Order, there has been no urgency to try persons by the commissions authorized by
the Order. This is unusual. Other Presidential orders resulted in the formation of
panels within a short period of time. For example, the German saboteurs
prosecuted pursuant to President Roosevelt's order in 1942 were already in
custody when the order was issued. 9 Within a two-month period, the saboteurs
were captured, the military commission was ordered and completed its
proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments and upheld the legality
of the trial, and the Germans were executed. In contrast, almost two years after the
Order, only preliminary steps toward actually using the commissions have been
taken, further suggesting that the rhetorical purposes of the Order, at least initially,
were paramount.
II. ACTS OF TERRORISM HAVE NOT BEEN CONSIDERED OFFENSES TRIABLE BY
MILITARY COMMISSIONS

Military tribunals, not being courts of general jurisdiction, may only
adjudicate crimes to the extent authorized to do by an act of Congress or the
common law of war. The legitimacy of terrorists being tried by military
commissions according to the Military Order, therefore, depends on whether such
authorization exists either in a federal statute or in the laws of war. If neither
Congress nor the laws of war permits such trials, any commissions created
pursuant to the Military Order may be perceived as lacking legitimacy.1
Regarding the first point, plainly Congress has never authorized military
commissions to try terrorists. No U.S. statute permits military commissions to try
terrorists. The statutory authority cited in the Military Order, Section 821 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) does not state that military tribunals can
be used to try terrorists. Instead, it simply preserves the well-established
jurisdiction of military commissions over crimes as established by statute or by the
laws of war. The statute itself states that it "do[es] not deprive military
8. Military Order, supra note 1.
9. Appointment of Military Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942).
10. The Military Order relies upon the President's authority as Commander in Chief and the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution. 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1998); S.J. Res. 23 107th
Cong. (2001). The President's authority as Commander in Chief to create military commissions,
however, must be exercised consistently with the laws of war. As to the Joint Resolution, it authorized
the use of force, not the creation of military commissions to try terrorists. It has been argued that
authorizing military force against terrorism necessarily includes authorizing military trial of terrorists.
There is no evidence, however, that Congress intended to approve military commissions, which had
never been used previously to try terrorists.
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commissions... of concurrent jurisdiction [with courts-martial] with respect to
offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military
commission.""
In the absence of statutory authorization, the question becomes whether the
law of war, also known as international humanitarian law, permits such
prosecutions. As the U.S. Attorney General opined in 1918, military courts cannot
try individuals who are "not a member of the military forces" unless they are2
"subject to the jurisdiction of such court under the laws of war or martial law."'
Thus, the issue is whether the laws of war, which traditionally has defined the
jurisdiction of American military commissions, can be stretched to encompass
terrorism. As shown below, while not entirely mutually exclusive, the acts of
terrorism committed by al Qaida and other groups that are the focus of the Order
cannot generally be fit into the definitional framework of international
humanitarian law.
The question of whether terrorism can be defined as a war crimes and
therefore come within the jurisdiction of military commissions, largely depends on
whether terrorism can be defined as an "international armed conflict." The most
universally accepted definition of war crimes, recognized in federal statutes 3 and
elsewhere, is the "grave breaches" provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of
1949.14 The Geneva Conventions require an "armed conflict which may arise5
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties" as a threshold requirement.1
Isolated attacks over a period of years by persons associated with freelance
terrorist networks unaffiliated with any government, however, generally have not
been defined as an armed conflict. Thus, the threshold requirement for application
of the Geneva Conventions - an "armed conflict" - is not satisfied by a conflict
between one High Contracting Party (the United States) and a transnational
network of terrorists (al Qaeda).
Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which apply to
non-international armed conflicts taking place within the territory of a High
Contracting Party, might be considered war crimes and therefore subject to
military commissions.' 6 However, Common Article 3 has traditionally been
viewed as applying to an armed conflict between rebel or insurgent groups and a

11. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2003).

See also Ex Pane Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 249 (1863)

("[Mlilitary jurisdiction is of two kinds. First, that which is conferred and defined by statute; second,
that which is derived from the common law of war").
12. Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals, 31 U.S. Op. Att. Gen. 356, 364.
13. See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (defining war crimes to mean, inter alia, any
conduct (1) defined as a grave breach under the Geneva Conventions; (2) prohibited by Hague
Convention IV; (3) that violates common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; or (4) willfully kills or
seriously injures civilians through mines or booby-traps).
14. Protection of War Victims: Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; Protection of War
Victims: Civilian Persons, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; Protection of War Victims: Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114; Protection of War Victims: Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217.
15. Id. at art. 2.
16. Id. at art. 3.
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government. The Military Order, moreover, focuses on international rather than
domestic crimes. The disconnect between terrorism and the armed conflict
requirement is also underscored by the unending nature of the "war on terrorism,"
its worldwide geographic scope and its applicability to a limitless number of
parties.
These problems are compounded by the indeterminacy and controversy over
the definition of terrorism. Although multilateral treaties have been concluded
defining terrorism largely in terms of specific actions such as airline hijacking,
hostage-taking and bombings, 17 a comprehensive treaty definition remains elusive.
The notorious subjectivity of defining terrorism, therefore, further suggests an
incompatibility between the scope of war crimes and terrorism.
Yet another distinction relates to the fora in which the two crimes are
prosecuted. Terrorism prosecutions largely remain a prerogative of domestic
courts, while war crimes are prosecuted by both domestic courts (including
military courts) and international tribunals. The United States, for example, while
applying an assortment of anti-terrorism provisions in the United States Code to
convict foreign terrorists in federal district courts, also supports war crime8
prosecutions by the international criminal tribunals in The Hague and elsewhere.'
In addition, during the drafting of the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal
Court in 1996-1998, the United States vigorously opposed the inclusion of
terrorism within the ICC's jurisdiction because of the lack of a consensus
definition of terrorism and because domestic courts had typically tried terrorism
cases.
This dichotomy is apparent in the fact that military tribunals have never
before been used to try terrorists unaffiliated with an enemy government. Indeed,
as discussed in Part III below, Supreme Court precedent endorses military
jurisdiction over soldiers and agents of enemy states, but not over civilians. The
President's Military Order departs from this precedent by authorizing the military
trial of foreign civilians suspected of engaging in, or conspiring to commit, acts of
international terrorism.
III.

THE SUPREME COURT HAS NEVER APPROVED THE USE OF MILITARY
COMMISSIONS TO TRY FOREIGN TERRORISTS

Prior to 9/11, the United States had not used military commissions to try
foreign civilians unconnected to enemy armies. Instead, military commissions

17. See Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T 1641;
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, treaty doc. 100-19.
18. See United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp.2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding extraterritorial
reach of U.S. criminal statutes to persons accused of bombing U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania);
United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming convictions following nine-month
jury trial of ten defendants for "seditious conspiracy and other offenses arising out of a wide-ranging
plot to conduct a campaign of urban terrorism"); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998)
(affirming convictions of four defendants who assisted in bombing of World Trade Center).
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have tried persons acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, a foreign
government.' 9 The Military Order does not require that defendants have any
governmental connection. Quite to the contrary, the Order permits the prosecution
of persons acting wholly independent of any government or conventional military
group. Its very purpose is to provide a forum for a wide range of persons that have
never before been prosecuted by military tribunals: foreign terrorists unaffiliated
with any government.
Although the Military Order is sui generis, its advocates argue that the
precedent approving military commissions in other contexts justifies the trial of
terrorists by military commissions. As the White House Counsel argued shortly
after the issuance of the Military Order, "[tihe use of such [military] commissions
has been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court. 2 ° In fact, the Supreme Court
has never upheld the use of military commissions to try foreign terrorists. The
Court's jurisprudence only holds that military commissions may try foreign
citizens that act on behalf of a country at war with the United States. 21 The Court
has also been suspicious of overly broad jurisdiction for military tribunals.
The Quirin and Yamashita cases are frequently cited for the proposition that
foreign terrorists may be properly tried by military tribunals. Neither case,
however, involved a foreign terrorist, and both involved persons acting as agents of
an enemy government in a declared war against the United States. In Quirin, the
defendants were agents of a foreign government during a declared war against the
United States. They landed on the American coast wearing German military
uniforms, and "received instructions in Germany from an officer of the German
High Command. 22 They were paid by the German government, and trained at a
German "sabotage school. '23 The charging document stated that the defendants
were "enemies of the United States and acting for.., the German Reich, a
belligerent enemy nation. 24
Quirin variously refers to the defendants as "unlawful belligerents," "enemy
belligerents," "unlawful combatants," and "enemy combatants." Nothing in
Quirin, however, supports the argument that these categories can be expanded to
include foreign terrorists who are not organized as a military force, and who
operate independent of any government. The defendants in Quirin themselves
were, of course, agents of an enemy government during a declared war. Moreover,
of the "familiar examples" of enemy combatants referenced by the Court in dicta,
such as "the spy" or one who "comes secretly through the [military] lines," none
encompass foreign terrorists.25 The Court cites examples of enemy combatants
19. E.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950) (German citizens acting "in the service
of German armed forces in China" were properly convicted of violating the laws of war following trial
by military commission).
20. Alberto R. Gonzales, MartialJustice,Full and Fair,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27.
21. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1; In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1.
22. ExParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1942).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 15.
25. Id. at 12.
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tried by military commissions from the Revolutionary War, the Mexican War, and
the Civil War. In every instance, the enemy combatant was a member or agent of a
conventional military force during a recognized armed conflict between two such
military forces.26
In Yamashita, the defendant was a Commanding General of the Imperial
Japanese Army. 7 After Yamashita surrendered to the United States Army,
General MacArthur ordered a military commission be convened to try him. The
Supreme Court held that Yamashita was an "enemy combatant" and that the
military commission was properly convened "pursuant to the common law of
war." 28 The term "enemy combatant," however, was plainly used in Yamashita to
connote a member of the organized military in a declared war against the United
States. 29 Nothing in Yamashita supports the extension of the enemy combatant
label to cover foreign terrorists. Indeed, the Court appears to limit it's holding to
violations of the laws of war during declared wartime:
The trial and punishment of enemy combatants who have committed violations of
the law of war... is an exercise of the authority sanctioned by Congress to
administer the system of military justice recognized by the law of war. That
sanction is without qualification as to the exercise of this authorit ° so long as a

state of war exists -from its declarationuntil peace is proclaimed.

In Quirin and Yamashita, the Court used narrow language to uphold the
jurisdiction of military commissions to try captured enemy soldiers during a
declared war. These decisions nowhere provide direct support for the contention
that military commissions may try terrorists. In contrast, Supreme Court decisions
such as Milligan, Duncan and Reid (described below), limiting the authority of
military commissions outside of the QuirinYamashita context, adopt broad
language to restrict and limit the authority of military commissions to try civilians.
In Ex Parte Milligan, the Supreme Court held that a United States citizen
could not be detained or imprisoned by the military absent a declaration of martial
law. In granting Milligan's habeas corpus application, the Court held that
"[m]artial law, established on such a basis, destroys every guarantee of the
Constitution and effectively renders the 'military independent of and superior to
the civil power.''
Similarly, in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the Court ruled that a
civilian held by the military, when the civilian courts were open and functioning,

26. Quirin lists the following persons as "familiar examples" of "offenders against the law of war
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals": Major Andre, an officer of the British Army; T.E.
Hogg, who had been "commissioned, enrolled, enlisted or engaged" by the Confederate Army; John Y.

Beall, who held a commission in the Confederate Navy; Robert C. Kennedy, a Captain of the
Confederate Army; William Murphy, a "rebel emissary"; and other "[s]oldiers and officers 'now or late
of the Confederate Army."' Id. at n. 9, n. 10.
27. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 4 (1946).
28. Id. at 19.

29. Id.

30. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
31. Ex ParteMilligan, 71 U.S. 2, 124 (1866).
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cannot be tried by a military tribunal.32
The Court again articulated the principle that military jurisdiction over
civilians should be limited, not expanded, in Reid v. Covert.33 In Reid, the Court
held that the military could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over civilian
defendants accused of murdering soldiers stationed overseas. The Court stated that
"[tlhe Founders envisioned the army as a necessary institution, but one dangerous
to liberty if not confined within its essential bounds." 34 Reid, moreover, puts to
rest the argument that Milligan is no longer good law in view of Quirin. In Reid,
described Milligan as "one of the
the Supreme Court, fifteen years after Quirin,
36
great landmarks in this Court's history.,
In addition, prior Opinions of the United States Attorney General do not
approve military commissions in the absence of a declaration of martial law, or
when the accused is a civilian not charged with war crimes. 37 For example, in
1918 the U.S. Attorney General opined on the status of Pable Waberski, an agent
of the German government sent to the United States to "blow things up." 38
Applying Milligan, the Attorney General distinguished between an "act of war"
and a "crime," and concluded that the acts of espionage of which Waberski was
accused did not qualify as violations of the laws of war.39 As a result, Waberski
could not be tried by a military tribunal:
[I]n this country, military tribunals, whether courts-martial or military
commissions, can not [sic] constitutionally be granted jurisdiction to try persons
charged with acts or offences [sic] committed outside of the field of military
operations or territory under martial law or other peculiarly military territory,
except members of the military or40naval forces or those immediately attached to
the forces such as camp followers.
The issue of international personality informed another Attorney General
Opinion approving trial by military commissions over the Mood Indian tribe.4'
The Attorney General found it appropriate to apply the rules of war to such
conflicts because the Indian tribes "have been recognized as independent
communities for treaty-making purposes" and are capable of engaging in "a
negotiation for peace after hostilities. 42 Al Qaida, in contrast, is not recognized as

32. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
33. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
34. Id. at 23-24.
35. In Quirin, Attorney General Biddle disparaged Milligan by arguing that "[tihe English courts
have.., long since rejected the doctrine ofEx parte Milligan." Quinin, 317. U.S. at 26.
36. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I at 30.
37. See Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297 (1865) (approving trial by military tribunal
of assassins of President Lincoln because at "time of the assassination a civil war was flagrant.. .[and]
Martial law had been declared").
38. Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 356 (1918).
39. Id.
40. Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 356 (1918).
41. The Modoc Indian Prisoners, 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 249 (1873).
42. Id.
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having the ability to engage in international treaties or peace talks.
The clarity of Milligan, Duncan and the Attorney General Opinions
underscores the fact that, before 9/11, members of al Qaida were not considered
"enemy combatants" and the United States was claimed to be in an "armed
conflict" with al Qaida. This consensus existed even though it was known that al
Qaida and bin Laden had planned and executed a series of deadly terrorist attacks
against American targets; that bin Laden had issued a religious edict calling for
Americans to be murdered; and that al Qaida planned future attacks against the
United States.43 Moreover, even absent the "enemy combatant" or "armed
conflict" designations, the U.S. was not been prevented from undertaking military
strikes against terrorist targets when necessary. The United States did so against
Libya in 1985, against Iraq in 1993, and against Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998.
After September 11th, however, Quirin and Yamashita were resurrected in
support of the U.S. government's argument that the response to 9/11 qualifies as a
"time of war" and that foreign terrorists are "enemy combatants."
These
designations were intended to legitimize not only the use of military tribunals
against foreign terrorists, but also the indefinite detention by military authorities of
U.S. and foreign citizens in the United States and in Guantanamo Bay.
IV. CONCLUSION

Certainly the laws of war should to some extent conform to changing
circumstances and not remain static. It is also true, however, that international
humanitarian law should not be infinitely malleable to suit any circumstance and
that our commitment to the rule of law should not be self-serving. As the Supreme
Court stated in Yamashita, "[w]e do not make the laws of war but we respect
them." 4 Before September 1Id, the United States regularly lambasted other
countries for trying terrorists before military tribunals. Now, however, this is
described as criticism of "the process and not the forum. 45 If the United States is
to embark now on military trials of foreign civilians, the legal justification for this
unprecedented step needs to be clearer. Continuing to justify such trials as
consistent with "internationally accepted practice with deep historical roots "46 will
undermine their legitimacy. Absent a greater degree of consensus on the legality
of such measures, the United States should not champion military trials of civilians
as an acceptable international norm.

43. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,129, (July 4, 1999) (declaring a national emergency due to
finding that Afghanistan was being "used as a safe haven and base operations for Usama bin Ladin and
the AI-Qaida organization who have committed and threaten to continue to commit acts of violence
against the United States and its nationals"); Mark E. Kosnik, The Military Response to Terrorism,
NWC Rev. (Spring 2000) availableat http://www.nwc.navy.millpresslreview/2000/springlartl-spO.htm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
44. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 15.
45. Pierre-Richard Prosper, DOJ Oversight: PreservingOur Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism, Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Dec. 4, 2001).
46. Id.

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN
POLICYMAKING
DANIEL H. JOYNER*
"Lawyer and diplomat.. are not even attempting to talk to each other, turning
away in silent disregard. Yet both purport to be looking at the same worldfrom
the vantage point of important disciplines. It seems unfortunate, indeed
destructive, that they should not, at the least, hear each other."

The above statement was made by renowned international lawyer and former
state department official Louis Henkin in 1979.1 Professor Henkin was bemoaning
what he saw as a significant and disturbing gap in communication between the
international legal community and the foreign policy community. 2 That such a gap
did exist and does exist today is an easily discernible fact. One need only read
accounts of an international lawyer's and a State Department or Foreign Ministry
policymaker's thoughts on any given subject of international affairs to see that the
two are not even speaking the same language, let alone following the same
analytical process when examining the issues. While one talks of norms, precedent
and international order, the other's rhetoric is replete with references to national
interest and practical exigencies. While one looks to the codicils of the UN
Charter and a seemingly never-ending supply of rules contained in international
conventions and the customs of nations for guidance, the other looks to the latest
administration position paper.
From the perspective of the State Department/Foreign Ministry policymaker,
it is completely natural that this should be the case. Why, after all, should she
*Martin J. Hillenbrand Scholar in the School of Public and International Affairs and Dean Rusk Fellow
in the Center for International Trade and Security, The University of Georgia. BA Brigham Young
University, JD Duke Law School. The author wishes to thank Gary Bertsch, Scott Jones and especially

Jan Huner of The Netherlands' Ministry of Economic Affairs, for helpful review and comments of
drafts of this article.
1. LOUIs HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1979) [hereinafter
How NATIONS BEHAVE].

2. In this paper, the terms "international legal community" and "international lawyers" make
reference to those legal scholars and practitioners who are primarily concerned with issues of public,
not private, international law, and in particular those in the academic community. The "foreign policy
community" or "foreign policymakers" referred to in this paper are those government officials in a
variety of agencies within national governments, but particularly within the primary foreign
policymaking organ, at a variety of levels whose responsibilities include significant foreign
policymaking or policy execution roles.
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devote hours to studying legal opinions, when even the international lawyers can't
all seem to come up with the same answer to the simple question "is this legal?"
And even if they could, she has a lot more to worry about than some abstract
principles of pseudo-law that she knows very well can be broken with near
impunity - she knows because she's seen it done a thousand times by her
government and others. She knows what her job is - to forward the interests of her
state client.3
As for the lawyer, he is by now used to being ignored and his ideas scoffed at
as being hopelessly idealistic and out of touch with reality. Eventually, he came to
accept that his was a discipline which is at the very fringe of consideration by most
policymakers, and he is content to theorize and write law review articles about how
opiniojurissive necessitatis is at the heart of custom. He stopped trying to have
meaningful conversations with the people in government years ago. Frankly, he
got tired of his ideas being marginalized and being made to feel like an ivory tower
utopianist. The best he can hope for is to get his book published and make tenure
early.
As Henkin observed, this is a highly inefficient and truly harmful state of
affairs, for both parties.4 Yet it continues, the officials formulating positions and
trying to get a head in the big game, basing their foreign policy assumptions on
institutional wisdom and the odd consultation with an outside area specialist; the
lawyer writing to and attending conferences with other lawyers; while all the time
both communities are looking at the same sets of facts and trying to grapple with
the most important issues of state behavior, the relationships of states to each
other, and the best ways to promote effective and advantageous interaction
between nations.
This is not to say that their perspectives on these and other issues are not quite
different. This indeed is at the very core of the communications gap that has
always existed between the two communities.
However, the process of
globalization continues to effect an ever-increasing phenomenon of legalization of
international relations, as witnessed by the modern multiplication of international
institutions and regimes and high frequency of front-page issues of international
politics in which international law and institutions play a significant role.5
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the debate on international security issues.
This fact leads to the urgent understanding that the international legal community
and the foreign policy community have a strong mutual interest in overcoming the
gaps in communication and culture which have long separated them.
This brief essay will attempt to identify some of the causes of this lack of
communication and cooperation between international lawyers and foreign
policymakers and will propose pragmatic means by which this sizeable gap may be
3. Generalizations of attitudes used in this paper, such as those of an average foreign
policymaker, can of course be criticized as overly stereotypical and refuted on a case by case basis.
However, throughout I have attempted to capture the core sentiments and assumptions of most
policymakers and international lawyers respectively as they bear on the issues addressed.
4. How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2.

5. See Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385 (2000).
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narrowed. It will offer some prescriptions for both communities for improving
their accessibility and acceptability to the other, since as with most instances of
miscommunication, no one party is solely to blame. The paper will begin by
offering a review of some relevant literature in both the fields of international law
and international relations, and will assert that the specific gap between the
international legal community and the foreign policymaking community has gone
largely unaddressed in academic literature in a targeted, systematic fashion. 6 It
will proceed to provide such an analysis, and will conclude with a practical
application of the analysis and normative prescriptions based thereon to current
issues regarding the Missile Technology Control Regime, a multilateral
nonproliferation body.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
In recent years there has been a wealth of scholarship on the evolving
relationship between the academic disciplines of international relations and
international law and the substantive role of norms in international politics.
Regime theorists such as Abram and Antonia Chayes and Oran Young have
written extensively on the relationship between power and rules and procedures in
international politics. 7 Institutionalists such as Robert Keohane have focused on
the role of formal and informal institutional arrangements between states and the
role of rules within those arrangements in coordinating behavior and shaping the
expectation of actors. 8 English School political science scholars as well have
pointed to the inherent connection between the concept of an international
community of states and the binding force of international law. 9 As Hedley Bull
has written:
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states,
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.' °

6. There has of course been significant work done on the general issue of the role of international
law in foreign policy. See FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (1989); THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers, ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE ROLE OF LAW].
7. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993); ORAN
R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATIONAL RESOURCES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1989) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION]; Oran R. Young, InternationalLaw
and InternationalRelations Theory: Building Bridges, 86 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROCEEDINGS 172 (1992).

8. See Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, in INTERNATIONAL
RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 187 (Robert J.
Beck, Anthony Clark Arend & Robert D. Vander Lugt, eds., 1996); Robert 0. Keohane and Lisa L.
Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 39 (Summer 1995)
[hereinafter CUSTOM, POWER].
9. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1999).
10. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 13
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International lawyers as well have devoted a great deal of energy to
harmonizing the work of the two disciplines and forging analytical as well as
rhetorical links between them. Leading legal scholars in this field include AnneMarie Slaughter, Kenneth Abbott and Michael Byers. These scholars, while
asserting the normative independence and value of international law, have made
great strides in opening up the field to analysis in international relations (IR)
theory terms, and in examining the role of international law in world politics." As
Slaughter has commented:
Just as constitutional lawyers study political theory, and political theorists inquire
into the nature and substance of constitutions, so too should two disciplines that
study the laws of state behavior seek to learn from one another... If social science
has any validity at all, the postulates developed by political scientists concerning
patterns and regularities in state behavior must afford a foundation and framework
for legal efforts to regulate that behavior... From the political science side, if law
- whether international, transnational or purely domestic - does push the behavior
of States toward outcomes other than those predicted by power and the pursuit of
national interest, then
political scientists must revise their models to take account
12
of legal variables.
There has also in the field of international relations, particularly since the
1993 publication of the book Bridging the Gap by Alexander George,1 3 evolved a
body of scholarly writing addressing the perceived disconnect between the
international relations academic community and the foreign policymaking
community. 14 This work proceeds from the realization that the two communities,
while nominally focusing their energies on the same sets of facts relative to cross
border political interaction, have almost entirely insulated and independent
cultures.' 5 Several works in this field have attempted to identify the underlying
disparities in analytical approach, questions asked and results desired by the two
how the
communities, and have fashioned recommendations to both concerning
16
widening gap in communication and cooperation might be narrowed.
Despite the long history of disciplinary independence of international law and
its primary ownership by students of law as opposed to political theory, there
seems yet to be a residual impression within some non-legal sectors of the

(1977); See C. A. W. MANNING, THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1962).
11. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and InternationalRelations Theory: A
Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Kenneth W. Abbott, InternationalRelations Theory,
InternationalLaw, and the Regime GoverningAtrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361
(1999); CUSTOM, POWER, supra note 10; THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 7.
12. See Burley, supra note 12.
13. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, BRIDGING THE GAP: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN FOREIGN POLICY

(1993).
14. See MIROSLAV NINCIC AND JOSEPH LEPGOLD, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER (2002); BEING
USEFUL: POLICY RELEVANCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (Nincic & Lepgold eds., 2000)
[hereinafter BEING USEFUL]; Bruce W. Jentleson, The Needfor Praxis; Bringing Policy Relevance Back
In, 26 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 169 (2002).
15. See GEORGE, supra note 14, at 3.
16. See BEING USEFUL, supra note 15.
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academy that international law as an academic exercise is largely subsumed within,
and categorizeable as a sub-discipline under, the overarching subject matter
heading of international relations theory. Indeed, international law is thus listed in
many political science department registers, highlighting the oft-perceived
substantive and procedural softness of international law and the tenuous nature of
its existence as a true system of law comparable to domestic legal systems. 17 Thus
to develop an analytical treatment of the divergences in form and substance
between the academic study of international relations and the practical field of
foreign policymaking must to the minds of many within the academy, particularly
in secondarily related fields but also to some within the IR community, include8
scholarship in the field of international law underneath its conceptual umbrella.'
However, this is a thoroughly misconceived view of the classical relationship
between international law and international political theory.
While its intellectual roots stretch back to Thucydides and beyond,
international relations theory as a distinct academic discipline is, after all, a relative
newcomer to the academic scene, having been developed in the 1930's and 40's by
such scholars as Edward Carr and Hans Morgenthau and their followers. 19
International law, by contrast, has been a distinct academic discipline in legal
circles since the writings of Grotius in the early seventeenth century and is today a
rich and highly developed scholarly field in its own right. 20 Largely due to these
genealogical facts, the attributes, assumptions, and analytical processes of
international legal scholarship are quite different from traditional international
relations theory, as witnessed by modern attempts at reconciliation between the
two disciplines. 2 1 And while the work of George and others in bridging the gap
between IR theorists and foreign policymakers is generally useful in many of its
points by analogy, in specifics there is yet much to be said concerning the very
distinct gap in understanding and communication as between international lawyers
and foreign policymakers.
II. THE GAP
This gap can be identified through similar analytical means as those employed
by George and his followers, but upon divination it turns out to be in substance
quite uniquely constituted. A primary step in isolating the causes of the
cooperative disconnect between international lawyers and policymakers is to
identify the supply and demand dynamics present.
A. Demand
If we consider policymakers to be the consumers and international lawyers to
17. See BULL, supra note 11.
18. See generallyCUSTOM, POWER, supranote 10, at 21-34.
19. EDWARD HALLETT CARP, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939 (2nd ed. 1946); HANS
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (3rd ed. 1960).

20. See generallyCUSTOM, POWER, supra note 10, at 3-46.
21. See id.
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be the providers in this scenario, it is useful to begin by examining what the
demand factor is, i.e. what do policymakers need and want. As an introduction to
their world, it is preliminarily important to note that foreign policymaking goes on
at many levels and by many different officials in government, and not just by the
foreign minister or secretary of state and their top aides.22 Often there are
relatively few centralized or top-down sources to guide officials in the day to day
making and execution of policy between states, and they are left to interact with
their counterparts in foreign governments and with private actors with little but
their own internally generated resources and individual experience and judgement
to guide them. 23 This phenomenon of decentralized interaction at all levels of
national government has only increased as the number of regulatory and issue
areas with international aspects, from the environment to securities law to human
rights, has multiplied.24
Added to this fact is the non-ideal reality that most government officials live
in a world in which they are, especially at the policy execution level, constantly
devoting large amounts of their time to putting out fires.25 Their responsibilities
are often varied and decisions on discrete issues must often be made with precious
little time to deliberate on the ramifications of their action or inaction on
international norms.26 And while they possess a great deal of information and
receive counsel from experts both within and without of government, they see their
decisions as being made as a result of judgment and common sense in furtherance
of the interests of their state as opposed to theory or norm-based decisions made
for greater and more abstract goods, such as to benefit global humanity or the
international system in general.27 This is not to assert categorically that such
causes may not receive important secondary consideration, but simply that a
realistic understanding of the value structure of most foreign policymakers, and
most government officials for that matter, must place national interests as
unchallenged primary objectives.28 What they need from outside sources,
therefore, is topical and specific information and recommendations, communicated
briefly and in understandable language, and laid out in logical and convincing
fashion based on their underlying goal - making sound decisions that forward the
state interest.
Policymakers often additionally hold latent assumptions which have
contributed to the existence of the gap between themselves and members of the

22. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE AND JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD
POLITICS IN TRANSITION 25 (1977).

23. Id. at 25-26.
24. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS:

ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 177-78 (Michael Byers, ed. 2000).

25. See generally George, supranote 14.
26. Id.
27. Id.; See also Condoleeza Rice, Promoting the National Interest, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb.,
2000, at 45, 47, 62.
28. See Rice, supra note 28, at 47.
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international law community. 29 The most widespread and invidious of these are
that international law is largely idealistic and impractical, that it is generally
ineffectual in carrying out its own prescriptions, and that it should seldom if ever
be deferred to when there is a real and pressing issue of national interest, and
particularly national security at stake. 30 Policymakers therefore need both these
assumptions addressed, as well as their substantive information needs met before
they will give greater consideration to international legal concerns and make them
a more important part of their overall policymaking calculus.
B. Supply
International lawyers, particularly in the academic setting, are in an entirely
different business. They primarily traffic in ideas about the rules that do, and
should hold the international system of state relations together. 3' Their work is
mainly in discerning what the rules are, their meaning, scope of application and
effect.32 The stock in trade among international lawyers in academia is basically
the same as among international relations scholars. It is publications in books and
scholarly journals, conferences among leading experts, and teaching the next
generation of scholars.33 And like the IR academic community, the culture of the
international legal community of scholars is marked by insularity, perpetuated by
shared language, educational background and international system-centric
perspective.34 However, a number of fundamental distinctions may be made
between international lawyers and international relations theorists. Unlike IR
theoretical work, the substance of international law - the norms themselves - are
meant to be part of the workings of the international system, i.e. they are meant to
be used by policymakers.35 Without actual application and recognition by
policymakers and policy executors, international law can be said to have even less
intrinsic value than analytical IR theory. IR scholars seek to generate theories
explaining the actual behavior of states and identifying motivating factors and
causal connections between social and administrative variables, an understanding
of which has value in and of itself and great potential for policy application in
unforeseeable future scenarios of foreign affairs concern even if it is not presently
utilized.36 International law, on the other hand, is a collection of normative
prescriptions and standards which, if not put to use merely take up room on library
shelves. 37 Thus at face value there would seem to be ample incentive for
international lawyers to bridge whatever cultural and communications gaps exist
between themselves and the policymaking community, if for no other reason than
29.
30.
from IR
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See George, supra note 14.
In support of these assumptions, policymakers can find no short supply of arguments drawn
literature, particularly within the classical and neo-realist schools of thought.
CUSTOM, POWER, supra note 10, at 47-48.
See id.
GEORGE, supra note 14, at 4.
GEORGE, supra note 14.
See CUSTON, POWER, supra note 10, at 15; BULL, supra note 11, at 141.
See CUSTOM, POWER, supra note 10, at 21.
Id. at21,48.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31:3

to preserve their relevance and value as a discipline. However, international
lawyers face obstacles in this regard that IR scholars do not.
As previously noted, IR theory essentially provides analytical frameworks for
explaining and in some cases predicting actual phenomena.38 International law by
contrast is a system of norms, largely contrived by lawyers, which purport to
regulate significant areas of international relations, but which are currently at an
evolutionary stage in which they are in large measure not supported by institutions
capable of effectively adjudicating and enforcing their prescriptions.39 This
recognition of the evolutionary stage of the international legal system, while very
valuable for lawyers in understanding the continuing importance of supporting the
development of international institutions and norms, does little to persuade foreign
policymakers to comply with international law in cases where doing so is
seemingly at odds with the short-term interests of their state clients. Government
officials in fact often view international law as merely a strategic tool, useful for
justifying their actions in harmony with its precepts and for condemning
incongruous acts by adversaries, but easily unmentioned when the action of their
state lies contrary to its dictates. 40 And international lawyers, it must be said, have
done little to usefully change this perception and the resultant lack of serious
consideration of international law by policymakers. 4 1 This is due in part to many
international lawyers' apparent fear that greater engagement and cooperation with
policymakers on a substantive level might effect a degree of watering down of the
objective theoretical integrity of international law, which has developed largely in
seclusion for centuries, and which has been the almost exclusive province of
academic thinking and writing by lawyers.42 As in other areas of the law, lawyers
are generally suspicious of outside influence in the substance and procedures of
their profession, which like the other classical professions has as a general rule
been allowed to be self-regulatory.43
International lawyers are especially suspicious of the intentions of foreign
policymakers, whom they know are largely unconcerned with many of the
theoretical underpinnings of international law, such as the maintenance of a
logically and theoretically consistent international legal regime founded on normbased conceptions of principled international interaction, and whose focus is rather
on immediate problem-solving and national interest with a general conceptual
grounding in realist notions of the influence of power and self-interest in all
aspects of international politics. 44 It is also likely a manifestation of the reluctance
of many international lawyers to be viewed as hired guns for any government,
including their own, in its designs to show the world its compliance and other
nations' non-compliance with international norms, and thereby be robbed of their

38. Id.
39. CUSTOM, POWER, supranote 10.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2.
Id. at Introduction.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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perceived objectivity and intellectual integrity. 4
1II. BRIDGING
Having established some of the divergences of culture and perspective as
between international lawyers and foreign policymakers, it remains to be
considered how those divergences may be addressed so as to foster an increased
level of cooperation between the two communities. This paper will attempt to
accomplish this in two separate sections, containing recommendations specific to
each group.
A. InternationalLawyers
As will be clarified herein, it is upon international lawyers that the heaviest
onus of responsibility for bridging the gap with policymakers should fall. This is
due to two particular considerations.
Firstly, as between the two sides,
international lawyers are possessed with the greatest opportunity to take upon
themselves this burden.46 While the demands of their traditionally valued activities
will remain, it will surely be conceded that the capacity exists for international
lawyers, particularly those in the academic setting, to re-prioritize those activities
and to place increased cooperation with government officials nearer the top of the
list. 47 This is decidedly more true for international lawyers than it is for
policymakers.
Which brings us to the second consideration. It is proposed that the
motivation for bridging the lawyer/policymaker gap also should rest most
particularly in the court of the international lawyer.48 This is caused by two
distinct factors. First, as previously stated, the very continuing existence of the
discipline of international law depends on its use and consideration by foreign
policymakers.49 Without that relevance, international legal scholarship will
become increasingly moot and will very possibly decline in importance and,
eventually, find little place in the world of academia.
Second, under a correct conceptualization of their business, international
lawyers should be motivated to place greater emphasis on increased engagement
with government officials in order to bring about their core interests.50 The heart
of what proponents of international law have always wanted, and the foundation
upon which the concept of international law is based, is that a rule of law and not
of power should obtain in international politics. 51
This is the theoretical
underpinning of the entire exercise of international normative thinking. 52 It is
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.

48.. Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
See Jentleson, supranote 15.
See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2, at introduction.
Id.
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clear, however, that the traditional scholarly and detached activities of international
lawyers will be insufficient to bring this change about, if it is to be brought about
at all. To in fact achieve such change, the proponents of an international rule of
law must work within the existing power structures of national governments to a
degree as yet unrealized, and make their wealth of wisdom and experience in
normative construction and institutionalization accessible to and usable by those in
power, who are in the end the only ones who can actually bring about fundamental
change to the existing international order. Policymakers have to want to be a part
of the international law system or it will fail.
How then is this to be accomplished by the international law community?
Through an emphasis on education and through increased and more effective
communication, international lawyers must make a concerted effort to address the
concerns and needs of policymakers as outlined herein. Firstly, there must be an
organized initiative with the goal of educating policymakers on the origins and
salient characteristics of the international legal system and international law in
general. There is a palpable lack of understanding of international law among
foreign policymakers, particularly in the United States but also among government
officials generally.53 This ignorance breeds confusion and misunderstanding of the
nature and application of international law, which too often leads simply to
dismissal of the importance and relevance of norms in foreign policy decisionmaking. A proper education in international law must include both theoretical and
practical perspectives on the current evolutionary state of the international
legal
54
system and on principles of state compliance with international norms.
This is perhaps the most difficult task facing international lawyers, as a better
education for the policymaking community is easy enough to point out as a
desirable end, but decidedly more difficult to actually achieve. However, in recent
years, there have been great strides in educational programs for judicial officers in
the foundational elements of international law through such means as the
American Society of International Law (ASIL) Judicial Outreach service and
others, through which judges from around the world are given a crash course in
international law specifically as it bears upon cases most often heard in their
courts. 55 Such programs are constructed to accommodate the busy lives of
government officials, and are extremely useful for establishing an elementary
understanding of the existence and proper application of international law norms in
specific areas of concern.56 Such courses in the foreign policy context could easily
be designed and administered by Universities and other interested nongovernmental organizations like the ASIL and would constitute a very useful step
toward addressing the pervasively held assumptions of the policymaking
53. Id.

54. See the excellent treatment of various forms of normative regulation and their relevance to
specific issue-area governance in Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Sofq Law in
InternationalGovernance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421 (2000).
55. The American Society of International Law, 2001 Annual Report: Buildingfor the Future 2-3
(2001), available at http://www.asil.org/annual.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,2003).
56. The American Society of International Law, Newsletter: October/December 2002, availableat
http://www.asil.org/newsletter/news.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
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community relevant to international law, which form a formidable obstacle to their
more substantive and beneficial engagement with international lawyers.
Second, international lawyers must take to heart the recommendations of
several writers in the international relations disciplinary context who have
observed that communication with government officials is not effectively achieved
through the writing of academic journal articles.5 7 In the international law context
this is no less true. And while it is certainly not proposed that all writing efforts be
devoted to the task of bridging the international law/policymaking gap, much could
be accomplished through the publication by eminent international law experts of
articles in excellent foreign policy periodicals such as ForeignAffairs, as well as in
more mainstream news media outlets. Even if these publications are little more
than boiled down summaries of more expanded arguments made in leading legal
journals, in view of the readership constituency of these publications, such efforts
will be much more likely to reach the desks of foreign policy makers, partially due
to the brevity and clearness of language which those formats demand.
This is not of course to say that direct communication between international
lawyers and foreign policymakers should not be attempted. Indeed, this is surely
the most effective means of increasing cooperation between the two communities
to the extent it can be effectuated. Volunteering to draft brief memoranda on
specific issues, and making oneself available for consultation on demand, are
efforts by international lawyers sure to be appreciated by officials who often seek
to supplement their in-house research and institutional wisdom with outside
advice.
When such advice is given, or memoranda drafted, and even in articles
targeted to reach the eyes of policymakers, close attention should be paid to the use
of vocabulary and identification of motivating dynamics which government
officials will both understand and value. This prescription does not merely refer to
the use of "legalese" in lawyer-official communications. Rather, it refers
additionally to the types of arguments made to motivate action or inaction on the
part of the policymakers when persuasive arguments are warranted (recognizing
that in many instances such arguments will not be appropriate, and that the product
sought by officials will simply be a run down of relevant norms, cost and benefit
analysis). International lawyers must take to heart the identification of foreign
policymakers' interests as described herein. Thus an argument based on "the best
interests of the international community" or "the normative soundness of the
international legal regime" is likely to hold much less sway in the mind of a
government official than arguments which may well be in support of action or
inaction for the good of humanity, but which may also legitimately be based on
important perceived national interests, including reputational and strategic
interests, which it is the job of the international lawyer to point out can be seriously
57. See JOSEPH LEPOLD & MIROSLAV NINCiC, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY AND THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE 2-3 (2001); Arthur A. Stein, Counselors, Kings,
and InternationalRelations: From Revelation to Reason, and Still No Policy-Relevant Theory, in BEING
USEFUL: POLICY RELEVANCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 51 (Miroslav Nincic & Joseph
Lepgold eds., 2000); Jentleson, supra note 15.
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affected by breaches of international norms. In short, lawyers must do a better job
of "writing to their audience" than they have done in the past.
There will of course be situations in which casting international legal
compliance in national interest terms will be more difficult than in others. In such
circumstances some attempt can be made to equate national interests with
international interests, and these arguments will likely be persuasive to a good
many in foreign policymaking circles, particularly as the process of globalization
and international institutional enmeshment makes the interdependency of nations
inan array of issue areas increasingly manifest. 58 However, in extreme cases of
the divergence of international and national immediate benefit, the lawyer faces an
advisory dilemma which his or her personal ideologies must dictate, but in which
there should be awareness of the fact that as one's advice generally is given greater
credence through the recognized presence of both substantive knowledge and
realistic understanding of national policymaking exigencies, so one's advocation of
systemic and overarching international long-term interests at the expense of shortterm national interests
will be heard with an increasingly friendly ear by
59
government officials.
These efforts by lawyers at the procedural level are very likely to significantly
narrow the gap between international lawyers and policymakers. However, it is
this paper's assertion that at the substantive norm creation and maintenance level
as well, efforts may be made to increase international law's acceptability, and
thereby usefulness, to rational-minded policymakers. There has, in recent decades,
been a movement within some circles to introduce elements of expanded
constitutionalism into the international legal system to a degree never before
attempted. 60
This movement aims to make of the international legal and
institutional system a regime which in both breadth and depth of regulatory
coverage, particularly into relationships traditionally considered to be within the
exclusive cognizance of domestic law, is unprecedented, and wholly revolutionary
in the history of international normative thinking. 6' This change is most poignant
in the modern development of the areas of international human rights law and
international criminal law, which seek not only to govern relations between states
in their capacity as world citizens, but also the relationships between states and
their citizens and of individuals to each other.62 And while this extension of
international legal coverage is satisfying to many on grounds of protecting
universal human dignity, it pushes the limits of international law's inherent
58. Woodrow Wilson said in 1916, "We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of
the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects
mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia." THE
POLITICS OF WOODROW WILSON: SELECTIONS FROM HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 258 (August

Heckscher ed., 1956).
59. See HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supranote 2 at introduction.

60. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31
(1995/1996) [hereinafter Human Rights]; BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995).
61. See Human Rights, supranote 61, at 34.

62. Id. at 39.
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limitations in institutional competence and enforcement difficulties, and thereby its
overall credibility.
It has additionally constituted an increasing source of
discomfort to many in government circles due to the potential implications for
principles of national sovereignty which such developments bear. 3
This paper therefore takes the currently unpopular but theoretically
compelling position that international lawyers should reexamine the fundamental
aims of international law and should strive through their influence to limit its
substantive coverage to those areas of international interaction most suited for its
regulatory purview. In doing so, they will not only preserve the theoretical
integrity of the enterprise of international law, but will make its precepts eminently
more palatable to foreign policymakers, who will be impressed more by logic and
practical necessity of substantive lawmaking than by idealistic and unnecessary
extensions of international law's coverage into areas of international and domestic
interaction perceived as traditionally and importantly the province of national
governments. 4
B. ForeignPolicymakers
For their part, foreign policymakers must try to overcome the conceptual
barriers into which they and their predecessors seem to have boxed themselves by
their underlying assumptions of structural realism, power politics and the
supremacy of self-centered national interest. 65 These indeed are partially valid and
practical foundational understandings, but can be taken altogether too far to the
exclusion of other valid conceptualizations of the international system of state
interaction. Indeed, within the field of international relations theory, significant
challenges to a strict realist understanding of world politics have been mounted in
recent decades, notably in this context by the branches of liberal institutionalism
and constructivism.
These theoretical advancements should encourage a
63. See John R. Bolton, The United States and the InternationalCriminalCourt: The Risks and
Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America's Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 167, 169 (2001).
64. For more on this matter of the substantive content of international law see J. SHAND WATSON,
THEORY & REALITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 203 (1999); Curtis A.
Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Il, The CurrentIllegitimacy of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation,
66 FORDHAM L. REv. 319,369 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,
97 MICH. L. REv. 390, 396 (1998); Daniel H. Joyner, International Human Rights Law: A System
Perspective,FORTHCOMING.
65. See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power
Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391, 410 (1992) ("By denying or bracketing states' collective authorship of
their identities and interests... the realist-rationalist alliance denies of brackets the fact that competitive
power politics help create the very 'problem of order' they are supposed to solve - that realism is a selffulfilling prophecy.") [hereinafter Anarchy]. There is growing literature within international relations
theory challenging rationalism as the conclusive explanatory paradigm of individual and collective
decisionmaking, particularly among behavioral decision theorists, constructivists, and prospect
theorists. See Stephen Walt, Rigor or Rigor Mortis?, 23 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 4 (1999); Herbert
Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science, in RATIONAL
CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY (Hogarth & Redereds 1986); Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences,246 SCI. AM. 1(1982).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31:3

reconceptualization of foreign policy priorities and the value structures and policy
calculations of policymakers. 66 Institutionalism has in very persuasive terms called
attention to the role of formal and informal regimes, which have been multiplying
exponentially in recent decades and increasing both in scope and in depth, in
reducing the effects of multipolar anarchy at the heart of realist thought, by
67
promoting cooperation, information transfer, and trust among member states.
Constructivism, one of the most influential theories of the past decade, has focused
on the changing nature of the identities and interests of states, and has assaulted the
traditional realist dogma that both of these attributes are static and the cause of an
inherently conflictual international structure. 68 Rather, say constructivists, the state
of international anarchy is "what states make of it," pliable to the formative acts
and intentions of states.69 Institutionalism and constructivism, among other
modem explanatory theories, illuminate the additional roles of community
perception, international norms and institutional cooperation in affecting state
behavior. This understanding lends legitimacy to the proposition that international
law is a viable motivating and regulating dynamic in the international community
of states, and should therefore be taken seriously as an integral element in foreign
policy considerations.
It is undeniable that in the modern era and going forward international norms
and institutions have and will increasingly have an important role to play in
international politics. And although a thorough treatment of the causes and
dynamics of this phenomenon is not possible in the context of this essay, it will
suffice to recognize that in a majority of nations, governments give deference to
international legal prescriptions and do not lightly breach them. 70 As the process
of globalization continues, so by necessity will the process of legalization of
international relations, as countries increasingly look to rules to order their
relations in areas such as trade, environmental protection, collective security,
maritime movement and space rights. 71 Enmeshment in international regimes and
world engagement will make understanding and working with international law
norms of increasing importance to foreign policymakers.72 This should provide the
66. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 8; Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity
Formationand the InternationalState, 88 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 384, 385 (1994) [hereinafter Collective
Identity].
67. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 1 (1989); INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 8; M.A.
Levy et al. The Study of InternationalRegimes, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1/3:267-330 (1995).
68. Collective Identity, supra note 67, at 384.

69. See Anarchy, supra note 66; Wendt, supra note 68, at 388.
70. As Louis Henkin famously commented "Violations of law attract attention and the occasional
important violation is dramatic; the daily, sober loyalty of nations to the law and their obligations is
hardly noted. It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of
internationallaw and almost all of their obligationsalmost all of the time." How NATIONS BEHAVE,
supra note 2.

71. See the excellent special issue entitled Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 3
(2000).
72. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 1 (1995); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER
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necessary motivation for policymakers to step out of their conceptual limitations
and seek to foster real and meaningful cooperative links with international lawyers,
who as outlined above have complimentary motivations, and who should be happy
to meet policymakers halfway in attempts at broader and more effective
communication between the two communities.
The term "halfway" is used purposefully here, because of the impression held
by many in the international law community that policymakers have not made
satisfactory efforts to engage international lawyers, despite the foregoing list of
perhaps as yet unperceived motivations, and that they are in a sense waiting for the
international lawyers to present a finished product of normative structures which
they can both accept and understand in toto before giving international norms
greater consideration in policy formation.7 s In so doing, of course, policymakers
are not sufficiently mindful of their own necessary role, through communication
and cooperation with international lawyers in the formative process of international
norms itself, in creating just such a product. It is, after all, states that make
international law and not international lawyers.
Policymakers should therefore be open to education programs in international
law as discussed above, and should actively seek advice from international lawyers
both inside and outside of government on specific issues facing them in policy
formation and execution. They should make a point to educate themselves through
reading the short and hopefully issue-specific articles recommended above to be
written by international lawyers in publications already widely circulated among
policy officials. These are reasonable steps which can easily be harmonized with
the many demands on policymakers, and which are indeed incumbent upon them
as a means of better preparing themselves to fulfill the duties of their position and
most effectively serve their nations' interests.
IV. CASE STUDY: THE MTCR
Since hortatory exercises such as the above are always clarified by concrete
example, this paper will proceed to consider a case study involving a discrete issue
area in international politics in order to show how the foregoing prescriptions may
be put to use in the real world.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal, non-treaty
political arrangement, currently consisting of 33 state members and founded in
1987 for the purpose of controlling the proliferation of rocket and unmanned air
vehicle systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
their associated materials and technology. 75 It is one of a number of informal
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
73. See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2, at introduction.

74. While traditionally the writings of eminent legal scholars were considered to have weight in
the creation of international norms, the use of this pseudo-source of law in the judgments of the
International Court of Justice has declined markedly in recent decades. Id.
75. See generally Aaron Karp, The Spread of BallisticMissiles and the Transformation of Global
Security, 7 THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 106, 116 (2000); Kenneth Weiss, The Limits of Missile
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multilateral regimes in the WMD proliferation area, but is distinct in that unlike
other multilateral nonproliferation regimes the MTCR is not closely associated
with a multilateral treaty regulating development of subject technologies and
materials. 76 It is rather a sui generis nonproliferation supply-side regime,
comprised of the owner/supplier states of missile-related technologies." Due to
this fact, it has been likened to a cartel of supplier states, determined to keep
missile technologies within their circle of knowledge and possession, thus creating
a continual and enforced haves and have-nots reality. 78 There has been growing
consensus, however, that the supply-side approach to regulating WMD
proliferation in this area, which the MTCR represents, has been largely ineffective
in curbing the proliferation of missile technologies. This perception became acute
in the 1990's as four non-regime states, the DPRK, Iran, Pakistan, and India were
in active pursuit of long-range ballistic missile capabilities and with the
contemporaneous emergence of a willing supplier's group consisting of Russia,
China and the DPRK, all of which were either wholly outside the MTCR's
framework or had been sanctioned by MTCR members for failing to control
exports of sensitive missile technologies.79
As one commentator has noted, the single most invidious problem the MTCR
faced was its inability to establish norms applicable to its subject matter.80 As
previously stated the MTCR is a voluntary organization of states, devoid of
institutional rulemaking or adjudicatory powers. 8' And while the state delegates to
MTCR plenaries do by consent agree on "guidelines" for export control and other
nonproliferation efforts, compliance with these guidelines is, again, purely
voluntary with only reputational cost to deter non-compliance. 2 In this way the
MTCR is little different from other multilateral nonproliferation regimes such as

Diplomacy: Missile Proliferation,Diplomacy, and Defense, WORLD AFFAIRS, Vol. 163, Issue 3 (2001).
76. Such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signatureJuly 1,

1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; or the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, openedfor signature
Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800. See David S. Gualtieri, The System of Non-proliferation Export Controls,
in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 467, 477-78 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Barry Kellman, Bridling the International Trade of
CatastrophicWeaponry, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 755, 820 (1994).
77. Mark Smith, On Thin Ice: First Steps for the Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY (July/August 2002), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_0708/smithjul-aug02.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter On Thin Ice].
78. Mark Smith, Rules for the Road? The InternationalCode of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation, DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY Issue No. 63 (March - April 2002), available at
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd63/63op3.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Rules for the
Road].
79. See Richard Speier, How Effective is the Missile Technology Control Regime?
NONPROLIFERATION BRIEF 4 (7), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2001); Dinshaw
Mistry, BallisticMissile Proliferationand the MTCR: A Ten-Year Review, CONTEMPORARY SECURITY
POLICY, Issue 18, Vol. 3 (1998).
80. Rules for the Road, supranote 80.
81. Barry Kellman, supranote 78, at 822.
82. See Anastasia A. Angelova, Compelling Compliance with InternationalRegimes: China and
the Missile Technology ControlRegime. 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419 (1999).
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the Wassenaar Arrangement 8 3 and the Nuclear Supplier's Group,8 4 but as
previously noted the subject technologies these regimes seek to control are
addressed in binding multilateral treaties, which are legally enforceable against
non-compliant states.
With this disparity in mind, in the late 1990's MTCR member countries began
to consider ways to introduce norms into the area of missile technology
proliferation, and began to develop the idea of a code of conduct to supplement, or
under some interpretations replace, the role of the MTCR in the area. 5 At the 15t"
plenary meeting of MTCR member states in October 2000, a draft International
Code of Conduct (ICoC) generating demand-side norms was circulated and
discussed, and in November of 2002, 92 countries agreed to adopt the ICoC at a
meeting at The Hague. 86 The adopted version of the ICoC contains a recitation of
agreed-upon principles, commitments, incentives for compliance, and confidence
building measures.8 7 And while the commitments are carefully worded so as to
avoid the attachment of legal obligation to their terms, they do include
commitments by signatory states to ratify a number of international treaties on
space exploration, to undertake measures to prevent the proliferation of WMDcapable missiles, to reduce national holdings of the same, to exercise vigilance in
the consideration of assistance to space launch vehicle programs in other countries
(a notorious front for military-use missile and WMD delivery system programs),
and not to support ballistic missile programs in countries which "might be
developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in a way incompatible with
the norms established by the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties."88 The
ICoC seeks to ground the missile proliferation regime in universally applicable
commitments and principles and thus to introduce markedly increased levels of
normative foundation to the regime. 9
However, the ICoC has met with a mixed reaction from important states both
within and without of the MTCR. Criticisms have ranged from fears of inadvertent
legitimization of some missile programs due to the minimalist approach of the
ICoC, to some rankling of nationalistic feathers and the expression of concern that
attempts through the ICoC to regulate missile programs, many of which are being
conducted for ostensibly civilian space-development purposes, impinge upon
national prerogatives in important and wholly legitimate areas of technological

83. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies, adopted July 11-12, 1996, available at http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/IE96.html
(last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
84. See Gualtieri, supra note 78, at 473.
85. On Thin Ice, supra note 79.
86. Preventing Missile Proliferation, DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (May 2001),
at
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd57/57note.htm (last visited Feb 5, 2003); MTCR Plenary Meeting,
DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (October-November 2002), at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd67/
67nr10.htm (last visited Feb 12, 2003).
87. Rulesfor the Road, supra note 80.
88. See PreventingMissile Proliferation,supra note 88.
89. On Thin Ice, supra note 79.
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innovation. 90
It is not the purpose of the current examination to vet the various significant
policy considerations surrounding adoption of the ICoC. However, when viewed
on a regime-institutional level, the case of the MTCR does present fertile ground
for analysis of possible cooperative interactions between international lawyers and
foreign policymakers within the issue area.
To an international lawyer, the current state of the area of missile and WMD
proliferation represents an issue area perfectly suited for international regulation by
means of soft, as opposed to hard, international law. 91 Some elaboration on the
meaning and use of these terms is due. International law classically recognized
two sources of binding normative development. The first is treaties, which are
written agreements between two or more parties, the obligations of which apply
solely to those executing the treaty. 92 Treaties are binding upon signatories and
subject to adjudication in international judicial fora. 93 The second is customary
international law, which develops through the acts of states accompanied with
sufficient opinio juris, or expressed sense of legal obligation, of state officials. 94
Custom may form parallel to or wholly independent from treaties and may bind not
only those who participate in its creation, but potentially also other states who do
not successfully obtain persistent objector status while the customary norm is in
creation. 95 While not without theoretical and practical weaknesses as a true system
of law, these two sources have traditionally been held to produce binding
obligations, or "hard" international law, enforceable to the extent any international
norm is enforceable upon subject state parties. 96
The concept of "soft" international law, by contrast, is relatively new. It is a
scholarly movement to attempt to recognize the value of some written instruments
as having many of the characteristics of international law, and thus contributing to
97
normative development, while remaining non-binding in a strictly legal sense.
Speaking of the proponents of this movement, one commentator has written:
they stress that these instruments fulfill at least some, if not a great number, of the
criteria required for rules to be considered rules of international law and cannot
therefore be simply put aside as non-law. In other words, they acknowledge that
there exists a considerable 'grey area' of 'soft-law' between the white space of
law and the black territory of non-law. Simultaneously, they make the salient
point that the 'grey area' may greatly affect the white one and explain, sometimes
90. Id.
91. See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2, at introduction.
92. AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW [Hereinafter AKEHURST'S]
(7th ed., Peter Malanczuk ed., 1997). See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27,
1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, also available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm(last visited

Feb. 12, 2003).
93. See AKEHURST'S, supranote 94.
94. See UN CHARTER, STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38 (listing the
sources of international law).
95. See AKEHURST'S, supranote 94.
96. See generally AKEHURST'S, supra note 94, at Chapter 3.
97. G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
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98
in considerable detail, in what ways 'soft law' can have legal effects.

A number of scholarly treatments have been done on the sources and uses of
soft law in the modem international legal and political system. One of the best of
these is by Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal, entitled "Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance," which appeared in the summer of 2000 in International
Organization. Abbot and Snidal develop therein a methodology for determining
issue areas best regulated by soft and hard international law respectively.99 They
conclude that hard law is best utilized in areas of international interaction in which
the value placed on making credible commitments is high, reduction of long-term
transactions costs from continual re-negotiation is important, political strategies
may be supplemented by adjudicative or otherwise legalistic international regimes,
and where delegation of authority to international fora is an attractive means for
remedying inherent problems of incomplete contracting. I°° They conclude that
soft law, by contrast, is most attractive in issue areas in which a premium is placed
on low initial contracting costs, where the use of hard law would present
unacceptable sovereignty costs (which are highest when proposed international
legalization purports to regulate the relationships between a state and its citizens or
touches upon important issues of national security), and where the novelty and
complexity of the issue area create a high degree of uncertainty and possibility for
positional change which make hard law enshrinement of norms unattractive.' 0 '
Abbott and Snidal also recognize soft law as being an efficient means of
compromise between antagonistic positions between states,
particularly in the early
02
stages of normative consideration of the subject area.1
The distinction of hard and soft law and the recognition of soft law
instruments has met with disapproval by some in the international legal
community, however. As expressed by Sztucki:
Primo, the term is inadequate and misleading. There are no two levels or
"species" of law - something is law or is not law. Secundo, the concept is
counterproductive or even dangerous. On the one hand, it creates illusory
expectations of (perhaps even insistence on) compliance with what no one is

obliged to comply; and on the other hand, it exposes binding legal norms for risks
of neglect, and international law as a whole for risks of erosion, by blurring the

threshold between what is legally binding and what is not.l13

However, as D.J. Harris has responded:
While it may be paradoxical and confusing to call something "law" when it is not

98. Id. at 187-8; See generally COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING

NORuMs INTHE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
99. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in InternationalGovernance, 54
INT'L ORG. 421 (2000).
100. Id. at 428-9.
101. Id. at 434.
102. Id. at 444.
103. Jerzy Sztucki, in Festkrift Hjerner550-551 (1990).
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law, the concept is nonetheless useful to describe instruments that clearly have an
impact on international relations and that may later harden into custom or become
the basis of a treaty.104
If an international lawyer were to maintain Harris' position, therefore, and
view the proliferation of missile and related technologies area as an almost
paradigmatically well suited issue area for soft law coverage, based on the Abbot
and Snidal methodology, he or she might conclude that the evolution of the
normative structure in this area would be well served by the primitive use of soft
law mechanisms, and that in so doing the states involved would contribute not only
to the normative progression and coherence of the subject area, but would also
make a significant contribution to the theoretical understanding of the use of soft
law mechanisms in international relations, which is a cutting edge and highly
intriguing area for study and further publication.
However, despite the appeal of this form of analysis and these policy
recommendations to an international legal scholar, little if anything contained in
the foregoing analysis of hard and soft law would appeal to a foreign policymaker,
or tempt such an official to invest much time in considering them. Again, such
policy professionals are chiefly concerned with effectiveness of policy in achieving
the goals which are in the best interest of their states, and they have very little time
to devote to or interest in considering the possible large-picture effects of their
policy on international legal system development or on the processes and theories
of international law. Thus an examination by an international lawyer along the
above lines will be of little assistance to them and will likely be ignored. But it is
crucial to point out once again that in being irrelevant to policymakers, such
analyses, although profitable in their element as progressions in theoretical
understanding of international law, fail the ultimate aims of most international
lawyers - to have norms and a rule of law govern international relations and not a
rule of power and self-interest.
Drawing from the lessons learned from the examinations of supply and
demand previously noted therefore, a more useful paradigm for international
lawyer/policymaker cooperation in this area, and by analogy in others, can be
sketched out. Instead of long-winded examination and in this context useless
theorizing, in the case of the MTCR as in other cases international lawyers could
be most helpful to policymakers by focusing on the particular facts of the issue
area and the problems at hand, and attempt to communicate briefly and effectively
the international
legal
issues involved
and specific
policy-relevant
recommendations.
In the MTCR case, such an analysis might proceed as follows. First to the
underlying threat.
There is a clear link between effective methods of
nonproliferation of missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction and their resultant non-use by dangerous regimes and the national
security of virtually every state in the world. It is further clear that the missile

104. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (5th ed. 1998).
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technology proliferation regime as it currently exists is lacking in normative
foundation. The first question therefore is whether or not greater normativization
in this area is desirable. Effective analysis in this regard could look to analogous
issue areas, such as the other weapons nonproliferation regimes to view the effect
greater normativization has had on the underlying threat. It could be briefly and
clearly shown that nonproliferation regimes in these areas, when closely associated
with binding international agreements, have aided in decreasing the threat of
proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction by formalizing underlying
normative principles and making them openly recognized as obligatory, thus
05
increasingly drastically the reputational costs of openly flouting the norms.1
However, in the missile technology area, the exact technologies involved create a
situation that includes not only threats of sovereignty impingement, but also
significant and uniquely difficult issues for normative coverage, principally due to
the dual-use nature of many such technologies. As mentioned previously, missiles,
unlike nuclear weapons themselves, have many legitimate civilian uses quite apart
from their military uses, many of which are themselves considered legitimate.' 0 6
These include, most importantly, use in peaceful space exploration and
development.10 7 To add to the difficulty, there is virtually no means available to
distinguish between a civilian space missile program and a military missile
program up until the very late stages of its development. Thus normative
progression in this area has been stalled over difficulties in addressing the specific
technologies involved.
However, effective international legal analysis can be offered by going
outside of the weapons proliferation regime area and examining cases of normative
development in other areas in which the substantive issue area has been especially
sensitive and complex. One such illustrative example is the area of international
trade. Trade between nations has historically been among the most sensitive of
areas to regulate because of the potential far-reaching effect of such regulation on
perceived domestic prerogatives and the importance of successful international
trade to national economies. 0 8 After the Second World War, the largest economic
powers concluded on a relatively loose association to preliminarily cover the area
of international trade, established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).' 0 9 The GATT was technically a binding international agreements, but it
It was adopted only
was in actuality quite soft in a number of ways.
"provisionally," its commitments were not subject to effective adjudicatory

105. Although this area presents the familiar logical conundrum wherein proving effectiveness
practically equates to proving the negative (i.e. effectiveness of regimes is best shown by the nonoccurrence of regulated activities), there is a general consensus, which could be supported by data, that
multilateral export control regimes have been effective in at least facilitating national export control
policies, which are an important and demonstrably effective tool in stopping, or at least slowing, the
proliferation of WMD.
106. See Preventing Missile Proliferation,supra note 88.
107. Jd.
108. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2nd ed. 1998).
109. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [Hereinafter GATT] available at
http://www.ciesin.org/TG/PI/TRADE/gatt.html(last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
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institutions, and it contained a relatively lenient withdrawal clause."10 The GATT
however served to introduce some nornativization to the field of international
trade, and in doing so illustrated in a fairly non-threatening way to its signatories
the advantages of mutual cooperation based on norms in the area."' The GATT
signatories learned this lesson so well, in fact, that in 1995 they collectively agreed
to establish a much harder regime in the cross-border trade area, that of the World
Trade Organization, which provided a much more binding institutional framework
for the GATT with authoritative adjudication
of disputes and a number of
2
additional substantive area agreements."
There are a great number of examples of variations on this same theme which
can be pointed to for illustrative purposes. One such example is Agenda 21, the
Forest Principles, adopted at the 1992 Rio Convention on Environment and
development, in which the instrument adopted was fairly precise, but not legally
binding." 3 Another is the corollary case of the original Vienna Ozone Convention
in which states were legally bound, but in imprecise ways.14 Perhaps most
analogous in form to the missile technology nonproliferation area is the joint Food
and Agriculture Organization-UN Environment Program (FAO-UNEP) regime
which was established to institutionally monitor the informed consent of states to
international transfers of hazardous chemicals and pesticides.1 5 The FAO adopted
a "code of conduct" to address distribution and use of pesticides in 1985 and the
UNEP established "guidelines" for exchange of information regarding
internationally traded chemicals in 1987.116 In 1989 the two organizations jointly
amended their respective soft law instruments to add a requirement for prior
informed consent of states to hazardous chemical and pesticide transfers and
established a procedure for handling the verification of such consents. 117 The two
organizations sponsored extensive consultation with outside experts on the issues
and provided technical assistance."l 8 By the late 1990's the member states of both
organizations had authorized formal treaty negotiations and in 1998 a convention
was formally adopted which closely followed the FAO-UNEP system.' '9
110. JACKSON, supra note 108, at 40.
111. Id. at 41.
112. See id.
113. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development [Hereinafter
Forest
Principles]
A/CONF. 151/26
(Vol.
I11)
(1992),
also
available
at
http://www.unorg/documents/ga/confl5J/aconfl5126-3annex3.htm(last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
114. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer entered into force Sept. 22, 1985.
115. See
United
Nations
Environment
Programme
available
at
http://www.unep.org/themes/chemicals/(last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
116. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [Hereinafter FAO], Guidelines on
Efficacy Datafor the Registration of Pesticidesfor Plant Protection(March 1985); London Guidelines
for the Exchange of Information o.n Chemicals in International Trade [Hereinafter London Guidelines],
DB
No.
051138
(1987)
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/publicdenglish/protection/
safework/cis/legoshuno/lxO51138.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
117. London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade
Amended 1989 (Decision 15/30 of the Governing Council of UNEP, May 25, 1989) available at
http://irptc.unep.ch/ethics/english/longuien.htm(last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
118. Id.
119. See a narrative and links to these documents available at http://www.pic.int/ (last visited Feb.
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These differing structures provide flexibility to meet the needs of the
underlying substantive issue area, while providing for some preliminary
normativization in the area, which allows states to see the rules in practice and
learn from actual application rather than engage solely in negotiated speculation. 120
These examples show better than detached theory that normativization through soft
law means has decided advantages of providing a process for learning and
evolution of understanding of the possibilities for normative coverage in a variety
of areas, with very many such primitive soft law instruments evolving over time
into harder, more binding and formalized instruments and institutions. Thus, there
is a sound basis in logic and observed analogous phenomena to conclude that the
further normativization of the area of missile technology nonproliferation will be
beneficial to states involved in that process, and that soft law means such as an
international code of conduct with obligations limited either by imprecision or
non-binding character (both in fact being present in the adopted version of the
ICoC) can have an important role to play in the normative evolution of the regime.
Such analytical devices as analogy and briefly expressed logical and
situationally-specific argument are much more likely than the previous generalized
theoretical observations to be appealing to foreign policymakers, and therefore
effective in illustrating the advantages of normativization and in influencing policy
choice in a discrete area. These therefore should be the analytical modes of choice
in communications between international lawyers and foreign policymakers,
whether made through solicited briefs, personal consultation or in journal and other
publications whose audience is likely to include policymakers.
CONCLUSION
This essay has attempted to ascertain and provide a brief practical
examination of the certain separations, both in communication and cooperation,
which currently subsist between members of the international law and foreign
Upon divination, this gap can be seen to be
policymaking communities.
pervasively based in ideology, professional culture, value structure and shared
The prescriptions for change in method and in substance of
suspicion.
communication and engagement between international lawyers and foreign
policymakers and in their respective underlying professions and cultures provided
herein will be novel to some on both sides of the proposed exchange, and will not
be actualized without much difficulty and soul searching by all concerned.
However, as the gap between the two communities was not created overnight, so
its narrowing will not be accomplished without a substantial re-direction of the
efforts and mindsets of both groups. It is submitted that through this process, both
sides will reap rewards of increased communication and cooperation, which will
inevitably inure to the benefit of both communities, the professions of which are of
such timely importance to international society in the modern era, and the
synergies among which have scarcely begun to be realized.
12, 2003).
120. See HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supranote 2, at introduction.

DEVELOPMENTS AND LIMITS IN
INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE'
PETER KOVACS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, it is hardly possible to deny the important role that the judicial
decisions of international tribunals play in the promotion and execution of states'
treaty law commitments, as well as those of international custom. It is commonly
admitted that modem international law cannot be understood without
acknowledging the paramount importance that scholars, judges, politicians (and
students during their exams) attribute to international courts.
But do we know exactly why courts choose to be innovative in certain cases
and why they are hesitant to do so in others? The reasoning of individual judges
is, in some respects, explained in their individual opinions, dissents, or advisory
opinions.
Yet how can we reconstruct ex post facto a set of common
jurisprudential principles?
Interesting and deep analyses of individual cases are available in all the
important reviews of international law, and case-law-based commentaries are often
prepared on the proper interpretation of a major treaty or even on a particular
article of a given convention. That is why this article has no ambition to give an
exhaustive description of all the roots and paths of the evolution of international
jurisprudence. This article modestly summarizes only those which are most often
referred to in judgments and opinions.
Several different approaches can be chosen for the presentation of the most
important factors of jurisprudential development and limitations. I have chosen to
begin with legal sources (both written and unwritten) to arrive at an analysis of
reasoning beyond traditional legal factors.

1. The paper is a shortened summary of a larger report presented at the 36th annual conference of
the French Society for International Law organized under the somewhat odd title: La
Juridictionnalisation du Droit International (Jurisdictionalization of International Law). The collected
proceedings of the conference will be published by the Editions Pedone (Paris).
' Professor of international law at Miskolc University and Peter Pazmany Catholic University in
Hungary. In the fall semester of 2002 Mr. Kovacs was a visiting Fulbright professor at the University
of Denver College of Law where he taught classes on European protection of national minorities and
the law of war.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

A. Legal Factors in JurisprudentialDevelopment
Jurisprudential development is engaged in, first and foremost, on a volunteer
basis. The will of the state, for example, may be manifested in contractual or ad
hoc public documents, but sometimes also in the act of only one of the stateparties, and the international judge will usually take note of such expressions of
intent.
The statute of an international tribunal, a given article of a convention, or the
uncertain or contradictory nature of the terms of a treaty, can all be considered as
treaty-law bases for jurisprudential developments.
More specifically, a mandate contained in a treaty authorizing a tribunal to
deliver advisory opinions can a priori function as a good tool for jurisprudential
development. The Permanent Court of International Justice,2 the International
Court of Justice, 3 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights4 have often used
treaty mandates for this purpose. A specific example is the Commission of
Arbitration of the International Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, chaired by the
president of the French Constitutional Court, Robert Badinter, which delivered a
good dozen advisory opinions during its brief existence. 5 Judges may also be
pushed towards jurisprudential development by the material, rather than by
procedural, clauses of a treaty, especially when it is thought necessary for judicial
decision-making.6
The elasticity of the terms of a treaty offer a good starting point. This
elasticity can be the product of a deliberate decision (the inclusion, for example, of
terms such as "economically reasonable efforts," or "in accordance with
environmental standards." French scholars refer to this as renoi mobil-literally,
"mobile reference") but it can also emerge nolens volens. 7 It is obvious that the
inherent contradictions in treaty texts require a jurisprudential choice between the
hypothetically possible contents. There are a number of famous examples of a

2. The Permanent Court of International Justice has delivered twenty-seven advisory opinions.
See World Courts, Statistics on the Permanent Court of International Justice, available at
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
3. As of 2003, the International Court of Justice has issued twenty-two advisory opinions. See
id.

4. Sixteen advisory opinions were issued from 1981 to 2000. See Interamerican Court of Human
Rights, Judgments and Opinions, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
5. Fifteen advisory opinions and one "decision before jurisdiction.".
6. See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Aft.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, at 336 (Dec. 21).
The International Court of Justice need not limit itself to mere grammatical interpretation because
"[t]his rule of interpretation is not an absolute one. Where such a method of interpretation results in a
meaning incompatible with the spirit, purpose and context of the clause or the instrument in which the
words are contained, no reliance can be validly placed on it." Id.
7. The use of such terms is generally the result of diplomatic compromises made during
multilateral negotiations in order to create mutually acceptable agreements.
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conflict between languages, and the International Court of Justice 8 and the
European Court of Human Rights 9 have both encountered such problems and both
resolved the issues according to the same general principles.
Treaty terms are often interpreted by recourse to preparatory documents
(travaux preparatoires),as described in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties,' 0 and most jurisdictions generally consider this to be an important
method for arriving at a cleaner vision regarding obscure treaty terms." The
International Court of Justice, for example, has often profited from this method. 12
At the other end of the spectrum, the precise formulation of a given
convention does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of competent and
evolving interpretations in various jurisdictions. For example, in the context of the
Balkan tragedy, the International Court of Justice was faced with the task of
formulating the precise relationship between the crime of genocide as defined in
the 1948 Geneva Convention, and the national or international character of the
particular armed conflict in which the genocide occurred. The Court concluded
that the convention applied to the signatories regardless of the political backdrop
behind such crimes. 13

8. See, e.g., LaGrand (Germany v. United States) 2001 I.C.J. (June 27), available at
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqua/iqusjudgment/ijusijudgment_20010625.html.
In the
LaGrand case, the International Court of Justice had to decide whether provisional measures adopted
according to article 41 of its Statute have a legally binding character (as suggested by the French text
"doivent etre prises" or the English text "ought to be taken") or not. The Court interpreted the provision
to be compulsory in nature, and closed a long doctrinal debate with its decision. Id. at §§ 100-09.
9. See, e.g., Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education
in Belgium, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 252, 284-85 (1968) (merits) [hereinafter Belgian Linguistic case,
merits]. In the Belgian linguistic case, the European Court of Human Rights had to pass on whether the
English ("without any discrimination") or the French version ("sans distinction aucune") of article 14 of
the European Convention of Human Rights better reflects the actual content of the non-discrimination
rule.
10. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 32, available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/text/treaties (last visited Mar. 1, 2003). Article 32 states: "Supplementary
means of interpretation: Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion .... " Id.
11. See infra note 12.
12. LaGrand case, supra note 8, at §§ 105-07. An important aspect of the case concerned the legal
value (i.e., compulsory or only recommendatory) of the provisional measures ordered by the
International Court of Justice. The judgment explains extensively in these paragraphs how the
corresponding article of the Statue of the Permanent Court of International Justice was formulated; Fifty
lines are devoted to the presentation of the history of this formula and the metamorphosis of the original
proposal. Id.
13. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yug.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 615 (July 11). The Court explained:
[Tlhe Convention is applicable without reference to the circumstances linked to the
domestic or international nature of the conflict provided the acts to which it refers in
Article 11and III have been perpetrated. In other words, irrespective of the nature of the
conflict forming the background to such acts, the obligations of prevention and
punishment which are incumbent upon the States parties to the Convention remain
identical.
Id.
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B. JurisprudentialDevelopment Beyond Treaty Law Bases
It happens quite often that jurisprudence benefits from the existence of a
custom (or from the mere postulation of its existence) which is interpreted to
enlarge the spectrum of international law. The International Court of Justice,
developed, in part, from an analysis of certain terms of the 1969 treaty leading to a
presumption of the general representative nature of heads of state-a presumption
of their ability to act on behalf of a state concerning its international relations
which extends beyond mere treaty-making.' 4 However, as Judge Jimdnez de
Ardchaga noted not only positive customary law, but crystallizing custom can also
exercise a considerable influence on tribunals.'"
One could cite several examples of the influence of customs on treaties and
vice versa, but the best-known instance of a comprehensive development is the
confirmation of the applicability of the story of Sleeping Beauty on codified
custom. For example, without the recognition of the autonomous existence of
codified customary rules, the International Court of Justice would hardly
have been
6
able to decide the dispute between Nicaragua and the United States.'
Do other such considerations constitute sufficient bases for a judge to
formulate new jurisprudential development? It is undeniable that international
jurisprudence-as well as international doctrinal approaches-does not necessarily
ignore factors like philosophy, even if they appear to be of importance7 only rarely.
The use of principles of equity provides a well-recognized exception.1
Obviously, the less someone is limited, the freer he is. Consequently, judges
feel the greatest freedom where a decision is to be taken ex aequo et bono.' 8
14. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yug.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 622 (July 11). The Court observed that
"[aiccording to international law, there is no doubt that every Head of Sate is presumed to be able to act
on behalf of the State in their international relations." Id.
15. See, e.g., Eduardo Jimdnez de Ar6chaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a Century,
159 RECUEIL DES Coups 20 (1978). Ardchaga observes a willingness, in the International Court of
Justice, to rely on generally accepted principles of international law existing outside textual
circumscription:
[lit may be asserted that the International Court of Justice has, in the last decade made a
significant contribution to the evolution of a more flexible concept of the source of
customary international law, based on the recognition of an established consensus of
State and irrespective of the formal requirements of adoption of a text, signature and
ratification of a convention. The Court gave considerable weight to what it termed "the
general consensus revealed" at the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea "which had crystallized as customary law in recent years," on the basis of
subsequent practice of States.
Id.
16. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 96 (June 27). In this
case, the Court explained, "[i]t will therefore be clear that customary international law continues to exist
and to apply, separately from international treaty law, even where the two categories of law have an
identical content." Id.
17. See infra note 25 for examples of the International Court of Justice discussing the concept of
equity.
18. See Wolfgang Friedmann, General Course in Public International Law, 127 RECUEIL DES
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However, neither the Permanent Court of International Justice, nor the
International Court of Justice have ever felt such freedom in delivering a
judgment, 19 and the same can be said of most international tribunals. 20 The very
few examples to the contrary are not very convincing. In these cases, the existence
of a mandate to pass a decision ex aequo was never truly clear and certainly not
express. 21 Indeed, the related decisions are very short and their formulation is
often lacking a proper legal argument, or even a written opinion. As such, they
seem not to be judicial decisions so much as amalgams of social, sociological,
geographical and ethnic considerations.
Grosso modo, the same considerations can be evoked in order to explaih why
states are reluctant when deciding upon a mandate in favor of an international
tribunal for a transactional decision. This theoretical possibility apparently does
not avail too much of a chance for jurisprudential development.22
However, the use of analogy and general principles of law has contributed
largely to jurisprudential development. 23 Though it is sometimes criticized in
academic circles because of its seemingly indefinable character,24 equity has not
been abandoned as a component of jurisprudence. Scholars have observed and
appreciated the presence of equity in the reasoning of tribunals and consequently,
COURS 159 (1969). Friedmann explains the concept in holistic terms:
What ex aequo et bono means is that the Court should, by agreement of the parties, look
at the whole matter in the light of the appropriate economic, geographical, racial,
religious and other circumstances which would seem conducive to a fair and lasting
solution. And such a decision may involve the modification of legal rights, e.g., of
boundaries established by previous treaties or annexations, or colonial occupations.
Freidmann, supra, at 159.
19. See Robert Yewdall, General Course on Principlesof InternationalLaw, 121 RECUEIL DES
COURs 343-44 (1967). Yewdall has observed, "[it is not surprising, therefore, that this is a much
underworked provision of the Statute; for it is inherently unlikely that in any case both parties will be
found willing to seek a decision which may be at odds with the legal rights of a party." Id.
20. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
21. See generally the text of the Vienna Award of August 30th, 1940, ceding the territory of
Transylvania to Hungary, reprinted in Rumanian-HungarianFrontier, 3 Whiteman DIGEST § 12, at
138-39. See also the very short text of the Ribbentrop-Ciano awards in Hungarian-Czechoslovak
Frontier,3 Whiteman DIGEST § 13, at 145-47.
22. See generally the Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in the Brcko Area,
Final Award, Mar. 5, 1999, availableat
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/990305_arbiter brcko.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
23. See, e.g., Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 at 29 (Sept. 13). Here,
the Court explained, "It is a general conception of law that every violation of an engagement involves
an obligation to make reparation." Id. See also Advisory Opinion No. 6, German Settlers in Poland,
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 36. In this case, the Court observed, "[i]t can hardly be maintained that
although the law survived, private rights acquired under it perished. Such a contention is based on no
principle and would be contrary to an almost universal opinion and practice." Id. See also Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18 (Apr. 9) ("Indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law
and its use is recognized by international decisions."); Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53 (July 13) ("According to a well-established
and generally recognized principle of law, a judgment rendered by such a judicial body is resjudicata
and has binding force between the parties to the dispute.").
24. See, e.g., PROSPER WEIL, PERSPECTIVES DU DROIT DE LA DELIMITATION MARITIME 147
(1988). Weil has characterized equity as a "jeu de hazard" (hazardous game). Id.
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an impressive jurisprudential construction [concerning equity?] has been created,
particularly in the law of sea. 25
Yet it is without any doubt that the simplest and most often observed method
of rendering progressive, activist developments in international law is through the
cascade of successivejurisprudentialdecisions.
To refer to formerly pronounced dicta, and to profit from their existence in
order to go a bit further is a well known and maybe the most often employed
method of jurisprudential development. It is rooted also in inherent judicial
functions, recognized in the European literature by the German phrase
"Kompetenz-Kompetenz" or the more or less similar Latin principle jura novit
curia. The judgments passed in Nicaragua v. United States26 and the Fisheries
Competencies27 cases provide examples. The same doctrine can also play an
important role in the field of advisory opinions; from their larger circle, let us cite
only the opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in order to
demonstrate the International Court of Justice's adoption of this prerogative.28
May it sound exaggerated to call it a stricto sensu development, it is worth
noting that a tribunal can proprio motu pass a decision on issues or aspects of

25. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 49 (Feb. 20) ("Equity does not
necessarily imply equality."); Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 60
(Feb. 24) ("Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice. The Court whose task
is by definition to administer justice is bound to apply it."); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 39 (June 3) ("Thus the justice of which equity is an emanation, is not an
abstract justice according to the rule of law; which is to say that its application should display
consistency and a degree of predictability .. ") [hereinafter cases concerning continental shelves].
26. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicr. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 24 (June 27) ("For the
purpose of deciding whether the claim is well founded in law, the principle jura novit curia signifies
that the Court is not solely dependent on the argument of the parties before it with respect to the
applicable law ... ").
27. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 9 (July 25). The Court explained:
The Court, however, as an international judicial organ, is deemed to take judicial notice of international
law, and is therefore required ... to consider on its own initiative all the rules of international law
which may be relevant to the settlement of the dispute. It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain
and apply the relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the burden of establishing or proving
rules of international law cannot be imposed upon any of the parties, for the law lies within the judicial
knowledge of the Court.
Id. See also Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 181 (July 25) (employing the same
language).
28. See Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 237 (July 8). In
section 18 of the opinion, the Court explained:
It is clear that the Court cannot legislate and in the circumstances of the present case, it is
not called upon to do so. Rather its task is to engage in its normal judicial function of
ascertaining the existence or otherwise of legal principles and rules applicable to the
threat or use of nuclear weapons. The contention that the giving of an answer to the
question posed would require the Court to legislate is based on a supposition that the
present corpus juris [sic] is devoid of relevant rules in this matter. The Court could not
accede to this argument. It states the existing international law and does not legislate.
This is so even if in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify its
scope and sometimes note its general trend.
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minimal importance even when the question is not explicitly mentioned in the
compromise. 29

Additionally, the statutory position of a tribunal within the structure of an

international organization can have a considerable effect on its reasoning, as judges
must place the legal dispute or the legal problem in the general framework of an
international organization, either universal or regional. The due consideration of
the functional interests of the organization as well as its capacities can exercise an
important influence on the procedure of judicial decision-making as well. For
example, the functional interests of the United Nations and in particular the role
and the position of the International Court of Justice in this context were pointed
out by Elihu Lauterpacht.30 The determination of the legal personality of the
United Nations in the Bernadotte case,3' the capacities of its organs in the Certain
32
Expenses case, and the assessment of its organs in the South West African and
33
Namibia cases are all examples of the phenomenon.
29. CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY
THE UNITED STATES, Vol. 2 1631-32 (2d. rev. ed., 1945). In the context of an arbitral award, Hyde
observes that collateral matters may be determined by the tribunal, even where there is no explicit
authorization to do so from the parties. For example:
It is perhaps unnecessary that the agreement to arbitrate should prescribe the currency in
which the terms of an award are to be expressed, even though it be highly important that
the amount thereof be fixed with precision and set forth in terms that leave no room for
doubt as to the extent of the fiscal burden imposed upon the respondent.
Id.
30. Elihu Lauterpacht, 152 RECUEIL DES COURs 466 (1976). Lauterpacht explains:
We are bound to ask whether the treatment by the Court of questions relating to
international organizations-and especially the interpretation of their constitutionsrepresents a deliberate or consistent attempt to develop a systematic approach to the law
of international organization as such. Or, is it, on the other hand, nothing more than an
accumulation of judicial episodes which share the common feature of being founded
upon facts of an "organizational" character and which happens only accidentally or
haphazardly to shed light on the legal system of international organization?
Id.
31. See generally Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174, 185-87 (Apr. 11).
32. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20). In this
advisory opinion, the Court observed:
[W]hen the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was
appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires... [1]f the action was taken by the
wrong organ, it was irregular as a matter of that internal structure, but this would not
necessarily mean that the expense incurred was not the expense of the organization.
Id.
33. See generally International Status of South West Africa, 1959 I.C.J. 128 (July I1);
Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 1956 l.C.J. 23 (June
1); Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South
West Africa, 1955 I.C.J. 67 (June 7). See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa and Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J.
16 (June 21). In this case the Court assessed the competency of the United Nations to supervise its own
various organs. The Court observed, "[Tihe United Nations, as a successor to the League, acting
through its competent organs, must be seen above all as the supervisory institution, competent to
pronounce, in that capacity, on the conduct of the mandatory with respect to its international
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In order to respect the principle of res judicata, great attention must be paid to
the scrupulous observance of prior decisions passed in the same case. However
this does not mean that mathematical errors should not be corrected 34 -even if a
pure arithmetical correction cannot really be taken as a true jurisprudential
development.
The Permanent Court of International Justice was formally
mandated to correct ex officio minor mistakes, and the existence of an analogous
competence is presumed for the International Court of Justice, despite silence on
the issue in the statute creating the court.
The phenomena of individual jurisprudential developments can be viewed as
bricks used in the progressive construction of a building. This happened most
obviously in the development the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice concerning the law of sea, the crime of genocide, or the norms erga omnes
(jus cogens).36 Often, a judgment can finalize the slow, continuous and consequent
evolution of international custom-a custom eventually linked to a particular treaty
law question.
Clearly, previous dicta enjoy an irrefutable authority in the formulations of
later judgments by the same court. It is interesting, however, to observe not only a
tribunal's utilization of its own historical jurisprudence, but also the effects on an
international tribunal of the judgments of other international tribunals. For
purposes of the present article, I will call this phenomenon jurisprudential
interactions, mindful that in reality we cannot speak about truly mutual
interactions, the general feeling among tribunals being a certain unilateralism
accompanied by judicial aristocratism. Still, this phenomenon merits a closer look.

obligations, and competent to act accordingly. Id.
34. HYDE, supra note 29, at 1635. Hyde quotes Arbitrator Roberts:
I think it clear that where the Commission has misinterpreted the evidence, or made a
mistake in calculation, or where its decision does not follow its fact findings, or where in
any other respect the decision does not comport with the record as made, or where the
decision involves a material error of law, the Commission not only has power, but is
under the duty, upon a proper showing, to reopen and correct a decision to accord with
the facts and applicable legal rules.
Id.
35. See Richard Plender, Procedure in the European Court: Comparisons and Proposals,267
RECUEIL DES CouRs 304 (1997). Plender notes that despite the lack of an explicit delineation of its
power to correct simple errors, the Court is, nevertheless, presumed to be able to do so. He observes:
It is a curiosity that between 1931 and 1936 the Permanent Court (or the President if the
Court was not sitting) was formally provided with a power to correct any error in any
judgment, opinion or order arising from a slip or accidental omission. Although
thereafter neither the Rules of the Permanent Court nor those of the International Court
of Justice expressly stipulated such a power, there is no doubt that the International
Court of Justice has an inherent power to rectify clerical errors or slips of the
hypothetical pen without invoking its revision jurisdiction under article 61 of the Statute.
Id.
36. See generally North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); Continental Shelf (Tunis.
v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v.
Malta) 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28); Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28); Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company
(BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
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In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights we can find a
good dozen references to cases decided by the Permanent Court of International
Justice 37 or the International Court of Justice. 38 It is true however that the ratio of
such references compared to the total number (over three
thousand) of judgments
39
from the European Court of Human Rights is very lOW.
37. See, e.g., Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium, I
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 241, 247 (1970) (preliminary objections) [hereinafter Belgian Linguistic case,
preliminary objections] ("[H]aving regard to the decisions of the Permanent Court of International
Justice and the International Court of Justice, the Belgian Government contends that the European
Court has no jurisdiction to pronounce on the merits of this case..."); Belgian Linguistic case, merits,
supra note 9. In the decision on the merits, the Court referred expressly to the jurisprudence of both the
Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice:
In its opinion of 24th of June 1965, the Commission expressed the view that although
Article 14 is not at all applicable to the rights and freedoms not guaranteed by the
Convention and Protocol, its applicability "is not limited to cases in which there is an
accompanying violation of another Article." In the view of the Commission "such a
restrictive application" would conflict with the principle of effectiveness established by
the case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court
of Justice, for the discrimination would be limited to the aggravation "of the violation of
another provision of the Convention."
Id. at 277.
See also Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1, 7 (1960) (preliminary objections) ("The
Commission has invoked various precedents drawn from advisory opinion procedure at the Permanent
Court of International Justice and subsequently at the International Court of Justice .. "); Stran Greek
Refineries v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293, 329. (1994) (Court report). Here, to
support its proposition that the unilateral termination of a contract cannot effect certain clauses of that
contract (such as an arbitration clause) the court cited the Losinger decision of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (Losinger & Co. v. Yug., 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 78, at 110 (Oct. 1I).). See also
Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, App. No. 14556/89, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 452 (1996) (Commission
report) (citing the Chorzow Factory case, infra note 40).
38. See, e.g., Lawless v. Ireland, I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), supra note 37, at 7; Belgian Linguistic
case, preliminary objections, supra note 37, at 247 ("[H]aving regard to the decisions of the Permanent
Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, the Belgian Government contends
that the European Court has no jurisdiction to pronounce on the merits of this case..."); Belgian
Linguistic case, merits, supra note 10, at 277 ("In the view of the Commission, 'such a restrictive
application' would conflict with the principle of effectiveness established by the case law of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice.. ."); Ringeisen v.
Austria, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 455, 498 (1971) ("Like the International Court of Justice, 'it is the
duty' of our Court 'to interpret the Treaties, not to revise them."'); Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No.
15576/89, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 40-41 (1991) (Commission report) ("The European Movement, which
first proposed the drafting of a European Convention on Human Rights, originally included in a draft
Statue of the European Court of Human Rights an interim measures provision (Article 35) based in
substance on Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice."); Loizidou v. Turkey, App.
No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 103 (1995) (Commission report) (discussing both differences and
similarities in the nature of the two courts); Agrotexim v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, 21 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 250, (1995) (Court report) ("The Supreme Courts of certain Member States of the Council of
Europe have taken the same line. The principle has also been confirmed with regard to the diplomatic
protection of companies by the International Court of Justice."); Cyprus v. Turkey, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep.
731, 737 (2001) ("Moreover, recognising the effectiveness of those bodies for the limited purpose of
protecting the rights of the territory's inhabitants does not, in the Court's view and following the
Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, legitimise the TRNC in any way.").
39. The European Court of Human Rights counts 3,499 judgments as of February 2003. See the
European Court of Human Rights, list of recent judgments, at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (last visited
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The European Court of Human Rights refers namely to the Chorzow40 and
Losinger4' cases of the Permanent Court of International Justice and some famous
arbitral awards.42 From the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice,
Strasbourg judges cited, for example, the judgment in the Barcelona Traction
case 43 and the 1971 advisory opinion on Namibia."
It is also interesting to observe that several times, the European Court of
Human Rights has refused to follow the direction of the Permanent Court of
International Justice or of the International Court of Justice, usually in cases
containing differences between the important aspects of the affairs.45
When the European Court of Human Rights refers proprio motu to the
jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice or to that of the
International Court of Justice, it usually follows their direction. On occasion, the
plaintiff, the respondent government or the European Commission of Human
Rights has suggested that the court follow this or that dictum. In such instances,
the European Court of Human Rights has scrupulously examined the relevance of
the work of other tribunals before adopting any of their positions. 46
Concerning the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, we can refer inter
alia to its recent judgments in the Last Temptation of Christ case (after the 1988
Martin Scorsese film of the same title, which was banned from release in Chile),
and the Ivcher Bronstein cases. In the first case, the judges of the court made
reference to the well-developed jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights in the field of freedom of expression. 47 In the second, the Inter-American

Feb. 17, 2003).
40. See, e.g., Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, App. No. 14556/89, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 452
(quoting the holding of the Chorzow Factory case).
41. See, e.g., Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293, 329
(1994) (Court report) (referring to the Losinger decision).
42. See Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 329 (referring to Lena Golfields v.
Soviet Government and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v.
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic).
43. See Agrotexim v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, Eur. H.R. Rep. 250, 271 (1995) (Commission
report) (citing the rules of diplomatic protection for shareholders and societies).
44. See Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 113 (1995) (Commission
report).
45. See e.g., Akdivar v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 182 (1996) (Court
report) (declining to follow principles enunciated in the Interhandel and Ambatielos judgments
concerning exceptions from the rule requiring exhaustion of local remedies).
46. For examples of the Court accepting principles delineated by other tribunals see the Belgian
Linguistic case, preliminary objections, supra note 37, at 247; Belgian Linguistic case, merits, supra
note 9, at 284-85. For an example of the Court refusing, despite the urging of the respondent
government, to adopt the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice see Akdivar v. Turkey,
supra note 46.
47. See The Last Temptation of Christ Case (Olmedo Bustos v. Chile), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.er (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). In section 69 of the judgment, the Court quoted
the European Court of Human Rights itself:
[The] supervisory function [of the Court] signifies that [it] must pay great attention to
the principles inherent in a "democratic society." Freedom of expression constitutes one
of the essential bases of such a society, one of the primordial conditions for its progress
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Court of Human Rights recalled the jurisprudence of the International Court of
though without
Justice with an apparent allusion
48 to the Barcelona Traction case,
mentioning the case expressly.
And vice versa?
The European Court of Human Rights appears to have adopted the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in order to find
support for its thesis on the responsibility of the plaintiff concerning the burden of
proof of the nonexistence or inefficacy of a remedy existing ex lege. 49 In another
case, the plaintiffs explicit reference to an Inter-American case was not
addressed. 50
If we examine the tendency of the International Court of Justice to cite the
dicta of other international tribunals, we can conclude that the attention of the
judges of the World Court is focused mostly on the jurisprudence of the Permanent
Court of International Justice and some arbitral awards. Apparently, the
International Court of Justice was more reluctant to profit from the dicta of the
European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or
the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia. Three judges have referred,
however, to the Strasbourg jurisprudence in their dissenting opinions. 5'
Importing the principle uti possidetis juris to Europe, the Commission of
Arbitration for Peace in Yugoslavia also profited from the heritage of the

and for the development of man. Article 10.2 [of the European Court of Human Rights]
is valid not only for the information or ideas that are favorably received or considered
inoffensive or indifferent but also for those that shock, concern or offend the State or any
sector of the population. Such are the requirements of pluralism, tolerance and the spirit
of openness without which no "democratic society" can exist. This means that any
formality, condition, restriction or sanction imposed in that respect, should be
proportionate to the legitimate aim sought. Also, those who exercise their freedom of
expression assume "obligations and responsibilities," the scope of which depends on the
context and the technical procedure used.
Id.
at
is
available
decision
Bronstein
of
the
Ivacher
text
48. The
http://mitglied.lycos.de/harueckner/art2lachr. In section 121 of the judgment, the Court explained,
"[tihe International Court of Justice has made a distinction between the rights of a company's
shareholders from those of the company itself." Id.
49. See, e.g., Akdivar v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 182 (1996) (Court
report). The European Court of Human Rights referred to both the Velasquez Rodrigues case (1987)
and the Advisory Opinion of 10 August 1990 on the Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic
Remedies, though not explicitly.
50. See Ergi v. Turkey, App. No. 23818/94, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 388, 426 (1998). The plaintiff
referred to sections 136 and 140-41 of the judgment in Godinez Cruz v. Honduras, decided by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights in 1989.
51. See Fisheries Jurisdiction, (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4). Judge Bedjaoui, in his
dissenting opinion, referred to the Interhandel case when emphasizing the importance of the principle of
divisibility of the reservations. Id. at 539-40. Similarly, Judge Torres Bernardez referred to the
Loizidou case in his dissent. Id. at 637. See also Ariel Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India), 2000
I.C.J. 12, 85 (June 21) (citing Belilos v. Switzerland, decided by the European Court of Human Rights
in 1988, and Loizidou v. Turkey).
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International Court of Justice52 when it pronounced on the borders of the exYugoslav states.53
However surprising it may be, the International Tribunal for the Law of Sea
has referred rarely to the decisions of the International Court of Justice. Among its
references, we can find classical dicta 54(as well as well known arbitral awards 55)
and newly pronounced judgments,56 but surprisingly none of these decisions
concerned the law of the sea. The Tribunal generally cited its own dicta57 -which
is not really surprising.
Another example presents itself in the decisions of international criminal
tribunals. Referring instead to the Nuremberg jurisprudence, 58 the International

52. See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 (Dec. 22). The Court
explained the principle as follows:
[T]he principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of
international law. It is a general principle which is logically connected with the
phenomenon of the obtaining of independence wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is
to prevent the independence and stability of new sates being endangered by fratricidal
struggles.
Id.
For an in-depth discussion on the Badinter Commission, see generally STEVE TERRETT, THE
DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL
STUDY OF PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD.

53. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1448, 1500 (1992). The Commission referred explicitly to the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice concerning the principle of utipossidetis:
Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by
international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial
status quo and in particular from the principle of uti possidetis. Uti possidetis, though
initially applied in settling decolonization issues in America and Africa, is today
recognized as a general principle, as stated by the International Court of Justice in its
judgment of 22 December 1986 in the case between Burkina Faso and Mali.
Id.
54. See, e.g., Saiga Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 38 I.L.M 1323, 1349 (1999). In section 120 of
the judgment the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea cited the Permanent Court of
International Justice's decision in the case concerning Certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia.
Id. Additionally, in section 170 of the judgment, the Tribunal refers to the Chorzow case. See also
Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624 (1999). Here, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea charactarized a legal dispute according to the terminology adopted by
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavromattis Palestine Concessions judgment of
1962 ("[A] dispute is a 'disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of
interests."'). See also Grand Prince, (Belize v. Fr.), available at http://www.itlosorg/start2_eng.html
(last visited Feb. 18, 2003). The Tribunal referred to the dictum of the case concerning the
Competencies of the Council of the ICAO, explaining, "[tihe Court must however always be satisfied
that it has jurisdiction and must if necessary go into that matter, propriomotu." Id.
55. See Saiga Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 38 I.L.M 1323, 1355 (1999). Section 156 of the
judgment refers to the lam Alone (1935) and Red Crusader (1962) cases. Id.
56. See id. at 1351-52. Section 133 of the judgment refers to the case concerning the GabcikovoNagymaros Project. Id.
57. See, e.g., Camouco Case (Pan. v. Fr.) 39 I.L.M. 666 (2000) (citing the Saiga case); Monte
Confunco (Sey. v. Fr.), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html. (citing the Comouco case in
sections 41 and 63).
58. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Excerpts from Judgment
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Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia, for example, not only failed to observe the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in the dispute between
Nicaragua and the United States, 59 but purposefully distanced itself from the
International Court of Justice. 60
We cannot say that recourse to auxiliary documents of compromises or to the
memoranda of the parties to the dispute has contributed in a consistent or decisive
manner to jurisprudential development. On the contrary, the picture is quite
contradictory especially concerning the value attributed to geographical maps.
But only due to the factum concludens of the parties, the International Court of

Justice can take note of maps even if "in [their] inception and at the moment of
[their] production, [they] had no binding character.",61 The Court seems to reason
that "maps merely constitute information... [and] by virtue solely of their
existence they cannot constitute a territorial title ... [though] in some cases, maps
may acquire ... legal force ... [as] physical expressions of the will of the State or
States concerned., 62 However, in the case of the "uncertainty and inconsistency of
the cartographic material submitted," the International Court of Justice can decline
to give weight to such materials. 63 Arbitral practice is slightly more open. 64
Soft law-the resolutions adopted by the organs of different organizationshas also fermented international jurisprudence. By opening the door to the
possible contribution of such resolutions to the formation of general norms of
international law, the International Court of Justice has manifested its willingness
in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, and Dissenting Opinion, 36 I.L.M. 908, 936 (1997) ("the Trial of the
Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal ('Ntlmberg Judgment') does not delve
into the legality of the inclusion of crimes against humanity in the Narnberg Charter .... ').
59. See id. at 927.
60. See id. at 927-28. The Commission was careful to distinguish the facts of the Nicaragua case
from the case before it:
However, the facts of the Nicaraguacase and this case are very different... thus, unlike
the Nicaragua case in which the Court considered whether the contra forces had, over
time, fallen into such a sufficient state of dependency and control vis-a-vis the United
States that the acts of one could be imputed to another, the question for this Trial
Chamber is whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), by its
withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
notwithstanding its continuing support for the VRS, had sufficiently distanced itself from
the VRS so that those forces could not be regarded as de facto organs or agents of the VJ
and hence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
Consequently, the Trial Chamber must consider the essence of the test of the relationship
between a de facto organ or agent, as a rebel force, and its controlling entity or principal,
as a foreign Power. It must also be shown that the VJ and Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exercised the potential for control inherent in that
relationship of dependency.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Excerpts from Judgment in
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, and Dissenting Opinion, supra note 58, at 927-28.
61. Temple of Preah Vihear, (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 21 (June 15).
62. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali) 1986 I.C.J. 554, 581 (Dec. 22).
63. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1100 (Dec. 13) ("[uln light of
the uncertainty and inconsistency of the cartographic material submitted to it, the Court considers itself
unable to draw conclusions from the map evidence produced in this case.").
64. See generallyRann of Kutch Arbitration (India v. Pak.), 7 I.L.M. 633 (1968).
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to take into account changes implied by the new world-order. The reference to
United Nations Resolution 2625 on the principles of co-existence and friendly
relations adopted by the General Assembly is a good example.65 The soft law of the
protection of the environment has also contributed to a new jurisprudential
response to contemporary challenges, as is reflected by the inclusion of terms used
in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration in one of the orders of the International Court
of Justice. 66
The contribution of the acts ofparties to jurisprudential development can be
found in several judgments as well. The International Court of Justice has
explained that "the views of the parties to a case as to the law applicable to their
dispute are very material, particularly ...when those views are concordant. '67 For
example, in the Kasikili-Sedudu case,68 the International Court of Justice concurred
with the observation by Namibia and Botswana, of the jurisprudential line
concerning the boundaries as was formulated in the Preah Vihear case.69 Mutatis
mutandis this can be seen also in the advisory opinions vis-A-vis the positionpapers submitted by states.70
B. Non-legal reasons ofjurisprudentialdevelopment
Social necessity or changes in global context can also influence international

65. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99-100 (June 27).
The Court explained:
[O]piniojurismay, though with all due caution, be deduced from, interalia the attitude
of the Parties and of the States towards certain General Assembly Resolutions and
particularly resolution 2625 (XXV)... The effect of consent to the text of such
resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of 'reiteration or elucidation' of treaty
commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an
acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolutions
themselves.
Id.
66. See Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 306 (Sept. 22) ("Whereas
moreover [sic] the present order is without prejudice to the obligations of States to respect and protect
the natural environment, obligations to which both New Zealand and France have in the present
instance reaffirmed their commitment ...").
For a deep analysis of the environmental issue in the Court's jurisprudence see SANDS, PHILIPPE:
DES ESSAIS NUCLEAIRES 11 (NOUVELLE-ZELANDE C. FRANCE): CONTRIBUTION
L'INSTANCE AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LENVIRONNEMENT RGDIP 1997/2 473-74.
L'AFFAIRE

DE

67. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 25 (June 27).
68. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13)
69. See id. at 1073 ("The Court stated in the Temple of Preah Vihear Case... this was 'an
obvious and convenient way of describing a frontier line objectively, though in general terms."').
70. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia,
1971 I.C.J. 16, 45 (June 21). The Court explained:
Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect
of the decisions taken by the United Nations' organs concerned ....However, in the
exercise of its judicial function and since objections have been advanced, the Court, in
the course of its reasoning, will consider these objections before determining any legal
consequences arising from those resolutions. Id.
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tribunals to refine their jurisprudence. 7'
We sometimes have the feeling that a tribunal in a given case was answering a
historical challenge, though it is true that courts acknowledge this kind of
reasoning with exceptional rarity. These are, however, very important moments in
the history of mankind-moments when the courts do not merely deliver justice,
but also reaffirm the notion that justice is triumphant. In these instances, the
tribunal cannot afford to be criticized for having allegedly committed an abuse of
power or denial of justice. Quite plainly, this feeling is perceptible in the work of
international criminal tribunals. The International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg,
for example, scrupulously summarized the number of witnesses, affidavits, and
testimonies (with a special regard to those advocating for the defense) in the
introductory portion of the judgment. 72 The Tribunal pointed out that "from the
beginning of the War in 1939 War Crimes were committed on a vast scale, which
were also Crimes against Humanity. 73 In the context of the tragedy of the
Balkans, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Formal Yugoslavia was
confronted with the same challenge and it referred, logically, to the heritage of the
Nuremberg judgment.74

71. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226. In this advisory
opinion, the Court considered the overarching social context surrounding the law governing nuclear
weapons:
Given the eminently difficult issues that arise in applying the law on the use of force and
above all the law applicable in armed conflict to nuclear weapons, the Court considers
that it now needs to examine one further aspect of the question before it, seen in a
broader context. In the long run, international law, and with it the stability of the
international order which it is intended to govern, are bound to suffer from the
continuing difference of views with regard to the legal status of weapons as deadly as
nuclear weapons. It is consequently important to put an end to this state of affairs: the
long-promised complete nuclear disarmament appears to be the most appropriate means
of achieving that result.
Id.
72. See The Avalon Project at Yale Law School: Judgment of the International Military Tribunal
for the Trial of Major War Criminals, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judgen.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2003). The prosecution offered the testimony of thirty-three witnesses, and the defense
sixty-one witnesses. The defense also offered additional testimony in the form of 143 written answers
to interrogatories. Specially appointed Commissioners heard the testimony of another 101 witnesses,
and a total of 1,809 affidavits were submitted.
73. "Ntmberg Judgment," infra note 82, at 254.
74. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Excerpts from Judgment in
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, and Dissenting Opinion, 36 I.L.M. 908, 936 (1997). The Tribunal
acknowledged the reasoning behind the inclusion, in the Namberg charter, of jurisdictional provisions
allowing authorities to deal with nontraditional crimes against humanity:
The decision to include crimes against humanity in the Ntrmberg Charter and thus grant
the Ntrmberg Tribunal jurisdiction over this crime resulted from the Allies' decision not
to limit their retributive powers to those who committed war crimes in the traditional
sense but to include those who committed other serious crimes that fall outside the ambit
of traditional war crimes, such as crimes where the victim is stateless, has the same
nationality as the perpetrator, or that of a state allied with that of the perpetrator. The
origins of this decision can be found in assertions made by individual governments, the
London International Assembly and the United Nations War Crimes Commission.
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International tribunals are not separated artificially from the social realities
which influence and develop their jurisprudence. In other words, we must examine
the underlying exigencies of the times in order to gain a complete understanding of
the work of such tribunals. 7
The question is, of course, how to identify the moment when international
tribunals should feel the necessity to react to such exigencies. Arguably, both
national and international judges should pay due attention to the social
acceptability of their decisions. This dilemma is similar-according to Reisman,
who addressed the influence of social forces on the advisory opinion concerning
the 1947 peace treaties-to "navigating Scylla and Charybdis."7 6
The issue of the objective legal personality of the United Nations,77 the law of
the sea,78 or the growing importance attributed nowadays to environmental
protection 79 are also representative examples of that judicial phenomenon in the

75. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178
(Apr. 11). The International Court of Justice took the same view, arguing that "[t]hroughout its history,
the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life." Id.
76. Michel Reisman, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice:
InternationalArbitrationand InternationalAdjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES CoURS 135 (1996).
77. See, e.g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174
(Apr. 11) ("[F]ifty States, representing the vast majority of the international community, had the power,
in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international
personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone.").
78. See, e.g., Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 47 (Feb. 24)
("The Court must thus turn to the question whether principles and rules of international law ...may be
derived or may be affected by the 'new accepted trends' which have emerged at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.").
79. See, e.g., Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 237 (July 8). In
its advisory opinion on the use of nuclear weapons, the Court explicitly recognized the importance of
environmental considerations:
The Court recognizes that the environment is under daily threat and that the use of
nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe for the environment. The Court also
recognizes that the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the
quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. The
existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond
national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
environment. Id.
See also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 67-68 (Sept. 25). The Court,
in this case, emphasized environmental concerns in its assessment of the treaty governing certain
aspects of the plan to develop and operate the Gabcikovo Nagymaros dam:
[T]he Court wishes to point out that newly developed norms of environmental
law are relevant for the implementation of the Treaty and that the parties could,
by agreement, incorporate them through the application of Articles 15, 19 and 20
of the Treaty. These articles do not contain specific obligations of performance
but require the parties, in carrying out their obligations to ensure that the quality
of water in the Danube is not impaired and that nature is protected, to take new
environmental norms into consideration when agreeing upon the means to be
specified in the Joint Contractual Plan... the Treaty is not static, and is open to
adapt to emerging norms of international law.
1d.
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jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. The dicta of the Commission
of Arbitration of the Peace Conference of Yugoslavia about the jus cogens nature
of the principle of the protection of minorities 80 were pronounced in a particular
period of history when several famous diplomatic and political brainstorming
centers were working to advocate the principles of preventative rather than
curative law. Governmental offices suggested that direction in order to avoid the
outbreak of a bloody conflict. With the pronouncement of their thesis on jus
cogens, Robert Badinter and his co-arbiters certainly made a historical step
forward, even if the court's decision did not fully embrace their ideals.
The expectations of the public also show some similarities with the
phenomenon of the exigencies of the times explored above. These expectations
were certainly perceptible in the condemnation of nazi war criminals and were
undoubtedly present in the creation of two contemporary penal tribunals-the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda-and the litigation before them.8' Even if one can
find a huge complex of considerations formulated sine ira et studio, one cannot
help but observe a profound indignation in8 some
of the language used by the
2
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg.
The judicial policy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia follows the same line, if perhaps somewhat more austerely.8 3 In
Africa, in the Kambanda case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
considered it important to emphasize that the crimes against humanity particularly
shocked the conscience of mankind. m

80. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising From
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1496 (1992) ("[T]he peremptory norms of general
international law and in particular respect for the fundamental rights of the individual and the rights of
peoples and minorities, are binding on all parties to the succession."). See generally Alain Pellet, The
Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of
Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 178 (1992).
81. For example, the indictments and the current proceedings against Milosevic, Milutinovic, and
others for crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia.
82. "Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."
NURNBERG JUDGMENT Vol. 1 223
83. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Prosecutor v. Furundzija,
38 I.L.M. 317, 346 (1999). The Tribunal clearly expressed a distaste for the criminal acts of the
defendant and for torture in general:
The treaty and customary rules referred to above impose obligations upon States and
other entities in an armed conflict, but first and foremost address themselves to the acts
of individuals, in particular to State officials or more generally, to officials of a party to
the conflict or else to individuals acting at the instigation or with the consent or
acquiescence of a party to the conflict. Both customary rules and treaty provisions
applicable in times of armed conflict prohibit any act of torture. Those who engage in
torture are personally accountable at the criminal level for such acts.
Id.
84. See International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: Prosecutor v. Kambanda, 37 I.L.M. 1411,
1417 (1998) ("The Chamber holds that crimes against humanity, already punished by the Nuremberg
and Tokyo Tribunals, and genocide, a concept defined later, are crimes which particularly shock the
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As Judge Bedjaoui noted, judicial decisions express law but they do not
completely neglect the moral climate. 5 A universal community of values
definitely exists in certain fields and the jus cogens is the quintessence of these
supreme, peremptory principles. Common values are born more easily and may
have more of an impact of judicial decision making when the number of the
countries concerned is limited, and especially when history and certain cultural
characteristics are shared among those countries. This factor is, then, generally
more developed and influential on a regional basis-namely European or InterAmerican. A shared community of values can be found, for example, behind the
6
affirmation of an absolute ban on the practice of torture, or in the tolerance of
some behaviors earlier considered to be criminal in nature, or to stem from mental
health problems. 87
What is the role played by the science of internationallaw in the phenomenon
of jurisprudential development? Without going into depth on this question it is
appropriate to observe that the contribution of the doctrine is mostly manifested in
88
and rarely ad hominem3 9
abstracto
Do other scientific branches contribute to jurisprudential development? The
cases concerning the delimitation of continental shelves were impregnated with
geomorphologic and other scientific data,90 and in the case of the dispute over the

collective conscience.").
85. BEDJAOUI, MOHAMMED: L'OPPORTUNITE DANS LES DECISIONS DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALE
DE JUSTICE in BoiSSONS DE CHAZOURNES, L - GOWLAND-DEBBAS, V (EDS): THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM IN QUEST OF EQUITY AND UNIVERSALITY / L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL, UN
SYSTEME EN QUETE D'EQUITE ET D'UNIVERSALITE, LIBER AMICORUM GEORGES ABI-SAAB, KLUWER

580(2001).
86. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Prosecutor v. Furundzija,
38 I.L.M. 317, 346 (discussing various aspects of both customary and treaty law prohibiting torture);
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. I (ser. A) at 14 (1978) ("[T]he prohibition contained in
article 3 is absolute and ...the Contracting States may not derogate from article 3 even in the event of
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.").
87. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149, 167. The Court
considered evolving social attitudes, particularly as reflected in domestic legislation, in its
determination that:
As compared with the era when that legislation [criminializing homosexual behavior]
was enacted, there is now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased
tolerance, of homosexual behaviour to the extent that in the great majority of the member
States of the Council of Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or appropriate
to treat homosexual practices of the kind now in question as in themselves a matter to
which the sanctions of the criminal law should be applied; the Court cannot overlook the
marked changes which have occurred in this regard in the domestic law of the member
States.
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149, 167.
88. See, e.g., Manfred Lachs, Teachings and Teaching of InternationalLaw, 151 RECUEIL DES
COURS 218 (discussing the role of scholarship in international law).
89. See The Allusions of Arbitrator Rend-Jean Dupuy on the Teachings of Paul Guggenheim,
Charles de Visscher, Prosper Weil, Michel Virally, Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, Georg Schwarzenberger et Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Texaco-Calasiatic v. Libya, 19 January
1977, J.D.I. 1977
90. See generally the cases concerning continental shelves, supra note 25. (discussing the exact
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Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam, 91 a considerable part of the memoranda (and the
replicas) as well as the oral pleadings were devoted to the presentation of scientific
research and the testimony of experts in the natural sciences.92 Similarly, in the
jurisprudence on the law of sea, the International Court of Justice has taken
scientific evidence into account 93 probably because of the ambiguity of the legal
rules. In the case of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam, however, the same tribunal
largely avoided such evidence because it was possible for the judges to decide the
dispute on the sole basis of the law of treaties, thus conforming to the rules of
procedure. 94

III.

LIMITS ON INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

A. Limits of a Legal Nature

The explicit limitations posed by treaty law should be considered first. The
existence of pertinent international treaties often prevents judges from formulating
jurisprudential developments. We can consider these types of treaties as a priori
imposed limits on jurisdictions. The actual applied formulae of decision-making,
whether precise or vague, can also be considered as limits of jurisprudential
development.
In its first judgment delivered in the Lawless case, the European Court of
95
Human Rights approved, without any hesitation, the theory of "acte claire".

extension and direction of continental shelves, the importance of submarine canyons, the issue of
geographical contiguity of the coast, and other scientific data).
91. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7.
92. See id. at 8. The list of technical experts is particularly illustrative. Id.
93. See Mohammed Bedjaoui, The "Manufacture" of Judgments at the InternationalCourt of
Justice, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 29, 46 (1991). While Bedjaoui recognizes the difficulties inherent in the
voluminous pleadings of the parties, he also recognizes their potential benefits:
Would it then have been normal for the Court to have told the parties at a given point in
the oral arguments, "enough of geology and geomorphology!?" Perhaps, if the Court
had been absolutely sure of itself. But it has no right to certainties before hearing the
parties out. Listening has, after all, one very important function, which is to sow doubt,
to generate the philosophical "skepsis" which cleans out all preconception from the
Judge's mind before he embarks upon his ultimate function of decision.
Id.
94. See Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Courtroom, 50 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 121, 122 (2001) ("[Als both the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) and
the Spain-Canada Fisheries cases have shown, what one party terms an overriding environmental issue,
another sees as rather relating to treaty obligations, or the law of State responsibility, or the law of the
sea.").
95. See Lawless v. Ireland, I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1, 28 (1960). Vis-;t-vis the habeas corpus
rule of the European Convention of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights emphasized
that:
The meaning thus arrived at by grammatical analysis is fully in harmony with the
purpose of the Convention which is to protect the freedom and security of the individual
against arbitrary detention or arrest .... [T]he Court cannot deny Article 5(1)(c) and (3)
the plain and natural meaning which follows both from the precise words used and from
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Elsewhere, recourse to the preparatory documents of a treaty (travaux
priparatoires) was felt appropriate-essentially in cases of obscure treaty
language.96 In the very first period of its practice, the European Court of Human
Rights rejected, under these limitations, the application of the European
Convention of Human Rights to problems of national or linguistic minorities.
(We have to add however, that the European Court of Human Rights later revised
that position, and its attitude became much more open as witnessed by the
judgments in the Buckley, Chapman, Serif, and Hassan & Chaush cases). 98 A
theoretical openness alone is already a considerable step forward, and is generally
the product of changed social and inter-social attitudes, but it cannot furnish an
absolute guarantee for a change in merito ofjurisprudential policy--certainly not if
the consensus of states is precarious or more political than legal, as can be
observed a series ofjudgments in Roma issues. 99
To find and to define a set of uniform European morals seems to be an
impossible mission. Without a common denominator at hand, States seek mostly
to preserve their margin of appreciation for other values, and the European Court
of Human Rights has often refused to go forward and build new jurisprudential
pillars. For example, in controversial cases such as those concerning the gay and
lesbian community, the European Court of Human Rights has been highly
cognizant of the moral climate and has taken pains to respect the limits imposed by
the diverging opinions of the states concerning minorities of different sexual
orientation.' 00 In Europe, only one common principle exists in this field-a
the impression created by their context.
Id.
96. See Belgian Linguistic case, merits, supra note 9, at 282 (referring to the preparatory work of
the European Convention on Human Rights).
97. See id. (rejecting the application of the Convention).
98. See generally Buckley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 203848/92, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 101
(1996) (Court report); Chapman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27238/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 399 (2001)
(Court report); Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 561 (1999) (Court report); Hasan
and Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 34 Eur. H.R. 55 (2000) (Court report).
99. See, e.g., Chapman v. United Kingdom App. No. 27238/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 399, 428 (2001)
(Court report). Whether the adoption of the Framework Convention for the protection of national
minorities should give an impetus for the Court to go towards a renewal of its jurisprudential policy, the
judges emphasized:
[T]he Court is not persuaded that the consensus is sufficiently concrete for it to derive
any guidance as to the conduct or standards which Contracting States consider desirable
in any particular situation. The Framework Convention, for example, sets out general
principles and goals but signatory states were unable to agree on means or
implementation. This reinforces the Court's view that the complexity and sensitivity of
the issues involved in policies balancing the interests of the general population, in
particular with regard to environmental protection and the interests of a minority with
possibly conflicting requirements, renders the Court's role a strictly supervisory one.
Chapman v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 428.
See also Lee v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25289/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 677, 702-03 (Court report);
Beard v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24882/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442, 470 (2001) (Court report)
(employing the same wording).
100. See generally Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149, 163-64 (1981)
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respect for the right to be different. Out of the application of this principle
emerges the jurisprudential concept that individual States are generally the best
positioned to determine the extent of gay rights within their own borders.' 0'
Limits can also be found in the principles of compromise, as can be observed
in the huge bodies of arbitral 0 2 and permanent jurisprudence. The Permanent
Court of International Justice expressed this rule for the first time in the Lotus
case 10 3 and the International Court of Justice has done so as well. 1' 4
Grosso modo the same principle can be found vis-A-vis advisory opinions.
The International Court of Justice is not bound to pronounce on questions which
are not raised in the original pleadings-even where certain states would like to
push the court to give an opinion on a particularly important but collateral issue. '05
(Court report); Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622, 631 (1990)
(Court report).
101. See, e.g., Frette v. France, merits (2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (last
visited Mar. 5, 2003). In section 41 of the judgment, the European Court of Human Rights addressed,
among other issues, the legal rights of gays and lesbians to adopt children, and largely differed to the
judgment of individual States:
It is indisputable that there is no common ground on the question. Although most of the
Contracting States do not expressly prohibit homosexuals from adopting where single
persons may adopt, it is not possible to find in the legal and social orders of the
Contracting States uniform principles on these social issues on which opinions within a
democratic society may reasonably differ widely. The Court considers it quite natural
that the national authorities, whose duty it is in a democratic society also to consider,
within the limits of their jurisdiction, the interests of society as a whole, should enjoy a
wide margin of appreciation when they are asked to make rulings on such matters. By
reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, the
national authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate
local needs and conditions. Since the delicate issues raised in the case, therefore, touch
on areas where there is little common ground amongst the member States of the Council
of Europe and, generally speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional stage, a wide
margin of appreciation must be left to the authorities of each State.
Id.
102. See, e.g., HYDE supra note 29, at 1626. Hyde observes that arbitrators have often limited
themselves to deciding only those questions explicitly put to them:
Secretary Bayard was correct in declaring in 1877, that an arbitrator should not assume
to decide any question other than that submitted to him by the States seeking his
judgment, or to take cognizance of any collateral issues between either of them and a
third State which was not expressly submitted to him by the States directly concerned.
Id.
103. See Lotus case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (set. A) No. 10, at 12 (Sept. 27) ("[T]he Court,
having obtained cognizance of the present case by notification of a special agreement concluded
between the Parties, it is rather to the terms of the agreement than to the submissions of the Parties that
the Court must have recourse establishing the precise points which it has to decide.").
104. See, e.g., Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. US.),
1984 1C.J.246, 266 (Oct. 12).
105. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 236 (July 8). In the
nuclear context, for example, the court has found it unnecessary to consider some principles of
international humanitarian law, despite the urging of the parties:
It has been maintained in these proceedings that these principles and rules of
humanitarian law are part of jus cogens as defined in Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. The question whether a norm is part
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There are, of course, also legal limits other than treaty law, such as the
inherentpowers of thejudiciary.
International tribunals (as well as national ones) try to follow the shortest and
the most logical path to a decision-at least according to their own theories. In their
judgments, judges may ignore those issues which have no direct connection to the
object of the dispute. They can do this despite the length of the memoranda or the
exhaustiveness of the pleadings submitted by the parties; courts can and do often
limit their considerations to issues which are dispositive to the outcome of the
dispute. No answer need be given to impertinent questions, and the court is not
obliged to follow the parties in all the directions suggested by them.1 6 The dictum
in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case provides a good example. 107 In the same
manner, the answer to sterile questions having a purely scientific interest'0 8 can be
economized, as was pointed out by Judge Shahabudden.'09
Jurisdictions also avoid passing judgment on documents having an uncertain
probative value or documents which are highly contradictory if the judges are not
convinced by either of the positions. 10 This is especially true if the dispute can be
settled without such documents, or when such a decision would have a negligible
effect on the merits of the case."'
Courts prefer to develop the rule of the case-and their jurisprudenceslowly and carefully. Courts are not bound to answer any preliminary questions if
there is enough time to deal with them during the procedure on the merits and a

of thejus cogens relates to the legal character of the norm. The request addressed to the
Court by the General Assembly raises the question of the applicability of the principles
and rules of humanitarian law in cases of recourse to nuclear weapons and the
consequences of that applicability for the legality of recourse to these weapons. But it
does not raise the question of the character of the humanitarian law which would apply
to the use of nuclear weapons. There is, therefore, no need for the Court to pronounce
on this matter.
Id.

106. See, e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39 (Sept. 25) ("Nor
does the Court need to dwell upon the question of the relationship between the law of treaties and the
law of State responsibility, to which the Parties devoted lengthy arguments, as those two branches of
international law obviously have a scope that is distinct.").
107. See id. at 45-46.
108. See id. at 71 ("The Court does not find it necessary... to enter into a discussion of whether or
not Article 34 of the 1978 Convention [on the succession of States in treaties] reflects the state of
customary international law."). See also Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 35
("The Court does not find it necessary to pronounce an opinion on these points which, in so far as
concerns the operation or administration of the trusteeship is no longer in existence, and no
determination reached by the court could be given effect to by the former administering authority.").
109. See MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 219 (1990).
110. See, e.g. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide 1996 I.C.J. 595, 619 (July 11); Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 561,
570 (1999) (Court report).
I 11. E.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide 1996 I.C.J. 595, 619 (July 11); Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 561,
570 (1999) (Court report). In both of these cases, the Courts avoided pronouncing on the eventual legal
validity of the minority protecting instruments of the League of Nations. Id.

2003

DEVELOPMENTS AND LIMITS IN INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

483

decision on that particular point is not a sine qua non condition of the provisory
measures." 2 Even the principle Kompetenz-Kompetenz has been used by

international tribunals in order to 4avoid highly political issues" 3 or questions not
vital to a resolution of the issues. 1

We can also find good examples of a statutory approachto self-limitation in
interstate disputes' 1 as well as in advisory opinions."176 There are especially good
examples in the United Nations staff litigation cases."
Another jurisprudential limitation can be observed in the fact that tribunals

112. See, e.g., Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, 15.
The International Court of Justice declined to decide upon certain questions which it saw as nondispositive:
[Tihe Court is not called upon to determine any of the other questions which have been
raised before it in the present proceedings, including the question of its jurisdiction to
entertain the merits of the case; and whereas the decision given in these proceedings in
no way prejudges any such question, and leaves unaffected the rights of the Government
of Libya and the Government of the United Kingdom to submit arguments in respect of
any of these questions... the Court finds that the circumstances of the case are not such
as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate
provisional measures. Id.
See also Legality of the Use of Force (Yug. v. Fr.), 1999 I.C.J. 363, 374 (June 2) (assessing the
separability of the jurisdictional issues from the merits of the case).
113. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion No. 5, Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5 at 27,
29 ("[T]he Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the
essential rules guiding their activity as a Court.").
114. See Agean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 16-17. The Court managed
to avoid pronouncing on the legal validity of the 1928 General Act of the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes because "it is evident that any pronouncement of the Court as to the status of the
1928 Act whether it were found to be a Convention in force or to be no longer in force, may have
implications in the relations between States other then Greece and Turkey." Id.
115. See Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yug.) 1993 I.C.J.
325, 344 (Sept.13). The Court implicitly refused to adjudge the legality or the opportunity of the
Security Council's arms embargo, hampering Bosnia from exercising self-defense:
The Court may, for the preservation of those rights, indicate provisional measures to be
taken by the parties, but not by third States or other entities who would not be bound by
the eventual judgment to recognize and respect those rights; whereas consequently the
Court cannot, in the exercise of its power to indicate provisional measures, indicate by
way of "clarification" that those States or entities should take, or refrain from, specific
action in relation to the acts of genocide which the Applicant alleges are being
committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Id.
116. See, e.g., International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 140 (July 11) ("The
Court is however, unable to deduce from these general considerations any legal obligation for
mandatory States to conclude or to negotiate such [trusteeship] agreements. It is not for the Court to
pronounce on the political or moral duties which these considerations may involve.").
117. See, e.g., Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation
Upon Complaints made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
1956 I.C.J. 77, 99 (Oct. 23). This phenomenon is manifested much more often in the United Nations
staff litigation cases in order to preserve the respective roles of the administrative tribunals and the
International Court of Justice. The Court has said, for example, that "a challenge of a decision
confirming jurisdiction cannot properly be transformed into a procedure against the manner in which
jurisdiction has been exercised or against the substance of the decision." Id.
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are generally rather reluctant to pronounce on the decisions of another tribunal,
particularly when the object of a dispute is to nullify or to maintain an arbitral
award. 1 8
Judicial caution, the reluctance of judges, or a desire to preserve the
coherence of a firmly established jurisprudence often operates as a well-founded
theoretical obstacle to development. 1 9 Despite the aesthetic beauty of a logical
construction, we cannot forget the underlying consideration that preserving
jurisprudential coherence is the best way to maintain the states' confidence-a
necessary condition for bringing future disputes before the courts. 120 Even in cases
of the compulsory jurisdiction of certain courts-for example, the reform of the
European Convention of Human Rights-the
preservation of jurisprudential
12
heritage remains particularly important.'
The influence of auxiliary documents is limited; the International Court of
Justice, for example, generally refuses to base a decision on geographical maps. 122

118. See, e.g., Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192, 214

(Nov. 18). The Court explained, "the [arbitral] award is not subject to appeal and the Court cannot
approach the considerations of the objections raised by Nicaragua to the validity of the Award as a
Court of Appeal. The Court is not called upon to pronounce whether the arbitrator's decision was right
or wrong." Id.
119. See, e.g., Northern Cameroons, (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 29 (Dec. 2) ("There are

inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function which the Court, as a Court of Justice, can
never ignore... the Court itself, and not the parties, must be the guardian of the Court's judicial
integrity."
120. See, e.g., Leo Gross, The InternationalCourtof Justice and the UnitedNations, 120 RECUEIL

DES COuRs 341 (1967) ("[T]he Court may refuse to give an opinion if the question is not a legal one
and even refuse to give an opinion if 'the circumstances of the case are of such a character as should
lead it to decline to answer the Request."'). But see, Elihu Lauterpacht, The Development of the Law of
InternationalOrganizationby the Decisions of InternationalTribunals, 152 RECUEIL DES COURS 466

(1976). Lauterpacht questions whether the body of decisions by the International Court of Justice
concerning international organizations amounts to any coherent jurisprudence:
[W]e are bound to ask whether the treatment by the Court of questions relating to international
organizations-and especially the interpretation of their constitutions-represents a deliberate or
consistent attempt to develop a systematic approach to the law of international organization as such.
Or, is it, on the other hand nothing more than an accumulation of judicial episodes which share the
common feature of being founded upon facts of an "organizational" character and which happens only
accidentally or haphazardly to shed light on the legal system of international organization?
Id.
121. See, e.g., Franz Matscher, QuaranteAns D'activitis de la Cour Europdenne des Droits de

L 'Homme, 270 RECUEIL DES COURs 283 (1997).
122. See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 582 (Dec. 22). The court
made clear that maps are usually regarded only as primafacie evidence and are rarely dispositive:
Maps merely constitute information which varies in accuracy from case to case; of
themselves, and by virtue solely of their existence, they cannot constitute a territorial
title, that is,a document endowed by international law with intrinsic legal force for the
purpose of establishing territorial rights. Of course, in some cases maps may acquire
such legal force, but where this is so the legal force does not arise solely from their
intrinsic merits: it is because such maps fall into the category of physical expressions of
the will of the State or States concerned. This is the case, for example, when maps are
annexed to an official text of which they form an integral part. Except in this clearly
defined case, maps are only extrinsic evidence of varying reliability or unreliability
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However, in some cases, it has considered such maps where both parties have
award
submitted them. On other occasions, it has refused to invalidate an arbitral
23
because one of the parties simply lacked a map to support its argument.'1
Acts and behavior of the parties can also serve as limits for on the
development of jurisprudence. If the parties do not ask the Court to provide an
explanation on a given legal question, despite the fact that the question is important
24
In the
to the merits of the case, the judges are not bound to address the issue.'
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, for example, the International Court of Justice could
avoid pronouncing on the eventual jus cogens nature (or at least the current stage
of the metamorphosis of a norm of jus cogens in statu nascendi) of environmental
protection. 125 Despite the logic in such a deduction, one cannot forget the suddenly
26
proclaimed examples of erga omnes norms in the Barcelona Traction case.
B. Non-Legal Limitations
The absence of information and the inaccessibility of information thought
necessary for the background of a judgment have also been evoked as motives for
refusing to make a decision, or refusing to extrapolate decisions with major legal
consequences from incomplete facts, or to use such information to take a new and
delicate direction. The advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons127 and some aspects of the case concerning military activities in

which may be used, along with other evidence of a circumstantial kind, to establish or
reconstitute the real facts.
Id.
But see, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1099 (Dec.13). In this case, the
court pointed out that the parties themselves had treated maps as evidence of little value:
The Court considers that, in the light of that disagreement, there cannot be any
question of the authorities concerned having accepted the maps then available in
a manner capable of constituting "subsequent practice in the application of the
[1890] treaty," still less recognition of the boundary shown on those maps. To
the contrary, it appears to the Court that the parties largely ignored the maps,
which they regarded as either accurate or inaccurate according to their respective
positions on the course of the boundary.
Id.
123. See, e.g., Arbitral Award of July 3, 1988 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53, 74 ("In the
circumstances of the case, the absence of a map cannot in any event constitute such an irregularity as
would render the [arbitral] Award invalid."); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J.
1045, 1071 (Dec. 13) (finding no viable conclusions could be drawn from the cartographic evidence
offered by the parties).
124. See LaGrand case (Germany v. United States) 27 June 2001 ICJ Reports § 98.
125. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 67 (Sept. 25) ("Neither of
the Parties contended that new peremptory norms of environmental law had emerged since the
conclusion of the 1977 Treaty, and the Court will consequently not be required to examine the scope of
Article 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties."); LaGrand case, supra note 124, at § 98.
126. See Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power (Belg. v. Spain), 1979 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). The
case is well known for its characterization of slavery and genocide as criminal acts erga omnes, though
the pronouncement had nothing to do with the merits of the case, which centered on diplomatic
protection of corporation.
127. See Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 237 (July 8). The
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Nicaragua are examples of such jurisprudential behavior. 128
Major social changes also encourage international tribunals to curb their
jurisprudential developments, and a particular legal heritage can have a similar
effect. Despite the philosophy developed in Tyrer v. United Kingdom, the
European Court of Human Rights has considered some local particularitiesnamely historical ones-in some of its decisions. 129 For example, in refusing to
apply the theory professed by some schools that a policeman is only a man in
uniform, the European Court of Human Rights recognized the importance of
maintaining a distance between police and political parties because of the historical
role, particularly in Central and
Eastern Europe, of the police and army within
130
totalitarian communist regimes.
Does the science of internationallaw have any restrictive influence on the
decision-making of international tribunals? As Judge Bedjaoui noted, the
existence and the attention of the academic community of international lawyers
considerably limit the subjectivism of tribunals.' 3 1 The manifest preference of the
Court felt unable to rule on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances:
Nor can the Court make a determination on the validity of the view that the recourse to
nuclear weapons would be illegal in any circumstance owing to their inherent and total
incompatibility with the law applicable in armed conflict.., the Court considers that it
does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of
nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law
applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.
Id.
128. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 125. ("Since the Court
has no information as to the interpretation in fact given to the Congress decision, or as to whether
intelligence information is in fact still being supplied to the contras, it will limit itself to a declaration as
to how the law applies in this respect.").
129. See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. I (ser. A) at 13-14 (1978.
130. See, e.g., Rekvenyi v.Hungary, App. No. 25390/94 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 519, 522 (1999) (Court
report). The Court recognized that:
In view of the particular history of some Contracting States, the national authorities of
these States may, so as to ensure the consolidation and maintenance of democracy,
consider it necessary to have constitutional safeguards to achieve this aim by restricting
the freedom of police officers to engage in political activities and, in particular, political
debate.
Id.
131. See MOHAMMED BEDJAOUi, L'OPPORTUNITE DANS LES DECISIONS DE LA COUR
INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE 569. Bedjaoui asserts:
Ce qui limite grandement lapart non pas de "subjectivitd", mdme au meilleur sens, mais
de "particularisme acquis de ses origines et de son dducation, c'est le regard attentif et
critique des "transmetteurs de normes" ("rule-transmitters"): les colldgues de travail
d'abord, les Etats parties au proc s ensuite, et enfin toute la profession juridique
internationale. 11demeure aussi sous le regard de l'dlite juridique de son pays d'origine,
qui attend confusdment de lui d'etre le promoteur de sa culture juridique nationale; mais
cela se mele et se croise aussi avec le regard des autres juristes du monde, frdquent6s
dans les forums intemationaux et aupr~s desquels il tient Aconserver sa reputation. I!est
aussi a l'dcoute des Acaddmies savantes, des Organisations internationales, des hauts
fonctionnaires internationaux et des membres des corps diplomatiques, particuli~rement
ceux du Siege de laCour et ceux du Siege des Nations Unies.
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International Court of Justice to the notion of erga omnes norms instead of jus
cogens can be explained by the division of the scientific community on the utility
and operability of the theory ofjus cogens. 132
The International Court of Justice has often distanced itself from non-juridical
sciences in order to avoid that exterior considerations should exercise too great an
influence on its decision-making. This is reflected, for example, in the court's
attitude towards geography and ecology.' 3 3 For example, though the parties
submitted a considerable number of calculations and analyses on the safety or
potentially dangerous character of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam, the
International Court of Justice explained that "it is not necessary in order to respond
to the questions put to it in the Special Agreement 134for it to determine which of
those points of view is scientifically better founded."'
Reading scientific articles and books written by judges, one can often be left
with the impression of their authors' conviction that masses of technical dossiers
often have a counter-productive effect. 3 The European Court of Human Rights
it observes a
has also been rather hesitant to come down on either
36 side when
division in the views of scholars on a particular issue. 1

132. Elisabeth Zoller, Elisabeth L'Affaire du Personnel Diplomatique et Consulaire des Etats-Unis
d'Amdrique c. Iran) Arr8t du 24 mars 1980 RGDIP 1980/4 1024. Zoller notes:
La question de savoir si les principes du droit international qui r6gissent les relations diplomatiques et
consulaires participent de lanotion dejus cogens, ne trouve pas de solution dans l'arret. IIest possible
que laCour ait
prdfdrd laisser leprobleme en l'dtat, le contenu de cette notion dtant trop imprdcis.
Id.
133. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1068 (Dec. 13) ("The Court is
not in a position to reconcile the figures submitted by the Parties, who take a totally different approach
to the definition of the channels concerned.").
134. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 42 (Sept. 25).
135. See Bedjaoui, supra note 93, at 37 ("The weight of documentation does not necessarily
correspond to the weight of the arguments, for at least two-thirds of the bulk consists of annexes, that is,
texts produced in support of the contentions sustained in the pleadings."); See also Higgins, supra note
94, at 129. Higgins argues:
In recent years, the dossier for each case has undoubtedly got larger and larger. In
technical cases, understandably, long and detailed technical reports are appended
(Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project and Botswana/Namibia afford recent examples).
Moreover, there has been a tendency to append every possible scrap of paper, however
marginal to the outcome. The translation costs for the Court were becoming prodigious
and indeed the necessity to translate these thousands of pages of documentary annexes
was beginning to dictate the pace at which cases could be heard.
Id.
136. See, e.g., Frette v. France, merits (2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (last
visited Mar. 5, 2003). In section 42 of the judgment, the Court declined, to make any findings as to the
consequences of being adopted by homosexual parents based on the scientific evidence presented,
noting that "[uit must be observed that the scientific community-particularly experts on childhood,
psychiatrists and psychologists-is divided over the possible consequences of a child's being adopted
by one or more homosexual parents, especially bearing in mind the limited number of scientific studies
conducted on the subject to date." Id.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS

As a conclusion to the above presentation-however rudimentary--of the
most often used reasons for jurisprudential development or jurisprudential
limitation, it can be observed that in the practices of international tribunals as a
whole, the same considerations are evoked as justifications for both expanding and
keeping in check jurisprudential evolution.
Thus, the judges' freedom may be based on reasons derived from the ex ante
will of states, manifested at different points in international conventions, submitted
for adjudication before an international tribunal. Or that freedom can be linked to
the acts of states or parties to the dispute. This freedom may also be recognized by
judges on the basis of the theory, practice, or functionality at work in a particular
jurisdiction. We can refer also to137Bedjaoui's words comparing judicial opportunity
to the effect of yeast in cooking.
What are the reasons judges give to explain their reluctance to formulate new
jurisprudence? These reasons can be found in the will of states, reflected in
conventions, treaties, or in procedural acts. The perception of proper judicial
functions is equally important, not only vis-A-vis usages and customs but, first and
foremost, according to the requirements of the position enjoyed by a given
international organization.
Apparently, there are other-probably less frequently occurring-motives as
well.
Was the eighteenth century French grand chancellor Henri-Franqois
d'Aguesseau right or wrong when exclaiming, "judges of the Earth, you are
Gods!" long before the creation of international tribunals?
Who is, in the final analysis, an international judge? An administrator or a
creator? A serf, a professor or a prophet? Can he be all of them at the same time?
In conclusion, we may observe that the developments and limits of
international justice can be conceived in a quadrangular system where the corners
are the following:
primo:judicial logic;
secundo: organic-functional imperative;
tertio: social necessity; and
quarto: the ambiguous "plus," or incalculable factor of irrationality that we
can call also a divine sparkle.
The order of their enumeration also reflects, however, the importance that we
should attribute to these factors. International jurisdiction and international
jurisprudence are neither automatisms, nor a lottery-they are a complex of social
phenomena, activity and science with all the precisions and lacunas, certainties and
uncertainties, that such a statement presumes.

137. See

BEDJAOUI,

supra note 131, at 583.
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This dialectic interrelation-the faculty of limited creativity, according to
Judge Shahabuddeen's observations 3 8-was well described by former President of
the International Court of Justice, Gilbert Guillaume, when he observed,
"[lInternational law is our common heritage from the nineteenth through the
twentieth centuries. It should evolve with the39 time. It must be adapted to local and
regional needs. But it must not be broken."'1

138. MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 232 (1990).

139. Guillaume, Gilbert: La Cour internationale de Justice - Quelques propositions concretes A
I'occasion du cinquantenaire RGDIP 1996/2 331-32 ("Le droit international est I'hritage commun que
nous avons re~u du XIXe si~cle et du XXe si6cle. II doit Al'6vidence dvoluer avec le temps. II doit
aussi s'adapter aux besoins locaux et r~gionaux. Mais ne doit pas 8tre brisd.").

CHINA'S GREAT WESTERN DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT IN XINJIANG:
ECONOMIC PALLIATIVE, OR POLITICAL TROJAN HORSE?
Matthew D. Moneyhon*
The Han nationality has the population, the minority nationalities have the
land... It is thus imperative that the Han assist the minorities in raising their
standard of living and socialist ideological consciousness, while the minorities
provide the naturalresources necessaryfor the industrializationand development
of the motherland.'
- Mao Zedong

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping declared that some people and some
regions in China should be allowed to get rich before others, 2 he initiated a
dramatic departure from traditional socialist economic policies and ushered in an
era of economic reforms. 3 Indeed, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Deng's
economic reforms made some people and some regions incredibly rich. Others,
however, have been left dramatically behind. While coastal Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) and "open cities" have flourished in the east, western regions,
comprising more than half of China's total land area and approximately twenty-

* As an East-West Center Graduate Fellow, the author received a J.D. at the University of Hawai'i,
William S. Richardson School of Law and an M.A. in Chinese Studies at the University of Hawai'i at
Manoa. This paper was judged "Best Overall Second Year Seminar Paper, 2002" by the Young
Lawyers Division of the Hawai'i State Bar Association. While attending the University of Hawai'i the
author served as Editor-in-Chief of the Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal. The author would like to
thank Dru Gladney, Eric Harwit, and Allison Conner for their guidance in writing this article.

1. Mao quoted in Chien-Peng Chung, Regional "Autonomy" For Minority Nationalities in the
People's Republic of China: Rhetoric or Reality?, in SELECTED PAPERS INASIAN STUDIES 23 (Western
Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, 1996).
2. DENG XIAOPNG, SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING, VOL. 1II, 1988-1992, at 62 (Bureau
for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin trans., 1994).
3. See generally DAVID WEN-WEI CHANG, CHINA UNDER DENG XIAOPNG: POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC REFORM (1988).

4. See generally Khorshed Chowdhury et. al., Regional Income Inequality in China, in
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES IN CHINA'S ECONOMIC TRANSITION 238-61 (Charles

Harvie ed., 2000) [hereinafter Chowdhury].

5. See id.
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three percent of its population, 6 still languish in dusty poverty. Many of China's
fifty-five minority groups live in the west and, especially in Xinjiang, economic
disparities fuel ethnic tensions, conjuring frightening parallels to the break up of
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The Chinese central government, wary of
separatist rumblings in both Tibet and Xinjiang, has endeavored to exorcise the
specter of political disintegration with an ambitious development campaign: the
"Great Western Development Drive" (alternatively, Go West).
The Go West development plan, in conjunction with recent revisions of the
Law on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA), 8 and accompanying economic
incentives, represents China's current strategy for dealing with its restive ethnic
minorities. The program, its policies, and accompanying legal reforms may rightly
be viewed as the latest incarnation of China's evolving minority policy. Analysis
of Go West's implications for Xinjiang demonstrates that the program is intended
as a significant step towards greater integration of ethnic minorities and,
ultimately, assimilation into the greater Han framework-a process incongruous
with the central government's proclaimed commitment to ethnic regional
autonomy. Although construed as an effort to alleviate poverty and bridge the
growing gap of economic disparity between the eastern and western regions, 9 Go
West is actually an attempt to quell ethnic unrest, solidify the nation, and
legitimize the current regime by taming the "wild west."
This article addresses the Go West development campaign's impact on
Xinjiang, specifically as the plan fits into Beijing's greater strategy for integration
and assimilation of Xinjiang's restive Uighur population. Section II begins with a
brief introduction to Go West's economic impetus-the asymmetric development
spawned by economic reforms of the 1980s. Section III explores the volatile
political and economic climates in Xinjiang, their role in feeding separatist
sentiment, and Go West's attempt to quell unrest. Section IV examines some of
Go West's policies and projects, emphasizing how they fit into the political agenda
of solidifying the nation through the pacification and integration of Xinjiang.
Section V briefly considers Go West as an effort to legitimize the current Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) regime. Section VI provides a historical framework for
conceptualizing Go West as part of China's evolving minority policy. Section VII
examines the legal wake of Go West-particularly the contraction of the autonomy
regime. Finally, the article concludes that even if the central government's
economic promises bear fruit, prosperity in Xinjiang may not yield Beijing's
desired results.

6. The Hinterland: Plan to Avoid "Asian Kosovo,'" CHINA ECON. REV., Mar. 13, 2001
[hereinafter "Asian Kosovo'].
7. Id.
8. LAW OF THE P.R.C. ON REGIONAL NATIONAL AUTONOMY (LRNA) (1984); see CHINA LAW
No. 200 (Adopted at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, promulgated by
Order No. 13 of the President of the People's Republic of China on May 31, 1984, and effective as of
at
http://www.lexis.com/research/
available
1,
1984),
October
retrieve? m=b16222ade91408d60379c3aca06fabbb&docnum=2 (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
9. Bruce Gilley, Saving the West, in FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW 22 (2000).
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II.

Go WEST: ANTIDOTE FOR ASYMMETRIC DEVELOPMENT?

Go West, Young Han: China's Manifest Destiny
Horace Greeley's cry to "Go west young man," epitomizes the dream of
American expansion and development of the west in the nineteenth century.' 0
America's conquest of the west both helped craft the American ethos and ushered
in what has widely been called the "American century."" Today, China stands at
the beginning of what many scholars predict will be the "Chinese century,"' 12 and it
is believed that sometime within the next twenty years, China will emerge as the
world's largest economy.' 3 The CCP, maintaining a tenuous hold on power and
faced with serious legitimacy concerns, 14 would like, more than anything, to make
such predictions realities.
In June 1999, President Jiang Zemin emphasized the need to "seize the
historic opportunity at the turn of the century to accelerate the development of
western China."' 5 An integral part of Beijing's strategy for ushering in the
"Chinese century" is the "Great Western Development Campaign," an ambitious
effort designed to direct state investment, outside expertise, foreign loans, and
private capital into vast, and comparatively backward, western China. 16 When
launching the project in early 2000, Chinese authorities drew comparisons to the
development of the American west in the early 1900s. 17 Premier Zhu Rongji and
10. See generally COY F. CROSS, Go WEST YOUNG MAN: HORACE GREELEY'S VISION FOR
AMERICA (1995).
11. See generally HAROLD EvANS, THE AMERICAN CENTURY (1998).
12. See e.g, Andy Hines, The Coming Chinese Century, in FUTURIST, Sept. 19, 1997, at 8
[hereinafter Hines]; see also John Lloyd, Will This Be The Chinese Century?, in NEW STATESMAN, Jan.
10, 2000, at 15.
13. Hines, supra note 12, at 8.
14. See generally FENG CHEN, ECONOMIC TRANSITION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IN POST-

MAO CHINA: IDEOLOGY AND REFORM, 1-20 (1995) [hereinafter FENG].

Chinese economic reforms,

initiated by Deng Xiaoping and continued in the post-Deng era, have shaken the foundation of CCP
legitimacy. Despite contradictions between the economic reforms and Marxist ideology, the CCP has
been unwilling to repudiate its fundamental principles. The discrepancy leads to a legitimacy crisis
caused by the disparity between current practices and original ideological tenets upon which the regime
was founded. Id.
15. Go West: Exploring New Business Opportunities, Hong Kong Indus., July 1, 2001 [hereinafter
Go West, Indus.]. In March 2003, Jiang Zemin stepped down after ten years as China's top leader.
Jiang's successor, Hu Jintao, has indicated that he will pick up where Jiang left off with the Go West
development plan. See Antoine Blua, Kazakhstan: Hu 's Visit Highlights Beijing's Growing Interest in
CentralAsia, TIMES OF CENTRAL ASIA, June 5, 2003 (last visited Aug. 8, 2003).
t6. See generally John Pomfret, Go West, Young Han; Beijing UrgingDominant Ethnic Group to
Resettle, Develop Restive Regions, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2000 at A01 [hereinafter Pomfret, Go West];
Go West, Young Han, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2000 [hereinafter Go West, ECONOMIST]; Ted Plafker,

China's 'Go West' Drive Seeks to Funnel Aid to PoorRegion, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 8, 2001, at 9;
Clara Li, Bountiful Region is Envy of the Neighborhood; Xinjiang Playing a Crucial Role in
Development Drive, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 18, 2001, at Supplement 2 [hereinafter Li,
Bountiful Region].
17. See generally Go West, ECONOMIST, supra note 16; Calum Macleod, China's 'Go West" Plan
May Threaten Tibetan Culture, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Dec. 1, 2000 [hereinafter Macleod].
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Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao, leaders of the campaign, even commissioned a detailed
study of the "take off of the American West in the early decades of the last
century."' 8 Indeed, the central government has high hopes that the Go West
project will tame China's Wild West. The growing economic disparity between
east and west has fueled ethnic unrest in the region, thereby threatening China's
stability and security.' 9 Jiang Zemin declared that the development of the west is
crucial to China's stability, the Communist Party's hold on power, and the
"revitalization of the Chinese people. 'z
Although it makes for good rhetoric domestically, comparisons between
China's Go West drive and the development of the American west are somewhat
suspect. In fact, there are more differences than similarities between the two
"projects." First, there is a dramatic difference in prevailing economic systems.
The pursuit of property drove the development of the American west. 21 In China,
however, land still belongs to the state and the central government has no plans to
cheaply sell, or freely distribute, land to "pioneers. 22 Second, although China's
west abounds with natural resources, it suffers from a severe scarcity of fertile
land--one of the great incentives to westward development and migration in the
United States. 23 Finally, in the twenty-first century, the international community
generally does not tolerate conquest and subjugation of minority rights. Thus
when China goes west, it must do so with sensitivity to local populations.
Although there are significant differences between the two endeavors, similarities
between China's Go West drive and the conquest of the American west do not go
unnoticed. Critics of the Go West plan have pointed out that just as America's
thrust westward translated into sweeping, and often negative, changes to the lives
of Native Americans, 24 China's Go West campaign also has serious implications
for the indigenous populations of China's west.25 For the CCP, however, these
implications are actually a major impetus for Go West, and the overt economic
goals belie the underlying political agenda.

18. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, BeyIing Rides Out West, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 2, 2000, at 17
[hereinafter Lam].
19. See generally Melinda Liu, Trouble in 'Turkestan,' NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 45
[hereinafter Liu, Trouble].
20. See Pomfret, Go West, supra note 16, at AO1.
21. See generallyPATRICIA NELSON LIMERiCK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, 55-77 (1987).

"If Hollywood wanted to capture the emotional center of Western history, its movies would be about
real estate. John Wayne would have been neither a gunfighter nor a sheriff, but a surveyor, speculator,
or claims lawyer. The showdowns would occur in the landclaims office or the courtroom; weapons
would be deed and lawsuits, not six-guns." Id. at 55.
22. P.R.C. ch. I, art. 10(1998).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Michael J. Meagher, Broken Promises: The Failure of the

1920's Native American IrrigationandAssimilation Policies, 19 U. HAW. L. REv. 1 (1997).
25. See generally TIBET INFO. NETWORK , CHINA'S GREAT LEAP WEST (2000) [hereinafter
CHINA'S GREAT LEAP WEST]; see also Macleod, supra note 17.
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"Two overall situations"
The very notion of the Go West drive provokes a preliminary question: Why
is developing China's west suddenly such an imperative? The answer lies in the
past two decades of asymmetric economic development. In the late 1980s Deng
Xiaoping put forth the strategy of "two overall situations. 26 Essentially, this
meant that the coastal regions in eastern China would be encouraged to develop
first, and only after they achieved a measure of prosperity would the central
government give the west special help. 27 Since its implementation, the strategy of
asymmetric development has created a vast wealth gap between east and west. In
line with Deng Xiaoping's strategy, central policies overwhelmingly emphasized
development of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and "open cities" located in
coastal provinces. 28 The coastal regions capitalized on natural advantages and
favorable economic policies by developing town and village enterprises (TVEs),
cultivating export-oriented ventures, and by successfully attracting foreign direct
investment.29 In contrast, the interior remained comparatively backward and
impoverished.30
While coastal provinces continue to reap the benefits of greater integration
into the international economy, the west scrambles to climb out of poverty and
debt. In 1978, the beginning of Deng's economic reforms, the difference in per
capita income between eastern and western China was two hundred yuan. 3'
Today, more than half of the eighty million people living under the poverty line are
in the west 32 and the income differential between coastal and interior provinces
stands at greater than 1:15. 3 Other economic indicators also tell the interior's
rather dreary tale. The western region accounts for only fourteen percent of the
national GDP 34 and in the past two decades the west has attracted less than five
percent of foreign investment in China.35 The western "poverty belt" sweeps
across almost two-thirds of China's landmass-from Yunnan in the south to
Xinjiang in the north-and includes 285 million people, twenty-three percent of
China's 1.3 billion.36 The Go West initiative, covering six provinces (Yunnan,
26. Go West, INDUS., supra note 15.
27. Id.
28. Chowdhury, supra note 4,at 239. The first four SEZs were located in the southern coastal
provinces Guangdong (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou) and Fujian (Xiamen). The 14 cities designated
as open cities in 1984 are also in coastal provinces: Dalian, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao,
Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhuou, Zhanjiang and Beihai. Id.
at 240.
29. Id. at 259.
30. See generally Dexter Roberts, China's Wealth Gap, Bus. WK., May 8, 2000, at 26.
31. Lan, supra note 18.

32. Go West, ECONOMIST, supra note 16. It should be noted that the Chinese state definition of
the poverty-line is an income of only U.S.$36 a year, well below the international standard of U.S.$370.
See ALAN HUNTER & JOHN SEXTON, CONTEMPORARY CHINA, 94 (1999) [hereinafter HUNTER &
SEXTON].

33. Id.
34. Chowdhury, supranote 4, at 238.
35. Go West, ECONOMIST, supra note 16.

36. Penny Crisp & Rose Tang, The GreatLeap West, ASIAWEEK, July 28, 2000, at 52.
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Gansu, Sichuan, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi), three autonomous regions (Ningxia,
37
Xizang (Tibet), Xinjiang), and one provincial level municipality (Chongqing),
strikes at the heart of the western "poverty belt" and hopes to redress the effects
and implications of asymmetric economic development. Go West's economic
goals, however, are window dressing for the underlying political agenda of
quelling unrest, solidifying the nation, and legitimizing the current regime.

III. QUELLING UNREST: TAMING

THE "NEW FRONTIER"

Nowhere are the implications and dangerous possibilities of asymmetric
development more apparent than in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
(XUAR). Positioned at the crossroads of Central Asia, Xinjiang (literally "New
Frontier") is the nexus of six cultural and geographic regions: Russia, Central Asia
(bordering Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), Mongolia, the Indian subcontinent, (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir provide Xinjiang's western
border), Tibet, and China proper.38 Xinjiang, occupying a sixth of China's
landmass, 39 also holds vast natural resources, critical to China's energy-hungry
economy.4 ° In 1993, domestic oil consumption finally outpaced production, and
China became a net importer of oil. 4' Recent geological explorations indicate
Xinjiang's Tarim basin contains large oil deposits, which some believe to be more
than three times those of the United States.4 2 In addition to its strategic position
and vast natural resources, Xinjiang hosts Lop Nor, China's premier nuclear test
site.43
One of five autonomous regions in China,44 the XUAR is also home to the
37. See Sheila Rae, Time to Go West?, at http://www.amcham-china.org.cn/publications/
brief/document/GoWest9-00.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Rae]. Although both western
and Chinese sources offer various definitions of "west," the ten listed above are always included. The
various definitions include or omit Guangxi and Inner Mongolia. Rae notes that Guangxi and Inner
Mongolia will be added to the list in the future. Id.
38. See Nicolas Becquelin, Xinjiang in the Nineties, CHINA J., July, 2000 at 65 [hereinafter
Becquelin]; see also http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle-east-and asia/china_po196.jpg (last
visited Jan. 29, 2003).
39. See JACK CHEN, THE SINKIANG STORY, at xix-xx (1977). Xinjiang covers one-sixth of
China's total land area, and at 660,000 square miles, the province is as big as Britain, France, Germany,
and Italy combined.
40. Paul S. Triolo & Christopher Hegadom, China's Wild West: A Wealth of Natural Resources
Has Made Xinjiang a Bustling New Frontier,CHINA Bus. REv., 41 (Mar.-Apr. 1996).
41. James P. Dorian et. al., China and Central Asia's Volatile Mix: Energy, Trade, and Ethnic
Relations, ASIA PAC. ISSUES, May 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Dorian].
42. Report on Xinjiang Oil, Gas, Exploration, Xinhua, Jun. 12 1997 available at
http://www.uyghuramerican.org/mediareports/1997/xhjunl297.htm (last visited Feb. 08, 2002). Other
reports suggest that the Tarim Basin will not be as productive as anticipated. See, e.g., Dorian, supra
note 4 1, at 4.
43. See Terry C. Wallace & Mark A. Tinker, The Last Nuclear Weapons Test? A Brief Review of
the
Chinese
Nuclear
Weapons
Program
(IRIS,
U.
Ariz.),
at
http://www.iris.iris.edu/newsletter/fallnews/chinese.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003); see also Bill Gertz,
Spy Photos Show Beijing Setfor UndergroundNuclear Test, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2001 at Al.
44. Three of the five autonomous regions (Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet), and Ningxia) are already
included in the Go West campaign, and the two others (Inner Mongolia and Guangxi) will be included
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Uighur nationality-a predominantly Muslim ethnic group encompassing the oasis
Turks of Xinjiang. 45 With a population of approximately eight million, the
Uighurs are Xinjiang's largest ethnic group, comprising almost half of the region's
population.46 The state recognized majority Han Chinese are still a minority in
Xinjiang, accounting for approximately thirty-seven percent of the region's
seventeen million people.4 7 Xinjiang, home to thirteen officially recognized
nationalities, is actually one of China's most diverse regions. 48 But despite
Xinjiang's diversity, the region is sharply segregated: Han Chinese live in larger
industrialized urban areas in the north, while ethnic minorities populate the
predominantly rural south.49
Economics and Unrest
The geographic segregation in Xinjiang also alludes to the economic
disparities in the region. While Xinjiang has experienced rapid economic
growth, 50 prosperity has remained elusive for the Uighurs.5
Moreover, the
growing economic chasm between east and west (and Han/non-Han) fuels ethnic
tensions and widens popular political fissures with Beijing. Arslan Alptekin, a
Uighur leader living in Turkey, predicts, "the Chinese empire will collapse from
within. The workers and farmers who brought Mao Zedong to power are unhappy
with the enormous wealth gap." 52 Alptekin's words apply generally to China, but
they carry special import for Xinjiang. Of the twenty counties (in Xinjiang) where
Uighurs make up ninety percent or more of the population, the central government
has designated thirteen as key poverty alleviation counties.53
in the project later. See Rae, supra note 37.
45. This piece employs the modem definition of "Uighur." In addition to the Uighurs, Xinjiang
has long been inhabited by the Muslim Kazakhs, Krgyz, and Tajiks. The Uighurs believe that their
ancestors were the indigenous peoples of the Tarim Basin. The Uighurs, though often portrayed as a
united front, are divided by religious conflicts, territorial loyalties, linguistic discrepancies, commonerelite alienation, and competing political loyalties. See Dru C. Gladney, China's Interests in Central
Asia, in ENERGY AND CONFLICT IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 211-13 (Robert Ebel & Rajan
Menon eds., 2000). For a full discussion of the Uighur ethnicity, see generally JUSTIN JON RUDELSON,
OASIS IDENTITIES: UYGHUR NATIONALISM ALONG CHINA'S SILK ROAD 17-38 (1997) [hereinafter
RUDELSON].

46. The
Uighurs of
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and
Uzbekistan,
at
http://www.strategicnetwork.org/index.asp?loc=pe&pe=2021& (last visited June 29, 2003).
47. Id.
48. See generally RUDELSON, supra note 45, at 20-32.
49. See Becquelin, supranote 38, at 68.
50. Id. at 67. For example, between 1991 and 1994, GDP doubled from 7.5 billion yuan to 15.5
billion. Id.
51. See id. at 68. The situation is especially bad in the southern, predominantly Uighur, regions.
In 1998, while the average rural income for Xinjiang was 684 yuan, in the Uighur south the figure was a
mere 200 yuan. Id. at 69.
52. Mark O'Neil, A Life in ForgottenExile, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 15, 2001, at 15.
53. Becquelin, supranote 32, at 68 n.10; see also Barry Sautman, PreferentialPoliciesfor Ethnic
Minorities in China: The Case of Xinjiang, in NATIONALISM AND ETHNOREGIONAL IDENTITIES IN
CHINA 87 (William Safran ed., 1998) [hereinafter Sautman, PreferentialPolicies]. ("Of 311 poor
counties listed by the PRC State Council, 143 are in minority areas. More than eighty percent of
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For much of the 1980s, Xinjiang suffered both from the consequences of
opening the economy to outside forces and the central government's preferential
policies for coastal areas.5 4 In spite of the region's vast natural resources, the
central government did little throughout the 1980s to develop Xinjiang's
potential-leading to the view that Beijing was failing to give the region adequate
attention. 55 The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) relegated most of western
China to the function of resource and raw material provider-Xinjiang would have
to wait for large-scale modernization projects.56 In 1991, however, the sudden
collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent emergence of independent Central
Asian states, and a growing separatist movement forced Beijing to reevaluate its
strategy for dealing with the western frontier. 57 Even before the breakup of the
Soviet Union, separatist agitations in Xinjiang forced Beijing to confront growing
Uighur unrest. 58 In 1990, Han police and soldiers clashed with Uighurs, whom
authorities called "counterrevolutionary plotters" belonging to the Islamic Party of
East Turkestan. 59 Although the death toll is uncertain, most estimates suggest the
altercation left dozens dead.60 The incident in 1990 would serve as a prelude of
things to come.
In the wake of the Soviet Union's disintegration, economic and security issues
have become increasingly intertwined as the CCP pursues its goals of stability and
continued integration and assimilation. 6 1 In 1991, the Soviet collapse and Uighur
separatist rumblings provoked a political scramble in Beijing, and just after the
aborted Moscow coup, Vice-President Wang Zhen rushed out to the XUAR.62
Wang seized the opportunity to advocate greater national unity, exhorting the
entire nation to "form a steel wall to safeguard socialism and the unification of the
motherland. 63 By tying socialism to the notion of a united motherland, Wang
demonstrates how the Party line links the support for the state economic system to
the concept of a united China.
Paralleling Party rhetoric, economic policies shifted to encourage greater

Chinese who lack sufficient food and clothing live in minority areas."). Id.
54. Peter Ferdinand, Xinjiang: Relations with China and Abroad, in CHINA DECONSTRUCTS:
POLITICS, TRADE AND REGIONALISM, 279 (David S.G. Goodman & Gerald Segal eds., 1994)
[hereinafter Ferdinand].
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally Becquelin, supra note 38, at 65.
58. See Colin Nickerson, Moslem Unrest Simmers on Sino-Soviet Border, BOSTON GLOBE, June
20, 1990, at 1. Shortly after this incident, authorities declared Xinjiang off-limits to foreigners and
People's Liberation Army (PLA) enforcements were mobilized to quell outbursts in the region. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See generally Becquelin, supranote 38, at 65.
62. See J. Richard Walsh, China and the New Geopolitics of CentralAsia, in ASIAN SURVEY, Vol.
33, No. 3, Mar. 1993, at 272-84 (A Monthly Review of Contemporary Asian Affairs, U. Cal. Press).
63. See id.The central government has recently used similar rhetoric to combat separatists in
Xinjiang. See generally Amy Woo, China-Xinjiang; "'Great Wall of Steel" to Quell Ethnic Unrest,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar., 11, 1997, at http://194.183.22.90/ips/eng.nsf/vwWebMainView/
0DBF69567EF3C68D80256A07004F6CE/?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 16, 2003).
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integration of outlying areas. The Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) continued
the emphasis on coastal regions, but also included initiatives to facilitate
development of China's west. 64 The new focus on the west brought dramatic
changes to Xinjiang-between 1991 and 1994, infrastructure investment in the
XUAR soared from 7.3 billion yuan to 16.5 billion, and the region's GDP doubled
from 7.5 billion yuan to 15.5 billion.65 In 1992, the central government announced
that tax-sharing arrangements like those enjoyed by coastal provinces would apply
to nine additional provinces, including Xinjiang. 66 Moreover, rather than the usual
fifty percent, ethnic minority regions would be allowed to retain eighty percent of
local taxes.67 Notwithstanding the economic changes of the early 1990s, by 1995
Xinjiang's per capita gross domestic product remained a dismal U.S.$598, one of
the lowest in China.68 Although there were a number of economic triumphs in
Xinjiang, the region remained dogged by economic difficulties. 69 Thus, rather than
rallying restive Uighurs around central government policies, the unfulfilled
promises of prosperity have helped channel the rising tide of Uighur disaffection
into separatist sentiment.
Rising Tide of Separatism
In the 1990s, periodic outbursts of separatist violence shook Xinjiang. 70 The
disintegration of the Soviet Union stimulated both a swell of Uighur pride and new
hope that the independence of the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia would
spill over into China, "establishing if not an independent 'Uighurstan,' at least
perhaps a unified 'Eastern Turkestan,' that would stand alongside Kazakhstan,
Beijing blames
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgzstan as independent Turkic republics.'
Uighur separatists for riots, assassinations, and hundreds of bombings since 1990.72
Abulahat Abdurixit, chairman of the XUAR government, admitted in 1999 that
"since the ... 1990s, if you count explosions, assassinations and other terrorist
activities, it comes to a few thousand incidents. 73 The central government now

64. See Aims of the Eighth Five-Year Plan, BBC Monitoring Service, Oct. 10, 1990from WEN
WEI Po (H.K.), Sept. 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
65. Becquelin, supranote 38, at 67.
66. Id. at 71.
67. Id.
68. Dorian, supra note 41, at 2. In 1995, the per capita GDPs of Kazakhstan (U.S.$3,200),
Kyrgyzstan (U.S.$1,790), Tajikistan (U.S.$1,415), Turkmenistan (U.S.$3,280), and Uzbekistan
(U.S.$2,400) all dwarfed that of Xinjiang. Id. at 6.
69. See June Teufel Dreyer, The PLA and Regionalism: Xinjiang, in CHINESE REGIONALISM 264
(Richard H. Yang et al. eds., 1994).
70. See, e.g., RUDELSON, supranote 45, at 171-72.
71. Dru Gladney, China's Uyghur Dilemma, in PROJECT SYNDICATE, at http://www.projectsyndicate.cz/series/seriestex.php4?id=770(last visited Feb. 16, 2003). Although there is no right to
secession under international law, there is also no prohibition on forcible division of an existing state,
so long as it does not result from an unlawful outside intervention. See DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY
AND MINORITY RIGHTS, at xiv (Hurst Hannum, ed., 1993).
72. Liu, Trouble, supra note 19, at 45.
73. Becquelin, supra note 38, at 87.
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recognizes separatists in Xinjiang as China's most serious internal security threat.74
In 1996, the central government responded to the escalation of violence in the
hinterlands with the "Strike Hard" anticrime campaign, designed to eradicate crime
76
75
The Xinjiang Public Security Bureau
and crack down on Uighur separatists.
announced that after launching the campaign, it captured more than 2,700
terrorists, murderers, and other criminals in the span of two months.77 Rather than
stemming the growing tide of Uighur separatism, the "Strike Hard" campaign
actually incited separatists, increasing Uighur anti-government protests and
violence to levels unprecedented since the Communists took control of the
region.78 In February 1997, hundreds of Uighurs took to the streets in Yining
waving blue East Turkestan flags and shouting "God is Great" and "Independence
for Xinjiang., 79 The "Yining incident," the largest publicly known "separatist"
protest, left at least ten dead and hundreds injured. 0 Shortly after the Yining
incident, Uighur separatists demonstrated their contempt and disrespect for
Chinese rule by coordinating several Urumchi bus bombings to coincide with the
state funeral for Deng Xiaoping. 81 As an encore, separatists exploded a pipe bomb
on a bus in Beijing's busiest shopping district.8 2
Although there are some indications of diminishing Uighur activism, 83 in
April 2001, Abulahat Abdurixit stated: "[T]he sabotage activities carried out by
ethnic separatist elements are the greatest threat to stability and public order in
Xinj iang." 84 In the wake of the September 11 attacks against the United States,
China has used the international campaign against terrorism to rally support for its
actions against Uighur separatists, even linking separatists in Xinjiang to Osama
bin Laden.8 5 Fearing that instability in Central Asia could ignite an uprising in the

74. Interview with an American Diplomat, Beijing, China (March 2000) (on file with author).

75. RUDELSON, supra note 45, at 171.
76. The Public Security Bureau (PSB) is the law enforcement agency charged with maintenance
of the criminal law and public administration. See CHtu ET AL., LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE PRC 93-97
(1991) (providing a general overview of the duties and powers of the PSB).
77. RUDELSON, supra note 45, at 171.
78. Id.
79. See John Pomfret, Separatists Defy Chinese Crackdown: Persistent Islamic Movement May
Have Help from Abroad, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2000, at Al 7 [hereinafter Pomfret, Separatists Defy
Chinese]; see also PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
XINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT (1999), available at
http://www.web.amnesty.orgai.nsf/index/ASA1 70181999 (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) (providing an
account of the 1997 Yining incident and its context)[hereinafter AMNESTY REP.]
80. Pomfret, SeparatistsDefy Chinese, supra note 79.
81. RUDELSON, supra note 45, at 171.
82. Id.
83. Dru Gladney, China's Uyghur Dilemma, in PROJECT SYNDICATE, Feb. 19, 2002, at
http://www.project-syndicate.cz/series/series-text.php4?id=770 [hereinafter
Gladney,
China's
Dilemma].
84. Id.
85. Joe McDonald, China Targets Xinjiang Rebels for bin Laden Links: Report, Aimed at World
Opinion, Lacks Support of Claims, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at A13; see also Jasper Becker,
China's 'Homegrown Terror,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 16,2001, at 18.
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86
region, China has intensified surveillance and control of Uighurs in Xinjiang.
into
Recent reports also indicate that China has moved up to 40,000 troops
87
Xinjiang to quell separatist activities and maintain security in the region.

While most Uighurs are not involved in separatist activities, economic and
cultural resentment toward Han Chinese is widespread.8 8 Some experts warn that
growing numbers of dispossessed Uighur males constitute fertile ground for
extremist ideologies or separatist uprisings.8 9 While increased ties with Central
Asia have had the desired effect of facilitating the flow of goods into the region,
increased cross-border trade means potentially dangerous ideologies will also flow
into Xinjiang from Central Asia. The centrifugal forces of ethno-nationalism (panTurkism) and pan-Islamism pose new challenges to stability and security in
Xinjiang.90 In an attempt to counter the dangerous political undercurrents in the
region, Beijing has joined Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and
Kyrgyzstan in the "Shanghai Six," which, among other functions, serves as a
unified front against separatists and extremists. 9' In spite of Beijing's best efforts,
future unrest is likely. Dru Gladney points out that the "Strike Hard" campaign
has done little but alienate Xinjiang's local population, and if the central
government truly wants to poultice the growing fissures between Xinjiang and
Beijing, the war against separatism must be combined with a policy that gives
Uighurs hope for the future.92
IV. SOLIDIFYING THE NATION

Pacificationand Integration: Taking Prosperityto the Hinterlands
The Go West plan is designed to give Uighurs (and other minorities in the
west) hope by redressing the dangerous economic rift between east and west. This
strategy rests upon the theory that prosperity will breed greater minority
cooperation and thereby encourage their integration into the "Chinese Han
majority mainstream. 93 Chinese officials note: "Separatist movements gnawing
away at Chinese control in ethnic border regions will only be silenced by an

86. Craig S. Smith, FearingUnrest, China Presses Muslim Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at
A3.
87. China Moves 4 Army Divisions To Xinjiang to Quell Separatists, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
Jan. 12, 2002.
88. Eric Eckholm, China Seeks World Support in Fight With Its Muslim Separatists,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2001, at A7.
89. Gladney, China'sDilemma, supranote 83.
90. See Yasmin Melet, China's Political and Economic Relations with Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, 17 CENTRAL ASIAN SURV., 229, 246 (1998)
91. Robert Marquand, CentralAsians Group to Counterweigh US, in CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR,

June 15, 2001, at http//www.csmonitor.com/durable/2001/06/1 5/p8sl .htm.
92. Gladney, China'sDilemma, supranote 83.
93. See Dru C. Gladney, Economy and Ethnicity: The Revitalization of a Muslim Minority in
Southeastern China, in THE WANING OF THE COMMUNIST STATE 242 (Andrew G. Walder ed., 1995)
[hereinafter Gladney, Economy and Ethnicity].
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increase in material wealth among local populations. 9 4 A "long-term program,"
with a timeline of twenty or thirty years, Go West emphasizes infrastructure
development, local industry, science, technology, education, improving the
investment environment, and working on environmental protection projects. 95 In
Xinjiang, thus far the plan has materialized in the form of large infrastructure
projects such as roads, railroads, and a U.S.$14 billion pipeline running from
Xinjiang's natural gas fields to Shanghai, 2,500 miles to the southeast. 96 As part of
the Go West campaign, Xinjiang Regional Development Planning Commission
identified thirty key projects for inclusion in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (20012005). 97 Three of the thirty projects are in agriculture, four are in the power
industry, two are in urban construction, three are in the petrochemical and gas
industry, five are water resource projects, nine are in transportation (road and
railway construction), and four are in other industries.98 These projects require a
total investment of 70 billion yuan (U.S.$8.46 billion). 99 In spite of Beijing's
pledges for support, some western scholars point out that central authorities have
back-pedaled from promises of financial participation, and Go West amounts to
little more than an opportunity for regional elites to demonstrate loyalty to the
central government by waving the Go West banner. 1° If rhetoric has any hope of
becoming reality in Xinjiang, the Go West plan will have to overcome the region's
harsh topography, technological backwardness, and infrastructure deficiencies. 0 1
In isolated Xinjiang, building transportation links to markets in the east is of
paramount importance.
Infrastructure improvements are critical to reduce
Xinjiang's isolation from both central and coastal China and potential markets in
Europe and Central Asia.1 2
Currently, transportation links are woefully
inadequate. While grapes from California can make it to a Guangdong fruit stand
in less than a week, grapes from Turfan, located in central Xinjiang, take up to
fifteen days.' 0 3 Clearly, Xinjiang's biggest challenge
to development is enhancing
4
shipping capabilities and transportation links.'
As part of the Tenth Five Year Plan, the central government has promised
approximately 100 billion yuan (U.S.$12.1 billion) for large and medium sized

94. Economic Improvement Only Antidote to Separatism,AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 2, 1996.
95. See generally Thomas L. Sims & Jonathan James Schiff, The Great Western Development
Strategy, CHINA Bus. REV., 44,48 (Nov.-Dec. 2000).
96. Pomfret, Go West supra note 16, at AO1. The natural gas pipeline is the only Xinjiang-related
project of the central government's ten major Go West projects. See Li, Bountiful Region, supra note
16, at2.
97. Economic & Technical News, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 19, 2000.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Robert M. Cutler, China's "Go West" Pipeline Projects: A "Great Leap Westward"?,
CENTRAL
ASIA
CAUCASUS
ANALYST,
Aug. 16, 2000, at http://www.cacianalyst.org!
Aug_16/homeaugl6.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
101. Paul S. Triolo & Christopher Hegadom, China's Wild West, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar. 1996, at
41.
102. Id. at 43.
103. Pomfret, Go West, supra note 16.
104. Li, Bountiful Region, supra note 16.
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railway construction projects in west China. 10 5 Plans exist to extend the recently
completed Kashgar-Urumqi line into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan,' 0 6 while another
proposed railway project passes through Yining into Kazakhstan. 10 7 Go West also
hopes to improve domestic east-west links, by either double-tracking existing lines
or building new ones.10 8 In addition to facilitating the enhanced transport of goods,
improving transportation links helps the central government maintain control of the
region. 109
Another priority for Xinjiang is "shift[ing] from exporting natural resources to
development of higher value-added processing industries in minerals, agricultural
produce and tourism." 110 Xinjiang has tremendous potential for a lucrative tourism
industry. The region is replete with historical and cultural sites, stunning natural
beauty, and colorful minority groups."' Local authorities also eye increased
2
tourism as the first phase in luring both domestic and international investment."l
The two pillar industries, black (oil) and white (cotton), are also central to
Xinjiang's strategy for economic development." 3 The emphasis on these
industries, however, demonstrates that Go West's strategy for Xinjiang does not
make sound economic sense. Although Xinjiang does have sizeable oil reserves,
hopeful estimates have largely been disappointed,'14 and the extraction costs make
Xinjiang's oil extremely expensive. 15 Beijing's emphasis on Xinjiang's oil also
has the undesired effect of fueling local frustrations. The oil industry in Xinjiang
is now almost completely run by Han Chinese, and the China National Petroleum
Company's exploration and extraction projects have bypassed the Xinjiang
Petroleum Bureau altogether.'1 6 Situations such as these anger locals and some
scholars speculate that the industry is steering the Han onto a collision course with
Uighurs. June Teufel Dreyer points out that the hype surrounding Xinjiang's oil
reserves gives locals the impression that the region could easily be economically
self-sufficient, even wealthy, if only Beijing would stop siphoning off the valuable
natural resources." 7 Thus, oil is problematic, both as an engine for development
105. CHINA'S GREAT LEAP WEST, supra note 25, at 43.

106. Id. at 44.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 43.
109. Dru C. Gladney, The Ethnogenesis of the Uighur, 9 CENTRAL ASIAN SURV., 17 (1990)
("While it took Zuo Zongtang six months to bring an imperial Qing army from Lanzhou to Urumqi in
order to suppress the Uighur uprising led by Yakub Beg at the end of the 19"' century, today Urumqi is
only five hours by plane and 72 hours by train from Beijing.").
110. Li, Bountful Region, supranote 16.
111. In 1999, the author spent three weeks in Xinjiang.
112. See Li, Bountiful Region, supra note 16.
113. Office of Leading Group for Western Region Development of the State Council, "Black and
White " Strategy Boosts Xinjiang's Economy, at http://www.chinawest.gov.cn/englishl
asp/start.asp?id=a(last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
114. See Cutler, supra note 100. ("[Sjeveral years ago western energy companies, encouraged by
Beijing's touting of Xinjiang's natural energy resources, paid high fees to test-drill for oil, and they
came up dry." ); See also Dorian, supranote 41, at 4.
115. Cutler, supranote 100.
116. Pomfret, Go West, supra note 16.
117. Dreyer, supra note 69, at 271.
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and as a rhetorical tool for rallying support for Go West.
As for cotton, "there is little evidence that cotton is [even] economically
viable" in the region." 8 Imported cotton is still fifteen per cent cheaper than the
local product, and heavy government subsidies keeping the industry going are
proving very costly for the central government." 9 China's textile crisis has left the
state with a stockpile of four million tons of cotton, equivalent to three years of
Xinjiang's output.' 20 The cotton strategy also demonstrates the need for nationally
integrated planning. Many of Go West's projects are conceived and implemented
from "the bottom up,' '2 with little or no national coordination. One commentary
from Xinhua News Agency points out the danger of such an approach, noting that
if regional plans are not coordinated centrally, it will be "hard to avoid running
around in circles when the work is fully underway, and we may have to pay a
considerably higher price for the 'remedies' after problems crop up, which will
inevitably impair the entire process of development."'' 22 In Xinjiang, as in other
regions, development policies that make little sense economically are often driven
by an underlying political agenda. Some have speculated that the explanation for
the importance of cotton in Xinjiang "lies in the opening up of new land through
reclamation: a key element in bringing in massive numbers of Han settlers to
reinforce territorial consolidation."' 123 This explanation resonates with Beijing's
desire to shore up control of the region by diluting restive indigenous
populations
' 24
with Han settlers, a process colloquially referred to as "mixing sand."'
"Mixing Sand": Han Migrationand Integrationinto the Chinese Fold
When Communist forces "liberated" Xinjiang in 1949, over ninety percent of
Xinjiang's population was ethnically non-Han. 25 The region, embroiled in a long
tradition of ethnic and religious animosity (both among native groups and towards
the non-Muslim Han), proved to be a difficult land to control. 126 After the CCP
consolidated power, the authorities launched a massive program of Han
27
resettlement, thereby dramatically increasing the Han population in the region.1
By 1979, almost half of Xinjiang's eleven million people were Han. 28 The 1990
census, however, indicated a steady and continuing decline of the Han population

118. Becquelin, supranote 38, at 81.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Cutler, supra note 114.
122. CHINA'S GREAT LEAP WEST, supra note 25, at 14.
123. Becquelin, supranote 38, at 83.
124. Id. at 74.
125. Donald H. McMillen, Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps: A Han
Organization in a Non-Han Region, AUSTRALIAN J. OF CHINESE AFF., July 1981, at 66 (exploring the
role of the Production and Construction Corps in the consolidation of CCP power and Han
rule)[hereinafter McMillen, XinjiangPCCJ.
126. Id. at67.
127. Id. at 66.
128. Id.
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in Xinj rang--owing in large part to lower Han birthrates.12 9 The central
government, concerned by the implications of such a demographic shift countered
the trend
with a strategy of increased Han migration, colloquially called "mixing
1 30
sand."

Go West continues the recent trend of accelerated Han migration to Xinjiang.
Increased economic opportunities and improved transportation links facilitate a
steady stream of Han migrants, and according to some estimates, 250,000 Han
make the journey west each year. 131 Go West's large infrastructure construction
projects provide jobs for migrant workers and in spite of preferential policies for
ethnic minorities, 132 jobs often go to Han workers rather than indigenous Uighurs.
For example, among 20,000 oil workers in the Tarim Basin, relatively few jobs
have been allocated to minorities; in the Taklamakan Desert oil exploration
13 3
project, only 253 of 4,000 technical workers came from minority groups.
Employment discrimination adds to Uighur frustrations and resentments of the
Han. One young Uighur in Xinjiang vents: "Look,... I am a strong man and welleducated. But [Han] Chinese firms won't give me a job. Yet go down to the
railway station and you can see all the [Han] Chinese who've just arrived. They'll
get jobs. It's a policy, to swamp us.' 134 Given the large number of Han Chinese
moving to Xinjiang, Go West may well be a Trojan Horse-Beijing tempts
Xinjiang with the prospect of economic prosperity while using development
projects as a vehicle for flooding the region with Han Chinese.
The steady stream of Han Chinese into Xinjiang has a powerful assimilative
effect on the Uighurs. In spite of the fact that Uighurs are the largest ethnic group
in Xinjiang, they demonstrate a much higher rate of assimilation to the Han, than
vice versa.135 The potency and supremacy of Han Chinese culture stands as a
strong and well-established principle in the Chinese world-view, and Han leaders
36
have long recognized its assimilative power. Mencius (fourth century B.C.)1
commented: "I have heard of man using the doctrines of our great land to change
barbarians, but I have never yet heard of any being changed by barbarians."' 137 For

129. Becquelin, supra note 38, at 69.
130. Id.at 74.
131. Pomfret, Go West, supra note 16.
132. See Sautman, PreferentialPolicies,supranote 53, at 88.
133. Id. at 97 (Wang Lequan, the Regional Party Secretary explains: "[T]he workforces in
Xinjiang's oilfields all come from other oilfields in China so we don't take local people.").
134. Go West, ECONOMIST, supra note 16.
135. See JiPing, Ethnic Inequality and Social Structural Assimilation: The Xinjiang Autonomous
Region of China, in MIGRATION, POPULATION STRUCTURE, AND RESDISTRIBUTION POLICIES 117-35
(Calvin Goldscheider, ed., 1992).
136. Mencius was the second sage in the Confucian tradition. He expanded on Confucian thought
by suggesting that human nature is inherently good. See DAVID HINTON, MENCIUS, at ix (1998).
137. JAMES LEGGE, THE CHINESE CLASSICS, II, 253-54 (1960). Ming Dynasty philosopherstatesman Wang Yang-ming also expressed this view in his prescription for governing the frontiers:
Barbarians are like wild deer. To institute direct civil service administration by
Han Chinese magistrates would be like herding deer into the hall of a house and
trying to tame them. In the end they merely butt over your sacrificial altars, kick
over your tables, and dash about in frantic flight. In the wilderness districts,
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the Uighurs, socioeconomic advancement is often tied to assimilation into the Han
social structure. 13 Han Chinese, however, do not see similar rewards for
assimilating into the Uighur social system.' 3 9 Therefore, rather than creating a
balanced blend of Han and Uighur, the Go West policy of "mixing sand" will
produce a Han-dominated social structure-the Uighurs will be forced to
assimilate, or "drown" in the "quicksand" of a Han dominated socioeconomic
structure.
Taming the West: A "Civilizing Project"
With increased separatist violence, and international awareness of the Uighur
plight growing, 140 CCP leaders recognize that this frontier powder keg is the single
greatest threat to their hold on power.' 4 ' Cadres from Beijing's leading Group on
Developing the Western Areas readily admit Go West's political agenda: "boosting
national unity, maintaining social stability, and consolidating the border
defences."' 142 Party officials have repeatedly stated that the only way to silence
separatist movements and consolidate control of ethnic border regions is to
increase wealth and economic prosperity in local minority populations. 43 One
official noted: "Only a strong economy and improved material and cultural living
standards can show the advantages of socialism ...and promote the unification of
all peoples towards the Communist Party."'"4 A member of the special team set up
by the State Council to draw up a master plan for the west even said:

therefore, one should adapt one's methods to the character of the wilderness...
On the other hand, to leave these tribal chiefs to themselves to conduct their own
alliances or split up their domains is like releasing deer into the wilderness... To
fragment their domains under separate chiefs is to follow the policy of erecting
restraining fences and is consonant with the policy of gelding the stalling and
castrating the boar... To set up independent chiefs without supervisory aids is
like herding deer in enclosed gardens. Without watchers to guard the fences and
prevent their goring and battling, they will leap the fences, bite through the
bamboo screens, and wander far to trample the young crops. The presently
established civil service aides are such guardians of the parks and fences.
quoted in JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA'S FORTY MILLIONS, 13-14 (1976) [hereinafter DREYER, FORTY
MILLIONS].

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. A 1999 Amnesty International Report, see AMNESTY REP., supra note 79, and the
proliferation of websites devoted to the "Uighur cause" indicate growing international awareness of the
Uighur movement. See generally Uyghur Human Rights Coalition, at http://www.uyghurs.org/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2003); Uyghur American Ass'n, Freedomfor the Heartand Soul of Eastern Turkestan,
at http://www.caccp.org/et/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2003); Uyghur American Ass'n, Brief Introduction to
East Turkestan and Uyghurs, at http://www.uyghuramerican.org/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
141. Interview with an American Diplomat, Beijing, China (March 2000) (on file with author). See
also David Wall, A Grim Futurefor China'sHinterlands, JAPAN TIMES, May 17, 2000.
142. Lam, supranote 18.
143. Economic Improvements Only Antidote to Separatism: Chinese Official, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESS, Oct. 2, 1996.
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The aim of the government's program to develop China's western provinces is to
prevent China's foreign enemies using poverty to create a Kosovo-style crisis in
the region... Providing ethnic minorities in those regions with more economic
development would help guarantee the45inviolability of China's borders and
political and social stability in the region.
Given that fifty-two of China's fifty-five ethnic minority groups live in the
west, 146 the Go West plan looks very much like a "civilizing project," designed to
assuage ethnic tensions and further integrate outlying minority regions into the
Chinese fold. In fact, the Go West project is an example of what Dru Gladney
calls internal colonialism-a situation "predicated upon the unequal rates of
exchange between the urban power centers and the peripheral, often ethnic,
hinterlands." 147

The ideological basis for "civilizing projects" is a combination of the
civilizing center's perceived superiority and a commitment to raise the level of
peripheral peoples' civilization. 14 Han Chinese widely view their own culture to
be "one of progress, opportunity, science, and reason,"' 49 while Uighur culture is
perceived to be "backward, poor, weak, superstitious, and worst of all, 'feudal'.' 5 0
One Chinese (Han) specialist of minority affairs characteristically proclaimed:
"[T]he Han nationality has always kept a higher level of development, so many of
the ethnic minorities have learned a lot from the Han nationality's mode of
production and way of life."' 5'1 Members of the Ninth Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) echo this sentiment when they assert that ethic
minority groups will be the biggest beneficiaries of the Go West development
scheme. 152 Wei Jiezheng, a minority member of the CPPCC National Committee
notes: "China's ethnic minorities have been poor and backward for centuries, but
we are confident of the future."'5 3 Go West as a civilizing project, however, has
serious implications running counter to Beijing's objectives. Civilizing projects
invariably precipitate greater ethnic consciousness in those people being
civilized. 54 Ethnic awareness does not necessarily lead to an increase in separatist
agitation, but in the past ten years increased
identification with Uighur culture has
55
paralleled an increase in Uighur protests.

145. "Asian Kosovo, "supra note 6.
146. Ethnic Minorities Biggest Beneficiaries of West
China Development, at
http://www.chinaorg.cn/english/8416.htm (last visited Mar. 1,2003) [hereinafter Ethnic Minorities].
147. Dru C. Gladney, Internal Colonialism and China's Uyghur Muslim Minority, XISIM
Newsletter, Jan. 1998, available at http:www.uyghuramerican.org/researchanalysis/ intemalcol.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Gladney, Internal Colonialism].
148. Stevan Harrell, Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them, in CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS ON
CHINA'S ETHNIC FRONTIERS, 4 (Stevan Harrell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Harrell].
149. RUDELSON, supra note 45 at 124.
150. Id.
151. Sautman, PreferentialPolicies, supranote 53, at 88.
152. Ethnic Minorities,supra note 146.
153. Id.
154. Harrell, supra note 148, at 6.
155. RUDLESON, supra note 45, at 130-31.
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The explicit agenda of China's new "civilizing project" attempts to tackle the
separatist threat. The stated goals of "boosting national unity, maintaining social
stability and consolidating border defenses,"1 56 clearly address the west's problem
of separatist agitators. Uighur and Tibetan groups vying for independence have
made Beijing painfully aware that the economic disparity between ethnic
minorities in the west and Han Chinese in the east strengthens the cause of
separatist movements. 157 A 1994 State Ethnic Affairs Commission report to the
CCP Central Committee notes: "[M]inority nationalities are complaining that all
the rich are Han people and that the Communist Party could not care less about the
minorities.
This problem, if ignored, surely will deepen nationality
contradictions."'' 58 In 1994, China Today recognized that of the eighty million
people living under the poverty line, eighty percent (sixty-four million) live in
minority areas. 59 Mou Benli, Vice Minister of the State Ethnic Affairs
Commission recently hailed the Western Development strategy, noting it provides
ethnic minorities their "best ever historical opportunities.' ' 160 Although minorities
are the intended "beneficiaries" of Go West, the plan's political and economic
agendas are crafted with a broader audience in mind. Go West also plays an
important role in the CCP's efforts to legitimize the current political power
structure and justify the continued existence of the regime.
V.

LEGITIMITIZING THE CURRENT REGIME BY TAMING THE WILD WEST

Since the PRC's inception, Party ideology has served as the theoretical basis
for all major policies. 16 1 In spite of China's economic liberalization and the
movement towards capitalism, the Party has refused to renounce its fundamental
ideology. Insistence on "socialism with Chinese characteristics," demonstrates an
attempt to reconcile the contradictions between economic reforms and Party
ideology, thereby sustaining political legitimacy. 162 The contradictions between
official ideology and the process of economic reform create a legitimacy crisis
threatening the current regime. I 63 When Jiang Zemin said that the development of
the west is crucial to China's stability, the Communist Party's hold on power, and
the "revitalization of the Chinese people,"' 64 he acknowledged the political
156. Lam, supra note 18.
157. Linda Benson, in her book on the Ili Rebellion, notes that economic factors helped push
Xinjiang to rebellion in the 1940's. See generally LINDA BENSON, THE ILl REBELLION: THE MOSLEM
CHALLENGE TO CHINESE AUTHORrrY IN XINJIANG 1944-1949, at 34-37 (1990).

158. Cited in Barry Sautman, Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progressand Constraints,
21 LAw & POL'Y 208-302, (1999), [hereinafter Sautman, Ethnic Law].
159. China:A United Country of56 Ethnic Groups, CHINA TODAY, Dec. 12, 1994, at 7.
160. China Continues to Highlight Economic Development in Minority Inhabited Areas, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 22, 2000, availableat LEXIS, News Group File.
161. FENG, supra note 14, at2.
162. See generally id.
163. Muthiah Alagappa, Contestationand Crisis, in POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
THE QUEST FOR MORAL AUTHORITY, 59 (Muthia Alagappa ed., 1995), A legitimacy crisis is "a

situation in which the basis on which authority has been claimed or acknowledged is under such severe
stress that there is a strong possibility of its destruction or transformation." [hereinafter Alagappa].
164. See Pomfret, Go West, supranote 16, at AO1.
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imperative behind western development.
While scholars recognize a number of bases for political legitimacy other than
performance, an unelected regime without a state religion, a charismatic leader, or
a viable ideology has little to justify its claim to power. 165 A strong performance
demonstrating a "[p]roper and effective use of power to promote the collective
well-being of the political community can generate moral authority."' 166 The CCP
hopes that successful development of the west will lend the regime legitimacy in
the eyes of both Han Chinese throughout the country and Uighurs in Xinjiang.
The program's primary thrust, however, is directed at the minority groups in the
west. Given the intended "beneficiaries" of the plan are minority groups, the Go
West project should be considered in the context of China's evolving minority
policy-a weaving story of appeasement and movement towards eventual
assimilation.
VI. CCP MINORITY POLICY IN XINJIANG: ROAD TO INTEGRATION

A brief history of China's minority policy and its impact in Xinjiang is
needed to fully contextualize the Go West project. China's minority policy has
general characteristics, applicable to all minority nationalities, but this history will
focus on the policy's impact on Xinjiang. Chinese policy towards the peoples of
Xinjiang has generally followed a trajectory of integration with the implicit
expectation of assimilation at a later date. 167 Since "liberation" in 1949, the central
government's integration policies have paralleled concerns for territorial integrity
and stimulation of greater Chinese nationalism. Tracing the evolution of CCP
minority policy from pre-liberation pacification to the current system of regional
autonomy reveals that although policy has undergone several major
transformations, the underlying goals of quelling unrest, moving the Uighurs
steadily towards assimilation, and ensuring continued8 control over the region have
always guided central government decision-making.16
Early Appeasement: Unify and Conquer
In the PRC's early years, the Party line maintained that Xinjiang, Tibet, and
Mongolia should be "autonomous states," ultimately voluntarily uniting with
China in a federated republic. 169 Communist leaders recognized that minorities on
China's frontiers harbored both deep nationalist desires and strong fears of forced

165. See Alagappa, supra note 163, at 31-53.
166. Id.at 41.
167. Political integration is the process through which an ethnic group shifts loyalties, expectations,
and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions welcome the group under an umbrella of
jurisdictional protection. See DREYER, FORTY MILLIONS, supra note 137, at I.
168. Gladney suggests that this is part of a process of "internal colonialism" which relies on
"integration by immigration" to make Uighurs a minority and incorporate them into the Chinese state.
See Gladney, Internal Colonialism,supra note 147.
169. CONRAD BRANDT ET AL., A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CHINESE CoMMUNISM 64 (1959)
[hereinafter BRANDT].
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assimilation, and policy was thus crafted to assuage these fears. In 1931, the
Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic (Jiangxi Constitution)170 emphasized
the equality of minorities' 71 and recognized "the right of self-determination of the
national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China, and to
the formation of an independent state for each national minority.' ' 172 In 1934,
however, Mao acknowledged that the minority policy set out in the Jiangxi
Constitution was an effort to enlist minority support against the Guomindang
(KMT) and imperialist forces. 173 Both the option of secession and the promise174of
self-determination quickly evaporated once the rhetoric outlived its usefulness.
The Party soon shifted its position-eliminating both the possibilities of
secession or true self-determination. 175 Under the CCP's new policy, minorities
were granted equal rights with the Han, they were encouraged to develop their own
cultures, were not forced to learn Chinese, and they were promised control of their
own affairs-as long as they remained part of a unified Chinese state. 176 In the
years leading up to the founding of the PRC in 1949, the CCP introduced a new
brand of rhetoric: unifying the nation by broadening the Chinese "family."
Creatinga Chinese "Family"
The next stage in the development of the minority policy reflects efforts by
the CCP to unify the country and cultivate a sense of Chinese nationhood. The
new regime's legitimacy in the hinterlands hinged upon the CCP's ability to
recreate the Chinese national identity. 177 Successful and lasting unification
required a stimulation of Chinese nationalism that spanned regional differences
and overcame localism.17 8 In 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, regarded as the father of
170. Id.at 220-24.
171. Id. at 221-24. Ostensibly, Chinese policy does not distinguish between different minority
groups. Unless otherwise noted the policies discussed in this paper apply to the Uighurs in Xinjiang as
well as Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans, and others living on Chinese territory.
172. Id.at 223.
173. See generally David Deal, Policy Towards Ethnic Minorities in Southwest China, 1927-1965,
in I J. OF ASIAN AFF. 31,34 [hereinafter Deal, Policy Towards Ethnic Minorities].
at 34.
174. See generally id.
175. Id.
176. In 1945, Mao Zedong wrote, in 'On Coalition Government', that the future People's China
would 'grant nations the right to be their own masters and to voluntarily enter into an alliance with the
Han people All national minorities in China must create, along voluntary and democratic lines, a
federation of democratic republics of China.' In later editions of Mao's Selected Works, however, that
passage vanished, and the original words of 'granting of the right to national self-determination to all
national-minorities' were replaced by the phrase 'the granting of the right to national autonomy to all
national minorities. BAO-GANG HE & YINGJIE GuO, NATIONALISM, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN CHINA 173-74 (2000).
177. Habermas dramatically states: a legitimacy crisis "is directly an identity crisis." Ernst Haas
asserted: "Legitimate authority under conditions of mass politics is tied up with successful nationalism;
when the national identity is in doubt, one prop supporting legitimacy is knocked away." quoted in
CHINA'S QUEST FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY 9 (Lowell Dittmer & Samuel S. Kim eds., 1993).
178. The nature of the Chinese Empire prior to 1949, in conjunction with the prolonged period of
foreign (Manchu) rule, inhibited the development of Chinese nationalism. The Chinese Empire was
traditionally comprised of numerous ethnic groups and nationalities, borders were not fixed and its
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modem China, highlighted the importance of instilling a sense of Chinese
nationhood:
The Chinese people have shown the greatest loyalty to family and clan with the
result that in China there have been family-ism and clan-ism but no real
nationalism. Foreign observers say that the Chinese are like a sheet of loose
sand... The unity of the79 Chinese people has stopped short at the clan and has not
extended to the nation.1
Sun Yat-sen's words resonate throughout the early policy statements of the
CCP. 180 Preparing to declare the formation of the PRC, Mao realized Sun's
observations revealed a critical aspect of Chinese society the CCP could utilize in
mobilizing the masses. Party rhetoric synthesized the concepts of nation and clan
into a familial metaphor, declaring: "All nationalities within the boundaries of the
People's Republic of China are equal. They shall establish unity and mutual aid
among themselves, and shall oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so
that the PRC will become a big fraternaland cooperativefamily composed of all
its nationalities."' 81 The Party's new language tried to inculcate both patriotism
brothers"
and the notion that "older brother" had arrived to assist his "younger
82
develop their own languages, customs, religious beliefs, and traditions.1
Creation of the Autonomous Regions
By casting minority integration in familial terms and by reneging on the
promise of the right to secede, the CCP paved the way for the creation of
autonomous minority regions. When the XUAR was created in 1955, CCP
rhetoric was tinged with overtones of the "Han man's burden," and the long-term
goal was ultimate assimilation of the province through sinification.18 3 While a few
basic rights were incorporated into the 1954 Constitution, insufficient guarantee
for these rights meant they basically did not exist. 18 Many have argued the longterritorial expanse depended largely on the reigning emperor's power and ambition. See generally
MARIA CHANG, RETURN OF THE DRAGON: CHINA'S WOUNDED NATIONALISM (2001).
179. SUN YAT-SEN, THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE: SAN MIN CHU 1 2 (1990).
180. In a political report to the party Mao addressed the minority question:
The CCP is in complete accord with Dr. Sun's racial policy ...to assist the broad
masses of the racial minorities, including their leaders who have connections
with the people, to fight for their political, economic, and cultural emancipation
and development, as well as for the establishment of their own armed forces that
protect the interests of the masses. Their languages, customs, habits, and religious
beliefs should be respected.
Mao Zedong, On CoalitionGovernment, quoted in BRANDT, supra note 169, at 313.
181. The Common Programof the Chinese People'sPoliticalConsultativeConference art. 50 (Sept
29, 1949), reprinted in HENRY G. SCHWARZ, CHINESE POLICIES TOWARDS MINORITIES: AN ESSAY AND
DOCUMENTS 52 (1971) [hereinafter CPCPPCC] (emphasis added).
182. See WOLFRAM EBERHARD, CHINA'S MINORITIES: YESTERDAY AND TODAY 157 (1982)
(hereinafter EBERHARD].
183. See DREYER, FORTY MILLIONS, supranote 137, at 137.
184. THOMAS HEBERER, CHINA AND ITS NATIONAL MINORITIES: AUTONOMY OR ASSIMILATION?
41 (1989).
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term Chinese policy is founded on the principle that giving minority areas a degree
of autonomy pacifies them by sustaining their own customs, religion, language,
and limited self-government until the immigration of Han Chinese slowly changes
the makeup of the population. 185 Go West, and the accompanying policy of
"mixing sand" fit very nicely into this pattern.
The Deng Years: Building a Legal Frameworkfor "Autonomy"
As China shook off the lingering effects of the Cultural Revolution 186 and
attempted to restore some semblance of law and order, CCP leaders reconsidered
the minority issue.' 87 By the early 1980s, the central government was quite aware
of growing minority discontent: "In 1981, a Han Chinese official in Xinjiang
complained that Uighurs would tell him repeatedly: 'What difference does it make
if the Russians come. They'll cut off the heads of the Han, not ours." 88 The 1982
Constitution upgraded the status of minorities and granted them more rights than
ever before-reflecting demands by minority leaders for an immediate realization
of regional autonomy as promised in the 1950s.189 In 1984, the central government
promulgated the Law on Regional National Autonomy, the "basic law for the
implementation of the system of regional national autonomy prescribed by the
Constitution."' 9 0
The LRNA Avoids the Issue ofAutonomy
The LRNA does not grant Xinjiang, or the other autonomous regions, any
degree of meaningful autonomy.' 91 Although official pronouncements laud the
autonomy regime as a system of self-government "established for the exercise of
autonomy and for people of ethnic minorities to become masters of their own
areas,"' 192 Western scholars criticize the system as little more than "fake" or "paper
autonomy."' 193 One scholar even likened China's autonomous areas to "political
eunuchs serving at the pleasure of the Communist court in Beijing."' 194 In fact, the
modern autonomy regime, as defined by the 1982 Constitution and the LRNA, is
185. EBERHARD, supranote 182, at 162.
186. HEBERER, supra note 184, at 29. ("Humiliation, insults, oppression, and an attempt at forced
assimilation; destruction of the ecological equilibrium and ruinous exploitation; economic plundering of
the minority regions: these were the consequences of the Cultural Revolution for the national minorities
and their regions.") Id.
187. See generally id. at41-42.
188. Seeid. at42.
189. See id.
190. LAW OF THE P.R.C. ON REGIONAL NATIONAL AUTONOMY (LRNA) preamble (1984),
availableat http://www.novexcn.com/regionalnationautonomy.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2003).
191. See generally Binh G. Phan, How Autonomous are the National Autonomous Areas of the
PRC? An Analysis of Documents and Cases, ISSUES AND STUDIES, Vol. 32, 7, 83-108 [hereinafter
Phan].
192. Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities, at http://englishpeopledaily.com.cn/
199909i28/enc_19990928001020_HomeNews.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
193. Sautman, Ethnic Law, supra note 158, at 293.
194. Phan, supranote 225, at 85.
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designed as a clever dance around the issue of true autonomy. Both documents
represent variations on the same theme of "give" and "take."
They give
autonomous regions rights and powers, and then by tying these rights to central
government approval, effectively take them away. While the modem system is the
most far-reaching autonomy regime to date, autonomous regions are still subject to
the "despotism 95and arbitrary wills of authorities and functionaries [of the central
government]."1
Ultimately, "autonomy" as implemented under the Constitution and LRNA
amounts to little more than a different way of describing the central-local
relationship.' 96 In spite of the claim that the LRNA "takes into account the
characteristics and special needs of the country's autonomous areas and ensures
the full exercise of autonomy by organs of self-government which have bigger
decision-making powers than other local governments,"'97 there is actually little
difference in the substantive powers enjoyed by autonomous regions and the
provinces. 98 In Xinjiang, the central government walks a fine line between
encouraging a safe amount of autonomy (thereby placating ethnic minorities) and
breeding local nationalism, or worse separatism. Economic prosperity (Go West)
is the promised panacea-it is supposed to tip the balance in favor of greater
integration by demonstrating that Uighurs will benefit more from cooperation with
the Chinese regime than resistance against it.199
VII. Go WEST'S

LEGAL WAKE: RECENTRALIZING POWER

CCP leaders recognize that developing, or taming, the west will require more
than rhetoric and money for infrastructure projects. In government news organs,
Party leaders note that the success of Go West depends upon the promulgation of
enabling legislation and the creation of a favorable legal environment. 200 A staterun website touts the achievements in legal reform of the last twenty years, but
acknowledges that the legal climate still needs improvement. 20 ' This website
quotes Lu Hushan, vice-chairman of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
People's Political Consultative Conference, as saying that the CCP should address
the following areas: legislation establishment, the systemic problems of law
enforcement agencies and judicial departments, and legal awareness. 0 2 In fact, Go
West's legal wake sends ripples through the existing autonomy regime195. HEBERER, supra note 218, at 43.
196. LIN FENG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CHINA 158 (2000) [hereinafter LIN FENG].
197. Self Government, at http://www.china.org.cn/e-groups/shaoshu/self htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2003).
198. LIN FENG, supranote 230, at 158.
199. DRU C. GLADNEY, ETHNIC IDENTITY INCHINA 171 (1998).
200. See Legal Climate Needs Improvement, at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/
Mar/9028.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Legal Climate] (" The Chinese Communist Party
has made the strategic decision to develop western China. People talk more about natural resources,
infrastructural facilities, ecological environment and flow of trained people when referring to this
subject. But, in fact, a favorable legal environment is also crucial.").
201. See id
202. See id.
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contracting Xinjiang's powers of self-control and recentralizing decision-making
authority.
In March of 2001, President Jiang Zemin signed an order announcing
revisions to the LRNA. 203 Xinhua cites the wide economic gap between
autonomous regions in the west and prosperous coastal areas in the east as the
primary motivation for the changes. 204 Officials say the amendments will
"promote the prosperity of all nationalities by narrowing the economic and social
development gap between autonomous minority nationality areas [and other
regions]. 20 5 Li Dezhu, minister in charge of State Ethnic Affairs Commission
notes the revisions promote legal construction in the autonomous regions and help
to foster an "equal, united, and mutually beneficial relationship among all of
China's fifty-six nationalities. 20 6 The revisions to the LRNA are appropriately
viewed as an integral component of the Go West campaign.
Recent Revisions to the LRNA
CCP pronouncements accompanying the recent amendments to the Law on
Regional National Autonomy demonstrate that the Go West project and the LRNA
are inextricably intertwined.20 7 Xinhua notes that amendments to the law were
"grounded in the need to build a socialist market economy and implement the
grand development of western China.,20 8 Another report indicates that the newly
amended law "will play an even more important role in promoting the
development of minority areas and preserving the nation's unification.,, 20 9 The
changes to the LRNA, prompted by Go West's political and economic agendas, are
designed to help the central government realize its political objectives in Xinjiang.
The revised law, which includes seventy-four articles, instead of the original
sixty-seven, changes the definition of regional autonomy in the Preamble from "an
important political system of the state" to "a basic policy system of the state. 210
This semantic shift is intended to demonstrate the CCP's redoubled commitment to
minority ethnicities and the system of regional autonomy.21 In fact, the revisions
203. Jiang Zemin Signs Order Announcing Revision of Minority Self-rule Law, BBC Monitoring
Service, Mar. 1, 2001,from XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 28, 2001, available in LEXIS, News Group
File [hereinafter JiangSigns Order].
204. See id.
205. China: New Law Tries to Narrow Regional Divides, BUS. DAILY UPDATE, Apr. 4, 2001,
available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Apr/ II192.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2003).
206. China to Amend Law on Regional Autonomy for Minorities, BBC Monitoring Service, Jan. 10,
2000,from XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 7, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
207. See, e.g., China's Li Peng Addresses Forum on Regional National Autonomy Law, BBC
Monitoring Service, Dec. 7, 2001,from XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 6, 2001, available in LEXIS,
News Group File.
208. Id.
209. NPC Deputies and CPPCC Members Hail Regional National Autonomy System as Success,
FIBIS Mar. 16,2001 ,from XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Mar. 11,2001.
210. THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE AUTONOMY OF MINORITY
NATIONALITY REGIONS 2001, Preamble, FIBIS translation [hereinafter LRNA (2001)].
211. See generally, Jiang Signs Order,supranote 203.
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are a step towards greater integration of minority areas into the Chinese fold.
Several of the few revisions that actually have a substantive bite recentralize
decision-making powers, rather than expanding the autonomy regime.212 The
changes focus primarily on financial incentives and preferential policies designed
to "accelerate the economic and social development of ethnic minorities and
promote national solidarity. ''213 Although the revised law is replete with Go West
rhetoric, it is short on substance. Some of the amendments are merely statements
of intent and carry little practical force. Article 69, in an expression of idealism
and magnanimity, provides that "state and higher level people's governments
should.., help impoverished populations shake off poverty as soon as possible
and realize a moderately high standard of living." 214 The LRNA, however, does
nothing to actualize such aspirations.
The exploitation of natural resources is an integral aspect of Go West in
Xinjiang. 2 15 While the revised LRNA takes the important step of addressing
compensation for resource exploitation, the law quietly shifts control of resources
and agricultural products to the central government. Article 65 maintains the state
will provide "certain compensations to the national autonomous areas exporting
natural resources. 216 This provision suggests the state acknowledges autonomous
areas should be compensated for the exploitation of their natural resources-a right
previously not recognized.217 The Chinese Constitution states: "In developing
natural resources [which, according to Article 9, are owned by the state] and
building enterprises in the national autonomous areas, the state shall give due
This marks a potentially
consideration to the interests of those areas." 2t 8
significant change, as it affords the autonomous areas in the west the opportunity
to capitalize on resources taken from them to fuel the east. Notwithstanding the
recognition of rights to compensation, the revised law takes steps to shift control of
those resources from the autonomous areas to the central government.
One of the more significant changes to the LRNA is not an added provision,
but rather an article that the new law does not include. The old version of the
LRNA included a provision granting autonomous areas the right to independently
arrange for the "use of industrial, agricultural, and other local and special products
after fulfilling the quotas for state purchase.,, 21 9 This right disappears in the
revised law. 220 The new version of the LRNA subtly shifts the right to control
resources and industrial and agricultural products from the autonomous regions to
the central government. Article 65 provides: "While exploiting resources and
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See, e.g., LRNA (2001) arts. 56, 57, 60, 65, 66, 69, 71.
Jiang Signs Order,supra note 203.
LRNA (2001) art. 69.
See supra pages 113-115.
LRNA (2001), art. 65.

217. NATIONAL AUTONOMY LAW REVISED TO SUPPORT WESTERN DEVELOPMENT POLICY, TIBET

INFORMATION NETWORK, Mar. 13, 2001, at http://www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/nul303O
visited Feb. 11, 2003) [hereinafter LAW REVISED].
218. P.R.C. CONST. art. 118.
219. LRNA (1984) art. 31.
220. See LRNA (2001).
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carrying out construction in national autonomous areas the state should take the
interests of national autonomous areas into consideration.,221 The LRNA makes
very clear that the state will play an integral role in resource exploitation and
agricultural production. Xinhua inadvertently highlights the inherent irony in
official rhetoric accompanying the law: "Economically, the Regional National
Autonomy Law is imbued with the spirit of self-reliance for national autonomous
areas, with sharp state support and active aid by economically developed
regions.,222 Under the revised LRNA, "self-reliance" means greater state
involvement and increased dependence on other regions.
Other Go West inspired changes to the LRNA are merely statements of
existing policy-allowing the CCP to wave the banner of progress and generosity
without loosening the reigns of political control. Article 62 stipulates that
autonomous areas are entitled to special treatment from fiscal authorities at higher
levels.223 This "special treatment" is intended to "increase funds for national
autonomous areas to be used in expediting the economic development and social
progress of national autonomous areas and gradually narrowing the gaps with
developed areas. '2 4 This provision, however, does not signify anything new for
Xinjiang. Since 1992, the XUAR has benefited more than any other province from
preferential fiscal transfer policies.225
Interestingly, the revisions also indicate some of the difficulties facing Go
West. Article 65 stipulates that the state will "guid[e] and encourage enterprises in
economically developed areas to act according to the principle of mutual benefit
and reciprocity to make investment in national autonomous areas and conduct
economic cooperation of diversified forms. ' 22 6 This provision exposes the reality
that capital will not flow west naturally. Moreover, the subsidies necessary to fund
Go West are taken from the prosperous east, and may become a source of
resentment. One troubling possibility is that "[tihe growing numbers of unhappy
people in the west will.., be joined by growing numbers of people in the east who
227
are unhappy at the increasing cost to them of financing the Great Leap West.,
CCP leaders may unwittingly promote the very beast they hope to eradicateincreased regionalism and national division.
Revisions to the LRNA do, however, offer a kernel of hope for Xinjiang's
large and decrepit state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Article 61 provides that the
state "formulates preferential policies, supports autonomous areas to develop
foreign economic and trade activities, expands the decision-making right of
production enterprises in national autonomous areas in conducting foreign trade,
encourages and develops the export of local superior products, and implements

221. LRNA (2001) art. 65 (emphasis added).
222. China's Li Peng,supra note 207 (emphasis added).
223. LRNA (2001) art. 62.
224. Id.
225. Becquelin, supra note 38, at 71.
226. LRNA (2001), art. 65.
227. David Wall, A Grim Futurefor China's Hinterlands,JAPAN TIMES, May 17, 2000, available
at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo20000517al.htm(last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
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preferential border trade policy., 228 Depending on their implementation, several
aspects of this amendment have the potential to dramatically affect Xinjiang.
Four-fifths of the XUAR's industrial assets remain in state hands, and this remains
one of the most serious impediments to Xinjiang's development.229 China's SOEs
are lumbering and inefficient and do not facilitate growth. 23 0 According to the
government's National Statistics Bureau, somewhere between half and two-thirds
of all SOEs are in the red, and keeping them afloat requires enormous state
subsidies.23' If Article 61 translates into greater autonomy for Xinjiang's large
state sector, when combined with the prospect of favorable border trade policies,
there is hope yet that Xinjiang will fulfill its potential as a "regional
powerhouse. 232
The revised LRNA offers no clear prescription for accomplishing its
expressed commitment to autonomous areas-none of the changes expand, or even
address autonomy. Arguably, all the amendments are policies designed to
recentralize decision-making powers. The amendments elucidate responsibilities
or commitments of the central government to the autonomous areas, without
offering the autonomous areas any expansion of power. Thus, the recent revisions
to the LRNA seem to suggest greater state involvement in the affairs of
autonomous areas2S3 -a trend incongruous with the concept of autonomy itself.
Other legal changes designed to buttress the Go West project also help
recentralize decision-making powers. In an effort to encourage foreign investment
in the west, the central government has granted a number of tax incentives to
foreign investment enterprises (FIEs). The incentives, which include a reduced
income tax rate and import tax breaks on technological equipment, only apply to
investment in projects and categories approved by the State Council.234
The recent revisions to the LRNA and the new tax laws are consistent with
the two-pronged strategy of loudly granting Xinjang preferential economic
policies, while quietly recentralizing fiscal and decision-making powers. 235
Almost all of the revisions take the form of state commitments to the autonomous
areas, thereby fostering greater integration of Xinjiang. 236 Beijing has taken care
to tie Xinjiang's economic development to other Chinese provinces, while also

228. LRNA (2001) art. 61.
229. Li, Bountiful Region, supra note 16. This is a stark contrast to prosperous Guangdong
province, where private businesses account for two-thirds of economic output. Id
230. See MARIA HSIA CHANG, THE LABORS OF SISYPHUS: THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF
COMMUNIST CHINA 104 (1998).
231. See id. at 103-08 (1998).
232. Becquelin, supra note 38, at 66-67. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China
announced a wish to open Xinjiang up to the world. Economic zones, expanded border trade, and
heavy investment into infrastructure and capital construction would cast Xinjiang as a regional
powerhouse. Id
233. LAw REVISED, supra note 217.
234. New Tax Incentive for FIEs in Central and Western China, China Legal Change, Jan. 15,
2000, at http://www.chinalegalchange.conz/2OOO-Ol/Olnewtax.htm(last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
235. Becquelin, supra note 38, at 71-72.
236. See e.g., LRNA (2001) arts. 56, 57, 60, 65, 66, 69, 71.
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ensuring that large sectors of Xinjiang's economy remain under the control of the
central government. 237 The amendments to the LRNA fit nicely into this strategy
and in spite of the CCP's expressed commitment to regional autonomy, Go West
translates into a contraction of the autonomy regime.
VII. THE ECONOMICS OF GO WEST:

EMPTY PROMISES?

Some of China's most influential economists question the ability of Go West
to bring prosperity to Xinjiang.23 s Hu Angang, head of the National Situation
Research Center at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, points out numerous
stumbling blocks for Go West:
First, the policies of the 9th Five Year Plan cannot effectively curb the widening of
regional disparities, which will continue to increase in the next five years.
Second, global economic restructuring weakens the comparative advantages of the
western regions in agriculture, energy, raw materials, and so on. Third, the
formation of a pattern in which supply exceeds demand on the domestic market
has weakened the west's relative advantages in resource exploitation. Fourth,
after China joins the WTO, the opportunities will outweigh
the challenges in the
239
eastern regions, but the opposite will apply in the west.
As Hu notes, in the short term, Go West is likely to disappoint. Even if Go
West does meet its economic objectives in the long-term, Beijing's political hopes
for the project are also suspect.
The underlying theory of the Go West strategy is that prosperity fosters
greater minority acquiescence and assists integration into the Han framework.24 °
In fact, there is reason to believe that economic prosperity may cut the other way.
Gladney points out that "[o]ne of the unexpected consequences of economic
reforms in China has been ethnic revitalization. 241 Reforms designed to bring
prosperity to minorities, and thereby encourage integration into the Han
mainstream, instead fostered an ethnic resurgence.242 A former director of the
CCP United Front Work Department also acknowledged this phenomenon:
The imbalance between the economic and cultural development of
different areas and different races is widening. On the one hand, the
Han and minority peoples are getting closer in terms of economic and
cultural connections, and on the other the consciousness of minorities,
their sense of pride, nationalism and self-respect is getting stronger and
43
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differences, 244 while the state's promotion of Han-centered "racial" nationalism
has effectively alienated minority people.245 Thus, even if the Go West program
fulfills its economic objectives, the plan may stimulate the very forces of
disintegration it was designed to counteract.
IX. CONCLUSION

Viewed within the context of China's evolving minority policy, Go West
looks more like the latest incarnation of Beijing's strategy to integrate and
assimilate ethnic minorities into the fabric of greater China, than it does a serious
economic development and poverty alleviation plan. The economic policy is a
vehicle for Beijing's political agenda in the region, and thus comparisons to the
Trojan Horse are not entirely inappropriate. However, if the political benefits (i.e.,
national unity, social stability, border security) of Go West are to accrue, the CCP
must accompany the policy of integration and assimilation with expanded
autonomy and increased decision-making powers for Xinjiang. Some scholars
have pointed out that the goal of Uighur separatists "is true autonomy, the kind
promised in the 1950s by the People's Republic of China but never really
delivered. 246
The current system of autonomy, created in the mid- 1980s and premised on a
planned economy is dominated by central power and guided by central decisionmaking. 247 China's economic success stories suggest that those jurisdictions
granted the greatest political and economic latitude-the SEZs-have also
received a tremendous developmental advantage.248 If Go West's political agenda
is to have any chance of success in Xinjiang, the central government must expand
the XUAR's powers of autonomy-specifically granting Xinjiang greater political
and economic latitude. Ultimately, the Go West program and the promise of
prosperity will not be enough to assuage separatist agitators. Furthermore, given
the program's design, Go West makes little economic sense. Go West does little to
alleviate poverty and fails to adequately address the role of the state in the
economy-one of the primary reasons for Xinjiang's economic backwardness.249
Even if the promised economic benefits do come to fruition, increased prosperity
may have the undesired effect of pushing the "New Frontier" further from Beijing.
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WTO and the Environment
REVIEW BY DON C. SMITH*
FIONA MACMILLAN, WTO AND THE ENVIRONMENT; Sweet &
Maxwell, London (2001); (L146); ISBN: 0-4218-2420-4; 368 pp.
(hardcover).
One of the most vexing contemporary economic, legal, and political issues is
the interrelationship between and underlying tension involving trade policy and
environmental policy. Indeed, there has never been a time when trade and the
environment have been so inextricably interwoven. This has come about largely
because of the environmental ramifications relating to where goods are produced
and sold. Moreover, despite the poor showing of the world economy in the last
several years, it has been estimated that trade (measured in terms of value) in
merchandise exports amounted to $6,240 billion in 2002 while trade related to
commercial services reached a new record of $1,540 billion.,
The importance of encouraging cross-border trade has long been an important
element in world economic development. However, it was not until the creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) 2 in 1995 that trade was "elevated to its true
level in the international economic pantheon." 3 The objective of the WTO is to
encourage, and oversee, the liberalization of trade between nation state members.4
In the context of the WTO, nation state members agree to the avoidance of
discriminatory trade practices. 5
It is in this context that Fiona Macmillan undertakes consideration of the
trade-environment issue through the prism of the WTO by looking at the protection
of the environment on one hand and the liberalization of trade on the other. In so
doing, the book aims to assess the way in which the WTO's legal rules and system
interact with environmental concerns.
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law, and Editor-in-Chief, Corporate
Environmental Strategy: International Journal of Corporate Responsibility; LL.M. University of
Leicester (England); J.D. Washburn University School of Law; B.S. University of Kansas.
1. Press Release, World Trade Organization, Trade Recovered in 2002, but uncertainty continues,
(April 22, 2003), http://www.wto.org/english/news__e/pres03_e/pr337 e.htm.
2. WTO legal texts can be found at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/legal e.htm.
3. Hugo Paeman, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZTION IN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 490
(Dinan & Desmond eds., 2000).
4. Daniel Esty, Economic Integration and the Environment, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:
INSTITUTIONS, LAW, AND POLICY 192 (Vig, Norman & Axelrod, Regina, eds.,1990).
5. Ian & Pamela Barnes, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 153 (1999).
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In terms of organization, Ms. Macmillan follows a logical and inclusive
approach. Chapter 1 addresses general issues about trade and the environment.
Chapter 2 considers the WTO system including rule making and conflicts between
WTO agreements and multilateral environmental agreements. In Chapter 3 the
institutional landscape of environmental policy is described and assessed. Chapter
4 provides a look at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its
relationship to environmental protection.
Access to genetic resources and
biotechnology and trade are the focus of Chapters 5 and 6. Trade in environmental
services is analyzed in Chapter 7 while Chapter 8 reviews the difficulty associated
with the regulation of multinational enterprises in the context of the environment.
Chapter 9 provides a glimpse of the future. Finally, the book contains the full text
of a number of key documents including the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
In large measure, WTO and the Environment provides a thoughtful, if not
always in depth, view of the issues involved in the environment-trade debate. This
will be particularly useful to those who are not generally familiar with the issues at
hand. By considering the central issues in terms of topics (e.g., the WTO system,
biotechnology and trade, and trade in environmental services), the reader is
provided a clear frame of reference in which to contemplate the oftentimes
seemingly intractable tensions. For example, Chapter 7 presents a clear and
succinct discussion about trade in environmental services including defining
"environmental services," explaining why they are a WTO concern, and factors
that restrict trade in environmental services.
On the other hand, however, it is unfortunate that a number of critical issues
do not receive the attention they deserve. In this regard, the book generally does
not really consider the role of trade sanctions in the context of achieving
environmental goals. In addition, more analysis could have been undertaken in the
matter of how the developed and developing countries view the underlying issues,
and assessing the reason for the differences. This is a key to the overall debate
since in many instances economic and even cultural differences play a role in how
the two sets of countries view environmental protection and trade. Another topic
that could have been expanded involves the relationship between multilateral
environmental agreements and the WTO. While the book identifies this as a
potential area of conflict, the discussion is brief and to some extent perfunctory. A
final area that received scant attention, but could have been useful to a first time
reader, would be consideration of how the world's two biggest trading powers, the
European Union and the United States, view the integration of environmental
protection into trade policies. In this regard, the E.U. recently tabled in the WTO a
detailed list of sectors "where it is offering companies and individuals in third
countries further opportunities to offer services in the E.U. market.",6 One of the
types of services are those in the environmental area. This is not an insignificant
6. Press Release, European Commission, EU proposes to improve trading opportunities giving
developing countries a better deal, (April 29, 2003), http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/
cgi/guesten.ksh?paction.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/03/582[0RAPID&lg=EN&display=.
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proposal in its own right since currently two out of every three jobs in the E.U. are
in the service sector. Moreover, the E.U. has advocated adopting a framework of
trade policy rules that would encourage the integration of sustainable development
into all areas of national policy-making. 7 The contrast of the E.U. with the current
U.S. position, which has shown little interest in sustainable development generally,
would be useful in illustrating the differences between the two economic
superpowers and explaining how these differences might influence future WTO
actions involving the environment.
In the final chapter, Ms. Macmillan sets out the case for the establishment of a
World Environment Organization. While this is not the first time such an
organization has been contemplated,8 Ms. Macmillan does pull together an
interesting list of features that should be a part of the new organization. Having
described what a World Environment Organization might look like, however, the
author admits that despite the growing consideration of such an organization,
[G]reening the WTO is a more urgent priority." 9
Bearing in mind the considerable range of issues that could be discussed in a
book about the WTO and environment as well as the plethora of information that is
available about nearly any WTO-related issue, WTO and the Environment is a
work well worth having as a reference source for those who seek to understand the
sometimes odd, but in nearly all cases complex, tapestry of the WTO.
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